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2Abstract
I examine representational theories of phenomenal consciousness. I first argue that none 
of the common objections to representationalism threaten qualia’s reducibility to 
intentional contents. Instead, far more insight into this reductive strategy is to be gained if 
we attempt to capture, in representational terms, the difference between qualitative and 
non-qualitative perceptions. The challenge, when presented for first-order 
representationalism, calls for a formulation of a higher-order condition. However, if 
Sellars is right about the nature of our introspective conceptions regarding experiences, 
the relevant higher-order thoughts do not contain concepts which distinctively apply to 
qualitative, as opposed to non-qualitative perceptions. As a consequence, a 
representationalist position which does make mention of an epistemologically sound 
higher-order condition collapses into a view on which qualia are intrinsic properties of 
experiences, and hence are irreducible to intentional contents. In view of this challenge, I 
put forward an alternative representationalist proposal and explain how it avoids this 
consequence. The proposal is that qualia are global meta-representational contents.
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5Introduction
“Intentionality can’t be reduced and it won’t go away”. These words sum up the 
manner in which Putnam distances himself in his book Representation and Reality from 
his earlier functionalist view of intentionality. Intentionality (of thoughts, beliefs, etc., as 
distinct from non-conceptual intentionality) is normative. The question of reducibility 
does not arise for normative facts – the fact that in Europe we become adults for legal 
purposes at the age of 18 is not to be explained in naturalistic terms. But this is not a 
concession to dualism, it is merely recognition of where epistemic intentionality belongs 
– in what Sellars calls ‘the logical Space of Reasons’. Pursuing a reductive explanation of 
epistemic intentionality in terms of a functionalist/computationalist model is therefore 
misguided. On the other hand, many feel that there must be a reductive explanation of 
non-conceptual intentionality – sensory perception is part of our basic phylogenetic 
equipment, lacks a normative dimension, and belongs in the what McDowell calls ‘the 
logical Space of Nature’ to contrast perception with the logical Space of Reasons. If non-
conceptual intentionality can (or indeed must) be reduced on these grounds, then the 
suggestion that we may find immediately appealing, as I certainly do, is that qualia could 
perhaps be reduced together with it. 
Representationalism about qualia offers a simple and original answer to the question 
as to how it is possible that we ‘see’ phenomenal colours even though nothing in the 
physical world including ourselves is coloured in this sense, without being dualistic or 
eliminativist. Seeing a phone booth across the street in, say, a three-dimensional virtual 
reality image by no means implies that there is an immaterial phone booth at the location 
where it appears to be in the image, rather, the phone booth is its topic-neutral intentional 
object. Similarly, the phenomenal colour of a phone booth I see in normal circumstances
is not something immaterial which must exist either at the location where I see the phone 
booth or ‘inside’ me – it is the representational content of my experience that is neither 
material nor immaterial. Unlike eliminativism, treating qualia as contents is not an 
overreaction to dualism. Representationalism explains away rather than ignores so-called 
qualia intuitions on the basis of which it is argued that qualia are intrinsic and non-
6relational properties of experiences. It is not surprising then that representationalism has 
drawn much endorsement and is nowadays a dominant position.
The work is divided into three sizeable chapters. In the opening chapter I defend 
externalist representationalism against objections raised on the grounds that sensory 
content isn’t wide (and hence neither are qualia), or that wide contents and qualia come 
apart in certain counterfactual circumstances. The aim of the discussion is, firstly, to 
clarify the notion of qualitative content and locate it within the general functionalist 
approach of which externalist representationalism is a branch, and, secondly, to show 
how we can gradually progress from the view that qualia are intrinsic properties of 
experiences to the view that qualia are wide contents. This gradual progress towards 
representationalism has two main stages marked by these claims:
(1) Intentional content of experience is narrow and so are qualia.
(2) Intentional content of experience is wide, but qualia are narrow,
a rejection of which leads to externalist representationalism:
(3) Intentional contents are wide and qualia are intentional contents.
In fact I begin Chapter One, for reasons I will explain below, by rehearsing Lycan’s 
counterfactual analysis designed to dissolve phenomenal individuals (such as sense-data). 
(3) is established at the end of the chapter because none of the common objections 
(falling under (1) and (2)) to representationalism are effective.
In the core part of my work (Chapter Two) I present a challenge for 
representationalism from an altogether different perspective. The challenge develops 
from the following initial difficulty: Consider the opposite ends of the evolutionary 
spectrum regarding photosensitivity. At one end there are simple organisms with 
photosensitive tissues which have not evolved visual organs. At the other end we have, 
for example, humans and higher animals with far more sophisticated photosensitivity 
involving visual organs and, crucially, phenomenal consciousness. It is what lies in the 
middle of the spectrum that is the root of the initial difficulty. We may reasonably 
7suppose that there are organisms with visual organs that do not produce phenomenally 
conscious states, which organisms I call ‘unconscious perceivers’, for it is unlikely that 
there was a sudden evolutionary leap from simple photosensitive tissues to phenomenal 
consciousness – in fact any claim to the contrary would be quite incredible. If so, the 
representationalist owes us an explanation of why such organisms meet his conditions for 
attribution of wide sensory contents, since they show sufficient behavioural sensitivity to 
external stimulation, and yet don’t experience anything. Here I follow Carruthers’ 
diagnosis of this situation (although he chooses blindsight as a case of perceiving without 
experiencing): what these organisms share with us is worldly subjectivity, i.e. an ability 
to take a subjective perspective towards worldly objects, but lack experiential 
subjectivity, which is an ability to take a subjective perspective towards their own 
experiences. It follows from this that the ‘locus’ of phenomenal consciousness is a 
higher-order introspective state and that we must amend our representationalist 
characterisation of qualia so as to include a formulation of a higher-order condition to the 
effect that qualia are those wide contents which are (at least) available (or poised) to be 
picked out by a higher-order introspective state. So if at the end of Chapter One we 
arrived at the claim that
(i) Qualia are not intrinsic properties of perceptual states, and if so, they must be wide 
contents,
we now have a claim that
(ii) The thesis that qualia are wide contents can be plausibly held only as a claim of 
higher- rather than first-order intentionalism.
Bearing in mind the diagnosis of the initial difficulty for first-order 
representationalism, the difference between unconscious perceivers (or blindsighters) and 
us is now to be found at the level of introspective states. In other words, the move to 
higher-order representationalism is a step forward only if introspection directed at 
qualitative states features concepts which unconscious perceivers do not acquire due to 
8not being able to satisfy their possession conditions, otherwise higher-order 
representationalism cannot be thought to overcome that initial difficulty. The concepts we 
are after are known as phenomenal concepts, i.e. concepts which distinctively apply to 
phenomenal properties. Further, the concepts in question mustn’t presuppose a pre-
existing conceptual material supplied by public language if we don’t want our higher-
order position to have undesirable implications for phenomenal consciousness in very 
small children. One kind of concepts with the required characteristics are purely 
recognitional concepts. A purely recognitional concept is acquired on the basis of a brute 
acquaintance with a phenomenal property of certain type, its intension reduces to the 
causal/nomic relation to a phenomenal property. 
It is at this point that I engage Sellars’ reconstruction of our introspective conceptions 
in the discussion. He would clearly deny the existence of concepts which we come to 
possess in the above manner (i.e. by means of brute acquaintance) as epistemological 
fiction. The remainder of my work can be seen as an examination of what becomes of 
representationalism when it is ‘filtered through’ Sellars’ thought regarding introspective 
awareness and subjectivity. I will argue In Chapter Three, where I make my alternative 
representationalist proposal, that representationalism is uniquely positioned to address his 
latter concerns to do with identifying a single and unified subject of experience. For it is
open to us to replace the notion of a unified subject of experience as it is traditionally 
understood with the notion of a global meta-representation. But the problem for 
representationalism – and this is the central problem of my work – that arises from the 
fact that phenomenal concepts (including purely recognitional concepts) are 
epistemologically dubious for largely Sellarsian reasons which I’m about to explain calls 
for a major revision of the standard representationalist accounts. I undertake that revision 
in Chapter Three.
Ordinary colour terms refer to properties of external objects. It is a trivial point that 
these are not sensitive to spectrum inversions. Grass may appear to me the way roses 
appear to someone with an inverted spectrum, even though we both apply the same 
ordinary colour term ‘green’ to grass and ‘red’ to roses. On the other hand, a purely 
recognitional phenomenal concept rigidly designates a (phenomenal) property of my 
experience and has no natural expression in public language. Postulating concepts which 
9are acquired in an act of ‘brute’ recognition independently of any prior conceptualisation 
would be regarded by Sellars as an illegitimate attempt to prise something epistemic out 
of the logical Space of Reasons. So none of my concepts referring to properties of my 
experiences are supplied ‘privately’ from within, so to speak, they must be supplied by 
public-language. Consequently, my ability to focus on a property of my experience
requires that I have a common-sense theory of mind, in other words, that I have a certain 
understanding of inner episodes, which understanding is formed in the course of learning 
a public language. This understanding is essentially intersubjective – inner experiential 
episodes are conceptualised as theoretical postulates (reported inferentially) which later 
become observable in the sense that they are non-inferentially reportable. In view of this 
rejection of phenomenal concepts, the third claim I add to (i) and (ii) goes as follows:
(iii) To have a higher-order thought about one’s own perceptual state is to token an 
internalised public-language sentence whose meaning is holistic and normative.
It was an insight of Stephen Leeds’ Qualia, Awareness, Sellars that blindsighters are not 
in principle precluded from developing the sort of common-sense theory of mind in 
which, according to Sellars, our introspective conceptions originate. They can be trained 
to non-inferentially report perceptual states with respect to the blind portion of their 
visual field in the way normally sighted people do according to Sellars. Remember that 
the move to higher-order representationalism was prompted by the failure to find a 
sufficient difference between us and unconscious perceivers at the level of first-order 
representation. The difficulty returns with an equal force at the level of higher-order 
representations. Internalised public-language sentences also fail to provide the required 
difference.
The first claim of my argument (claim (i)) was that qualia are extrinsic properties of 
experiences and if so, they must be wide contents. But now it seems that we cannot 
distinguish sighted creatures from unconscious perceivers in terms of wide contents even 
if we add the aforementioned higher-order condition, namely, that qualia are those wide 
contents that are available to be picked out by higher-order meta-representations. The 
immediate consequence of this is that qualia are, after all, intrinsic – our states have them, 
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whereas the states of creatures who perceive without experiencing don’t. Hence the 
following claim:   
(iv) Since higher-order perceptual thoughts are internalised public-language sentences, 
qualia are intrinsic properties of experiences.
Accepting that qualia are intrinsic is a substantial concession to dualism. Claim (iv) 
clearly contradicts claim (i) where qualia are said to be extrinsic, which brings us to the 
central problem in my work: I said at the very beginning that the question of reducibility 
does not arise for epistemic intentionality precisely because it belong in the logical Space 
of Reasons and that, on the other hand, we should rightly expect phenomenal
consciousness to be reducible because it belongs in the logical Space of Nature. 
However, if we build epistemic intentionality (i.e. the intentionality of introspective states 
understood as internalised public-language sentences) into the architecture of 
phenomenal consciousness as we did above, and the resulting representationalist position 
collapses into a view that qualia are intrinsic, a naturalistic explanation of phenomenal 
consciousness in representationalist (or indeed any other) terms will prove elusive.
Chapter Three is an attempt to put forward an alternative higher-order 
representationalist view which escapes that consequence. Firstly, I suggest that we think 
of the relevant higher-order states as non-epistemic in order not to rely on phenomenal 
concepts to provide the difference between us and blindsighters. It may be objected that 
this move could have been made earlier and that I should not have restricted my 
discussion of higher-order states to thoughts, so the central problem would not have 
arisen. There are of course Inner Sense theories of introspection, but on the Sellarsian 
approach I adopt introspection presupposes a common-sense theory of mind developed in 
the way briefly described above. Introspection is therefore a conceptual capacity and 
Sellars would, again, dismiss Inner Sense theories of introspection as an attempt to force 
something epistemic outside the logical Space of Reasons. Bearing these points in mind, 
my suggestion is not only that the higher-order states are non-epistemic, but also that they 
are not introspective. Introspection is an independent capacity acquired later in life, while 
non-epistemic meta-representations that are built into the higher-order structure of 
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phenomenal consciousness continuously target lower-order contents and are available 
from birth. Another notable advantage of this is that we need not deny phenomenal 
consciousness to pre-linguistic children. Such a commitment to non-epistemic meta-
representations also involves shifting qualia to higher-order level in that higher-order 
contents are qualitative but lower-order contents are not. Suppose, for illustration, that I 
am now in a situation where there is a non-qualitative non-epistemic meta-representation 
aimed at a lower-order quale. Since my awareness of the lower-order quale is facilitated 
by the meta-representation, whose content has no phenomenal character, I would not 
experience anything in these circumstances. 
As I present the central argument in Chapter Two, another important problem 
regarding phenomenal consciousness comes into focus, one which representationalism  
can deal with in its own specific way. To address the problem, I suggest that it is in fact 
not a multitude of individual meta-representations that target lower-order states, rather, 
there is a single global meta-representation which is continuously directed at all lower-
order perceptual and as well as proprioceptive contents. Sellars does acknowledge the 
problem near the end of his essay Phenomenalism where he says that sense impressions 
are attributable to a single and unified self (or subject), although there is no such self to 
be found. We are made up of micro-physical parts none of which serve as subjects to 
which sense impressions are attributable. A (non-representationalist) functionalist model 
will not solve the difficulty either, for it consists of a number of interacting functionally 
described components (modules, sub-routines, etc.), each of which is a sub-personal part
and, again, cannot serve a subject to which sense impressions are attributable. It is partly 
for this reason that he turns, as he puts it, each sensing into a logical subject in its own 
right and introduces sensa (or phantasms) as the Scientific Image replacement for sense 
impressions, whose home framework is the Manifest Image. I argue that the move to 
sensa can be avoided by introducing the idea of a global (qualitative) meta-
representational content; the meta-representation itself is sub-personal, as it is 
presumably a brain state, but its content, due to its global scope, is a personal level one. 
Global meta-representational content is introduced as a replacement for a single and 
unified subject as it is traditionally understood. Finally, the existence of a global meta-
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representation is certainly consistent with the fact that we are made up of micro-physical 
parts, since at least those in our brains can be thought of as realising the global state. 
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1. Towards the Representational Thesis
Sensory experience is analysed into these three components: it has an intentional content, 
a functional role and a qualitative aspect. The intentional content of an experience 
expresses what the experience is about, or the properties of what object we are aware of 
in our undergoing a certain experience. Attributing intentional content to experiences
carries the assumption that experiences have certain representational properties. The 
experience’s functional role, on the other hand, relates the experience to its sensory input, 
other mental states and motor outputs (or more generally, behavioural outputs). 
The qualitative aspect, or qualia, is the only component of experience that is purported 
to be non-relational or intrinsic to the experience and can therefore be reduced to neither 
the intentional content of the experience nor its functional role. The term ‘qualia’ is used
here in its more rigid sense, meaning that if one talks of experience in relational terms he 
necessarily leaves out qualia. In the looser sense the term ‘quale’ is interchangeable with 
‘what-it’s-likeness’ or ‘raw feel’, without further commenting on whether this is 
relational or not. If some authors maintain that there exist no such things as qualia, it only 
amounts to rejecting that there are qualia as defined in the former way, and not to 
claiming that there is nothing it is like for us to undergo an experience. For illustration
purposes I will use the term in its strict sense for a moment and I will notify the reader of
changes made afterwards. In this rather highly theoretical sense of the word then, it is by 
no means obvious how a correlate of it is to be traced in ordinary language or common-
sense psychology. In perceiving, our qualitative property ascriptions seem to regard 
external objects (it is hardly common practice among us as ordinary folk to describe our
perceptual states as being pink or triangular), although it may be pointed out that in 
certain non-standard conditions the converse is demonstrated by thoughts such as “this
looks to be blue, although it is in fact purple”, when we allegedly direct our attention at 
certain features of the experience itself - by having such a thought I come to distinguish 
between the property of the perceived object on the one hand, and what my experience 
presents the object as on the other and thus, some would urge, the (qualitative) properties
of my experience. Undeniably, such scenarios do occasionally induce in us higher-order
(or introspective) beliefs about our own perceptual states. At the same time, though, 
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common-sense psychology provides no further clues as to whether “I have a pink and 
triangular experience” does not simply stand for “I’m in a state that presents me with a 
pink and triangular object”. Ordinary language does little to reinstate qualia.
One pre-theoretic temptation to insist that higher-order beliefs of the above variety are 
about the properties of experiences rather than their intentional objects rests on likening
perceptual states to pictures. To see how embracing this pre-theoretic association with 
pictures uncritically leads one to believe in qualia, consider this illustration: Suppose that 
a cinema screen depicting an oncoming train is an analogue of a visual experience of an 
oncoming train. Now imagine that one person in the audience doesn’t understand how 
screens generally work, he hasn’t seen one before and no one has explained to him that 
what he is in fact viewing is a two-dimensional projection of light rays of various colours 
of the spectrum on to a piece of canvas. He thus believes he is in danger of being run over 
by an actual train. Another person, by some strange misfortune, is unable to interpret 
what he is viewing as a depiction of a moving object, but in all other respects he is just 
like us. He is also aware that he has a flat piece of canvas in front of him. To complete 
the story, the rest of the audience suffers no such impairments and understands perfectly 
well that there is a depiction of an approaching object in front of them. If we now apply 
the above definition of the distinction between intentional contents and qualia, it follows 
that in this example the person who is sincerely frightened by what he sees is aware 
merely of the representational content of the moving picture due to his failure to 
appreciate the intrinsic features of the picture, which is in turn an inability to comprehend 
that the representational content (of the picture) he is aware of is in this case given by the 
spatial relations obtaining among two-dimensional areas of different colours and shapes
on a flat surface presented to him.1 The situation in which the other person finds himself 
is quite the opposite. He is unaware of the representational content (as all he sees is a 
rapidly expanding patch of colour, without the third dimension), but is well aware of the 
intrinsic features of the picture. If we strain the terminology a little, we may conclude that 
1 Michael Tye argues (1992) that pictures are not analogous to visual experiences in that it is disputable 
whether experiences have their contents determined by their qualitative aspects. Indeed, in this article he 
rejects that there are qualia in this sense. But more on this further below. The purpose of my present 
example is to bring out how some philosophers make sense of the idea that qualia are intrinsic to 
experiences. 
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the first person is not aware of the ‘quale’ of the picture, whereas the second one is (the 
rest of the audience will be capable of shifting focus from one to the other).2
The case of the person who is only aware of the intrinsic features of the picture 
models the aforementioned pre-theoretic conception of how introspective (higher-order) 
beliefs about our perceptual states can uncover their intrinsic qualitative features. If the 
model goes unquestioned, it is easy to see why many are adamant that the notions of 
intentional content and functional role on the one hand, and the notion of qualitative 
aspect on the other must be strictly kept apart. For the model will simultaneously be used 
to articulate our awareness of the intentional content of our experiences (this, in the 
example, is the case of the person who was sincerely frightened of what the screen 
confronted him with) – such awareness will be mediated by an analogue of a picture with 
non-relational qualitative features. Qualia, it would be concluded, can’t be reduced to 
intentional contents – qualia explain how they arise (they are their source – just as in the 
example the rapidly expanding patch explained how one could see an approaching train),
and therefore precede intentional contents in order of explanation. In other words, 
something along these lines may lie at the bottom of the widespread reluctance to define 
qualia in the looser sense. From now on I will use the term ‘quale’ in its looser sense, 
which is merely for the sake of convenience as it will spare me making verbal points 
almost each time the term is used. ‘Quale’ will not be suggestive of whether mental 
qualities are intrinsic or relational in nature. The following considerations will be those of 
the status of qualia rather than of their existence (see footnote 1). 
The fully developed philosophical positions that are compatible with and lend 
theoretical support to the preconception just discussed take on a variety of forms. Their 
unifying feature is, in accordance with the preconception, the way they view the relation 
between intentional content and qualia, namely that the latter determine the former. In 
this chapter I set myself the task of proceeding towards a reversal of this determination 
relation and thereby arriving at the representational thesis (as formulated in (3) below).
Although pursuing the task will inevitably involve dismantling all fundamentals of the 
2 Note, again, that this is only an illustration and I do not mean to attribute qualia to pictures. Qualia, 
however they are construed, are mental features. Nor do I wish to suggest that there is nothing it is like for 
the person who is unaware of the ‘quale’ of the picture to see the screen. The screen itself will be the object 
of his experience (and not the train) producing its own quale in him and therefore there will be something it 
is like for him. 
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theories that are in the spirit of the preconception, having done so will not by itself 
complete the reversal. In fact there will be a number of stages to it - we will, on behalf of 
the representationalist, advance through a terrain of philosophical theories surveyed and 
mapped in terms of where they stand on the issue of narrowness vs. wideness of content 
as well as narrowness vs. wideness of qualia. One highly desirable by-product of this 
strategy will be a fairly detailed characterisation of representationalism – its essential 
characteristics, scope, argumentative resources and explanatory power will gradually 
come to surface in the course of the reversal. 
In view of the task thus laid out and the way I intend to go about it, I will present 
representationalism as a thesis one arrives at once one has successfully refuted the claim 
that intentional contents of experiences are narrow and qualia are narrow and then the 
claim that although intentional contents are wide, qualia are narrow (the two conceptions 
will be the two major stages in the process of the reversal). Therefore, these assertions 
will be the subject of my discussion:
(1) Intentional content of experience is narrow and so are qualia.
(2) Intentional content of experience is wide, but qualia are narrow.
, a successful refutation of which will leave us with the following:
(3) Intentional contents are wide and qualia are intentional contents (representationalism).
Some general comments on the scope of (3) are immediately in place. Plainly, the 
mention of ‘wide’ in (3) takes pains outside of its scope. This does not by itself mean 
that a suitable representational account of bodily sensations cannot be given, despite their 
inevitably being only narrowly intentional. Those who are already sceptical about 
representationalism as a theory of perception will generally find a representational 
treatment of pains even less palatable – while few doubt that perceptions have intentional 
contents, it remains under dispute whether bodily sensations exhibit any sort of 
intentionality at all. But representationalism about bodily sensations does not always 
come out worse off than representationalism about perceptions. Take, for instance, 
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Block’s (1990) rejection of the theory in general on the grounds that qualia supervene on 
physical (to mean physicochemical or molecular) constitution (although I shall argue 
extensively in section 1.2. that Block is wrong). Whereas the supervenience claim clearly 
clashes with the former (if true, perceptual qualia can’t even be narrowly intentional), its 
truth is insufficient to establish that pain qualia aren’t intentional. To appreciate this, 
consider the representationalist’s perspective on the issue of pains: my pain or ache is 
about a discomfort felt at a particular location in or on the surface of my body, making 
me wish to rid myself of whatever is causing it. It also alerts me to (and so is also about)
which type of tissue is affected, not least because I can assess the risk to my health that 
may result from the disturbance of that particular type of tissue. Therefore, having my 
earlobe pierced will feel differently to having my palm pierced (with, say, the same 
needle) due to them, physicochemically speaking, being different types of tissue. Now, 
given that we can feel either a pain or an ache in virtually every part of our body, for two 
individuals’ pains and aches to have the same intentional contents it is perhaps necessary 
that their bodies be made up of the same variety of types of tissue and hence that they be 
physically identical. The case for intentionality of pains (endorsed already by Pitcher 
(1970) and Armstrong (1962)) can be pressed alongside the supervenience claim.
My second remark on the scope of (3) concerns qualitative differences among states 
belonging to distinct sense modalities. While there was no question about where pains 
stand in relation to the scope of (3), here, opinion among qualia externalists themselves is 
divided. Lycan (1996) suspends (3) as a possible explanation of this kind of qualitative 
difference and turns instead to differences in proximal stimulation for more promising 
results. One familiar example that would appear to point towards such differences falling 
outside the scope of (3) sets a visual sensation of a smooth surface against a tactile 
sensation of a smooth surface: same wide content, distinct qualities. The immediate 
answer is that much here hinges on how content is made explicit, for we have as yet no 
independent grounds to hold that the two states’ contents should not turn out to be 
distinct. I propose that a final verdict on the matter be postponed until it is put under 
closer scrutiny. However, the character of some of the discussions that follow in this 
chapter will create suitable setting for these questions to be brought up as we go along, 
giving increasingly broad hints as to where the answer should lie.  
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I will now embark on the reversal announced in the opening paragraphs. The next 
section will carry us through its initial stage, that is, a move from (1) to (2).
1.1 Intentional Content of Experience is Narrow and so are Qualia
We already touched on the topic of narrow content in connection with bodily 
sensations. This only covers one sense in which content can be said to be narrow. There 
are others. For the wide/narrow distinction with respect to intentional contents is not 
understood as being parallel with the external/internal distinction with respect to the 
objects that we are aware of. To spell this out, even if a theory has it that, in experiencing, 
we are aware of external states of affairs, it can not be concluded that it necessarily
supports the alternative that intentional contents of experiences are wide. On the other 
hand, if a theory has it that experiences make us aware of internal objects – whether they 
be mental (e.g. sense-data) or physical (disturbed tissue, as in the case of pains) it can be 
safely concluded that it amounts to claiming that intentional contents are narrow.
Intentional content of experience is narrow either if it is the case that experience makes 
us conscious of mental objects (those existing in the mind), or if it is the case that 
although experience makes us conscious of external objects, the intentional content of 
experience is determined internally.  (1) thus allows these two alternatives:
(1a) Experience makes us conscious of internal states of affairs and so its intentional 
content is narrow and so are qualia.
(1b) Experience makes us conscious of external states of affairs, but its intentional 
content is determined internally and so it is narrow and so are qualia.
It also helps to think of the wide/narrow distinction as applied to intentional contents in 
terms of supervenience: if intentional contents of experience supervene on causal, 
contextual relations, they are wide, and if they do not co-vary with variations in 
environmental factors, they are narrow. This should make obvious the reason for which
in (1b) intentional content is still narrow. (1b) does not make the causal links relevant in 
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the requisite way3. Distinguishing (1a) and (1b) further fragments the reversal I have 
undertaken to complete, so the move from (1) to (2) will in fact be a move from (1a) to 
(1b) and then from (1b) to (2). I now turn to (1a).
1.1.1 Experience Makes Us Conscious of Internal States of Affairs and so its Intentional                                                                
Content is Narrow and so are Qualia
According to (1a), our experiences are immediately about objects existing in the 
realm of the mental and if they refer to external objects, they do so in a derived way. For 
instance, in hallucinating a mermaid, although there is nothing in front of my eyes, I am 
certainly conscious of something and this something must exist in my head. The 
experience shares all its introspectible properties with one I would undergo were a real 
mermaid present (if there were such things as mermaids) save for the fact that its object
does not actually take up a region of space (we may say that it is temporal only). After-
images are supposed to be similar cases to the one just mentioned. They make us 
conscious of a mental object which becomes the intentional object of the sensation. The 
fact that the very same sensation-type sometimes happens to be causally correlated with 
an external object is accounted for by saying that the causation is indirect and that the 
external object only causes a mental object to occur in the mind which is then sensed. 
The argument that is very often alleged to sustain this approach states that the perceived 
properties are in many respects unlike the properties we ascribe to physical objects. The 
argument also entails that the properties we associate with physical objects are the result 
3 We should be wary of possible misinterpretations of the co-variation. For instance, John Searle (1983) 
maintains that the same (narrow) psychological states occurring in two different subjects can nonetheless 
determine distinct intentional contents, which may, at a first glance, seem to be consistent with saying that 
intentional contents co-vary with changes in environmental factors. The appearance of consistency stems 
from the fact that on this view, by thinking “Water is wet” on Twin Earth Twin Oscar will refer to XYZ 
(XYZ is the chemical composition of the liquid that fills rivers and lakes on Twin Earth, as opposed to H2O 
on Earth) and not to H2O. But the external factor here – XYZ – is not meant to be the reason why Twin 
Oscar’s thought has a different content from that of Oscar’s thought on Earth. It is because of something 
internal that Twin Oscar’s thought has a different content. 
On the other hand, representationalists have come up with a teleological response to Block’s version of 
the thought experiment involving visual perception. The response is perfectly in accordance with the co-
variation thesis, although the contents of the traveller’s experiences will not shift on his arrival at Block’s 
Twin Earth (the experiment as well as the responses will be examined later).
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of the process of learning how to derive them from the perceived ones. Take, for 
example, the property of something being parallel with something else. If I stand on a 
railway track, staring at the two lines as they reach up to the horizon I perceive them as 
convergent. It is solely by means of reasoning and other cognitive faculties we possess
that from the perceived convergence we are able to infer to the objects’ real features. If I 
walk to the point where the horizon seemed to be from the spot where I was previously 
standing and then look back, I won’t see any divergent lines, but again, there will be two 
lines converging at just the same rate as before, from which I will figure out, having 
enough similar experience with other objects, that they are parallel.
This apparently strikes a chord with the pictorial model of sensory perception laid bare 
in the illustration at the beginning of this chapter that was seen as the precise opposite of 
representationalism, as being virtually its mirror image, embodying all that the 
representationalist will want to distance himself from. To get ourselves off the ground 
and begin progressing towards (3) we must expel the kind of mental object from the mind 
that the model implants there to mediate between the world and our perceptual awareness 
of it. Let’s focus on just one (vivid) example of such ostensible mental objects - after-
images. The choice isn’t arbitrary. Traditional approaches like (1a) often extrapolate from 
non-veridical cases to veridical ones, not otherwise, since non-veridical states are often 
held up as supreme evidence of there being mental targets of perceiving (to repeat what 
was said above, in having a green after-image, there is nothing green out there, so it must 
be in my mind). Showing that there are no such things in non-veridical cases will remove
the source of the positing of the mediators allegedly involved in veridical ones. 
One strategy for avoiding talk of mental objects (or sense-data talk) that instantly 
springs to mind is to introduce adverbial translations for sentences like “I am sensing a 
green patch” (uttered in situations when I have a green after-image) which, without such 
translations, clearly entail that “there is a green patch that I am sensing”. Adverbialism 
was designed to sever this entailment link through which the sense-data theory gains its 
force. If topic-neutrality proves unattainable (whether this is done adverbially or by some 
other means), the object involved in the quantification will necessarily be mental, since 
there is certainly no green physical object in my brain when I have a green after-image.
Michael Tye (1995), for example, mentions two types of theories of adverbs: an event 
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theory and a predicate operator theory. According to the former, a sentence like “I am 
sensing greenly” is analysed as “There is an event of sensing that has me as its subject, 
and that event is green”. Tye says that one of the difficulties here, among others, is that 
‘that event is green’ is unintelligible, although quantification over events should not itself 
be a problem considering the obvious advantages they bring in contrast with mental 
objects. The latter adverbial theory does succeed in not introducing entities except the 
subject itself, on which, he says, statements about mental objects are in fact statements 
about sentient creatures and the phenomenal properties they instantiate. Nevertheless, 
with example sentences like “I sense quadruply-pinkly”, which is the predicate operator
translation of “I have four pink after-images”, we are incapable of making the apparently 
valid inferences to sentences like “I have fewer than seven after-images”.
So can we propose a type of topic-neutral translations that do not quantify over mental 
objects? I will follow Lycan’s investigations in (1987, p.85-89) for a moment to 
demonstrate that there are topic-neutral translations that not only overcome all the 
difficulties adverbialism normally runs into, but also that there is much in the outcome of 
this analysis that the representationalist will wish to build and elaborate on. I’ll try to 
justify the latter claim as soon as I’ve shown how Lycan’s discussion proceeds. Lycan 
begins his considerations by clarifying the syntax of “Leopold is sensing homogeneously-
greenly”, homogeneity being a property of having the same colour throughout. He 
observes that homogeneity cannot be ascribed to the property greenness, which is what 
‘homogeneously-greenly’ is partly made up of. To make homogeneity a first-order 
property (a property of an object rather than just another property), and in order for the 
sentence to retain its adverbial form he gives this alternative: “Leopold is sensing a-
homogeneously-green-patch-ly”. ‘Homogeneous’ is now ascribed to a green patch 
instead of greenness itself. However, a different problem arises. Lycan asks how it is 
possible to understand such a complex predicate and, worse, how it is possible to
understand a predicate containing a noun, namely, ‘green patch’, generally. What is its 
semantics? He urges us to understand it as an instrumental adverb, that is, along the lines 
of “Leopold is buttering with-a-knife-ly”, which is an adverbial translation of “Leopold is 
buttering with a knife”. On this construal, the sentence will entail that “There is a green 
patch that Leopold is sensing”, just as “Leopold is buttering-with-a-knife-ly” entails that 
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“There is a knife with which Leopold is buttering”. To take this route would be to favour 
sense-data talk again. We have seen, on the other hand, that he cannot dispense with 
including some grammatical form of ‘green patch’ in the sentence, because he needs to 
keep ‘homogeneity’ a first-order property. So the only way out of the trouble, he 
suggests, is to look for an instrumental adverb that does not bring the presence of an 
actual object with itself. This can be achieved by rephrasing adverbial sentences as 
counterfactuals. Lycan gives us another example: “Leopold is running as if a lion were 
chasing him”. It is a counterfactual rendering of “Leopold is running a-lion-is-chasing-
him-ly” and in this case it can easily be argued that the sentence does not require that 
there be a lion chasing Leopold. It does not entail that “There is a lion chasing Leopold”.
When applied to sensing, the reasoning leads to the following result: “Leopold is sensing 
as he would be sensing if a green patch were present to him”. There is nothing in the 
sentence that suggests that there is an (actual) green patch in front of Leopold. Hence, the 
question as to whether what Leopold is seeing is mental or physical simply becomes 
irrelevant. We have an uncontroversial example of topic-neutrality. It fits into this general 
model: 
There is a mode of sensing M such that Leopold is sensing in way M and Leopold 
would be sensing in way M if a green patch were present to him and conditions 
were normal,
and Lycan adds that
the antecedent of this counterfactual is “there is a green patch present to 
Leopold”. Thus, any of the standard accounts mentioned above directs us to look 
at an alternative world in which (it is really true that) there is a green patch 
present to Leopold. And this is the source of our quantifier: the value of its 
variable is a green – physically green – patch (p.87-88, italics original).
According to Lycan, having explained after-images in this way we can now specify 
the truth-conditions for “Leopold is sensing a-homogeneously-green-patch-ly” by an 
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appeal to whichever particular semantics for counterfactuals we prefer. We are also able 
to determine the meaning of the slightly overcomplicated adverb ‘a-homogeneously-
green-patch-ly’, because the puzzling ‘green-patch’, by being in fact a part of a 
counterfactual, will refer to an object existing at a possible world. 
Let us now take stock of what we have arrived at. On (1a), what we directly perceive 
in both veridical (e.g. a sense-datum presenting me with convergent lines, as in the 
example above) and non-veridical cases (e.g. an after-image) are (ontologically) mental 
objects. Clearly, if we allow this, the states that constitute awareness of such objects 
must also be ontologically mental, since it is out of the question that something 
immaterial should be sensed by something material. The counterfactual treatment 
removes mental objects of perception from the mind, hence the states that constitute 
perceptual awareness being ontologically mental is no longer a matter of necessity
(although it is of course the translation itself that guarantees this in the first place). We
can now conclude that in fact two types of topic-neutrality emerge from this way of 
purging the mind of mental objects of perception: that with respect to what is represented
and that with respect to the state that does the representing.
Seeing that the representationalist will wish to embrace both is revelatory of what 
type of position representationalism is. The counterfactual analysis implies that what is to 
be found in the mind is only a perceptual mental state (in which an object is represented, 
whether existent or non-existent), not the perceived object. The mental representation 
may give rise in us to thoughts such as “There is a green patch in front of me”, but this is 
as reliable evidence of the presence of an object as someone’s reporting that there is a cat 
in front him while looking at an extremely realistic painting. All he is physically 
presented with is a canvas and paint arranged in such a way that it happens to represent a 
cat. No one, having been told what he is in fact staring at, would believe that some non-
spatial cat must nonetheless somehow be there. This is, in principle, how topic-neutrality
of what is represented should be understood. In principle only, because as far as 
representationalism is concerned perceptions do not represent in the same manner as 
pictures do. One of the reasons for this is that representationalists are typically 
materialists, which means that mental representations are supposed to be realized in the 
brain-matter. Neurons do not constitute pictures in any literal sense. Tye (1991), for 
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instance, favours the hypothesis that veridical as well as non-veridical perceptions share 
the same mechanism taking place in our visual cortex consisting of matrices of symbol-
filled cells, with symbols encoding information about various properties of physical 
objects. But the symbols themselves are not coloured. The encoding function they 
perform is (chemically?) hardwired. It is easy to construct a counterfactual of the above 
type for the case of after-images if this particular hypothesis is adopted to explain mental 
representations: The matrices of cells in the visual cortex of subject S who is having a 
green after-image are filled by the same symbols as they would be if a real green patch 
were present. Non-veridical perceptions are situations which cause our visual system to 
react in the same way as it would react if the perception was veridical. To put it rather 
loosely, when for some reason our brain changes its state to that in which it seems to us 
that there is something green in front of us, we can do nothing but perceive it, no matter 
whether we do or do not believe what it presents us with.
Having said this, it is important to emphasize again that the fact that
representationalists are typically materialists is not the crucial reason why they 
commonly deny that perceptions represent in the same way as pictures. We could quite 
plausibly imagine a representational theory of perception on which representations would 
not be realised by the brain. This is explains why the theory is also topic-neutral with 
respect to the states that do the representing. Dualism is not a priori incompatible with 
representationalism. A creature consisting of both body and soul could still be a 
representational system, with representations taking place in the soul. Thus, the issue of 
what realises representations is more an empirical one and cannot be resolved on a priori 
grounds4. The representationalist can leave it open whether representations are 
ontologically mental or not. What he does not leave open is whether they represent like 
pictures. They do not, it is claimed, because experiences do not have any intrinsic 
phenomenal properties. Or, at least, there are no intrinsic phenomenal properties we are 
conscious of in undergoing an experience.5 If, after enough empirical research has been 
carried out, representations turn out to be functional states of the brain (as 
representationalists typically assume) then the relevant physical-chemical properties will 
4 The same is true of functionalism in general. See, for example, (Putnam 1967).
5 For this alternative see (Harman 1989).
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indeed be intrinsic to them. Representationalism and the more traditional views have 
things the opposite way round: representationalists hold that it is impossible to account 
for the what-it’s-likeness without referring to (wide) intentional contents, whereas on the 
traditional view the intrinsic phenomenal properties (if there are such things) do not only 
explain the what-it’s-likeness of experience, but in many cases they are also supposed to 
determine intentional contents.
I hope these remarks have helped clarify why I believe that Lycan’s counterfactual 
analysis provides suitable ground for the representationalist to build on. However, there is 
nothing in the analysis to stipulate that that ground is to be occupied solely by an 
externalist theory (of qualia). It does link Leopold’s state to a physically green object, but 
it falls short of showing that this physical greenness is what gives the state its qualitative 
identity. The analysis can equally well be complemented by any of the instances of (1b), 
which, despite not implanting any ontologically mental mediators between the world and 
the mind’s perceptual awareness of it, remain internalist in that it is entirely features of 
the subject that impart qualitative identity to his experiences – the instances differ merely 
over which particular features of the subject these should be. We nonetheless conclude 
this sub-section content that the important initial step in the direction of (3) has been 
made. I now move on to (1b).
1.1.2 Experience Makes Us Conscious of External States of Affairs, but its Intentional 
Content is Determined Internally and so it is Narrow and so are Qualia
There are at least three kinds of views that ought not to be overlooked in connection 
with (1b). They all fit into (1b), although each does so for slightly different reasons. I’ll
begin by examining with John Searle’s treatment of experiential content in his (1983). 
The underlying assumption that constrains Searle’s thought is this: experiences have 
intentional contents, because they have conditions of satisfaction, and the contents are 
propositional, which is “an immediate consequence of the fact that they have conditions 
of satisfaction, for conditions of satisfaction are always that such and such is the case” (p. 
41). In other words, Searle conjectures that if experiences are intentional states, they have 
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conditions of satisfaction and if they have conditions of satisfaction, their content is 
propositional. This means that experiential content is made explicit by “x sees that such 
and such is the case” rather than by “x sees y”. The former alternative being intensional, 
he says, it warrants a smaller set of inferences than the latter one (the latter one being 
extensional). For instance, “Seeing that Mr. Cameron is giving a speech” does not imply 
“Seeing that the youngest leader of the conservative party is giving a speech”, even 
though Mr. Cameron is in fact the youngest leader of the conservative party, whereas 
“seeing Mr. Cameron give a speech” does imply “seeing the youngest leader of the 
conservative party give a speech”, as well as other facts true of Mr. Cameron included in 
the “x sees y” form. To Searle, such distinction between intensionality and extensionality 
parallels the distinction between intentional content and intentional object. Seeing what 
he takes the relation between the two to be will be crucial for our understanding of why 
his views of experiential content fall under (1b).
The following fragment of Searle’s text will take us straight to the point we are after. 
There he specifies the truth conditions of “X sees that there is a yellow station wagon in 
front of X”, which proposition is the content of an experience of a yellow station wagon.
1. X has a visual experience which has:
a. certain conditions of satisfaction
b. certain phenomenal properties.
2. The conditions of satisfaction are: that there is a yellow station wagon in front 
of X and the fact that there is a station wagon in front of X is causing the visual 
experience.
3. The phenomenal properties are such as to determine that the conditions of 
satisfaction are as described in 2. That is, those conditions of satisfaction are 
determined by the experience.
4. The form of the causal relation in the conditions of satisfaction is continuous 
and regular Intentional causation.
5. The conditions of satisfaction are in fact satisfied. That is, there actually is a 
station wagon causing (in the manner described in 4) the visual experience 
(described in 3) which has the intentional content (described in 2) (p. 61-62).
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What 3. suggests is that intentional content is determined phenomenally. At a first glance, 
this conclusion may not be so obvious, as 3. speaks of determination of conditions of 
satisfaction, rather than of intentional content. But they are the conditions of satisfaction 
of the above proposition which is the intentional content of the experience in question. 
Hence I think that such interpretation is perfectly fair and it is indeed at the experiential 
level alone that intentional content is specified. Nothing in Searle’s account requires that 
we look outside the experience itself (that we look at what causes it, for instance) in order 
to specify its content (together with its conditions of satisfaction).
If this sounds unconvincing, consider also what Searle says earlier on p. 48 about how 
the intentional content of experience is to be made explicit: “I have a visual experience 
that there is a yellow station wagon there and that there is a yellow station wagon there is 
causing this visual experience”, which he then spells out by saying that “the intentional 
content of the visual experience determines under what conditions it is satisfied or not 
satisfied, what must be the case in order that it be, as they say, ‘veridical’” (p.48). 
Content is self-referential, meaning that it makes reference to the object which is the 
standard cause of the experience. Now, although points 2. and 4. in the above quotation 
do incorporate causality into Searle’s account, causality is not intended to be prior to the 
phenomenal properties of the experience when it comes to determining content. To sum
up, Searle’s proposal is that phenomenal properties specify content and content (thus 
specified) only subsequently specifies the standard cause. This order of determination 
makes Searle’s position straightforwardly an instance of (1b). Having outlined Searle’s 
position, the task is to assess how powerful it really is as an objection to the claim that 
intentional contents are wide. In so doing I shall also attempt to overcome the objection 
and move on to (2), just as in the previous section I tried to provide reasons to abandon 
(1a) and move at least to (1b).
Michael Devitt’s (1990) has a very similar objective to the one pursued here, although 
his primary concern is with the issue of thought content. In that article he highlights the 
contrast between Searle’s view and externalism with respect to the importance they attach 
to the causal links by saying that on Searle’s view, content determines object, whereas 
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externalism has it that object determines content. However succinct a way to put it this is, 
it may encourage a kind of misapprehension that (for reasons I will explain in just a 
moment) must be avoided here at all costs. What we must be cautious about is that, in the 
claim that object determines content, we do not understand the term ‘content’ in the same 
way as Searle does (this of course does not apply to the claim that the content determines 
the object, as it is Searle’s own claim!). On page 16. I said that Searle introduces the 
distinction between content and object as a distinction between proposition, which is, 
according to him, intensional with respect to the possibility of substitution (‘x sees that 
such and such is the case’) and extension, which is the intentional object stripped of all 
modes of presentation (i.e. the y in ‘x sees y’). Bearing this in mind, the point is that if 
Devitt’s formulation of externalism (i.e. that object determines content) is read as 
“extension determines intension”, the result is something which no externalist has ever 
wished to defend. 
The oddity of attributing such claim to externalism is best exposed by drawing
attention to thought contents, for which the application of the distinction between 
intension and extension is much less problematic. I do not think anyone is willing to 
believe that twin-earth experiments and the notion of rigid designation have been put 
forward to show that extension determines intension. Intension is the mode under which a 
referent is presented, or, the way we come to understand the associated term (via its 
intension). Understanding meaning is undoubtedly a psychological state. Putnam (1975, 
1981) and Kripke (1972) argued that meaning, as opposed to understanding meaning (i.e. 
intension and/or the relevant psychological state), is a non-psychological matter, because 
it is individuated causally. The character in Putnam’s story uses the term ‘water’ when
the chemical constitution of water has yet to be discovered. The narrow psychological 
state he is in when using the term can be described as ‘a transparent, odourless liquid that 
fills rivers and lakes’. Putnam says that his thoughts containing ‘water’ are nonetheless 
about H2O. He imagines that the natives of a different planet also use the term ‘water’, 
which they understand as ‘a transparent, odourless liquid that fills rivers and lakes’, even 
though the chemical composition of water there is XYZ instead of H2O. Thus thoughts 
containing ‘water’ on Earth are about H2O, while thoughts containing ‘water’ on the 
other planet are about XYZ. The upshot is, briefly, that ‘a transparent, odourless liquid 
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that fills rivers and lakes’ fails to differentiate between thoughts about H2O and those 
about XYZ and therefore cannot be regarded as constitutive of content. The purpose of 
the experiment surely is not to demonstrate that the causal factor (extension) determines 
the intension (i.e. the narrow psychological state). 
Although I have been using ‘meaning’ and ‘content’ as if they are interchangeable, I 
do not mean to conflate them, as meaning is of course a language-world relation, while 
intentionality is a mind-world relation. However, the idea I would like to make clear does 
not depend on the difference. Let us return to Searle and experiential content. What I will 
now hope to make obvious is that Searle’s dismissal of the causal theories of experiential 
content is based on the mistake described above. His mistake is, in other words, that he 
first imposes his own construal of content on the formulation of externalism (by 
‘formulation of externalism’ I understand Devitt’s “object determines content”) and only 
then he gives reasons for rejecting it. So what he in fact rejects is the claim that “object 
determines intensional-propositional content”, even though, as I explained at some length 
in the previous two paragraphs, no externalist wants to say this. But it is time I provided 
some textual evidence.
Searle raises his objections to the causal theory of experiential content when 
explaining how his own conception can deal with the particularity problem. The 
particularity problem is a problem of how two phenomenally identical states caused by 
two identical (but numerically different) objects can have different contents. I think many 
would be inclined to believe that externalism is better equipped to cope with the problem. 
However, Searle clearly does not share the inclination. He describes a version of 
Putnam’s twin earth.  Our earth Jones sees his wife, Sally, getting out of their station 
wagon and on twin earth, twin Jones sees twin Sally getting out of their station wagon. 
The externalist’s solution to this would be that Jones’ experience has Sally as its content 
because Sally is the standard cause of his experience and twin Jones’ experience has twin 
Sally as its content because twin Sally is the standard cause of his experience. But Searle 
is not convinced. He says: “ … the problem as I have posed it is a first-person internal 
problem” (p.63). And his question is: 
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… what is it about the content of Jones’ visual experience that makes the presence 
of Sally rather than twin Sally part of the conditions of satisfaction of his visual 
experience, and what makes the presence of twin Sally part of the conditions of 
satisfaction of twin Jones’ experience? (p. 62, italics original)
What he understands by the italicised ‘content’ in the quotation is intensional-
propositional content (that is, again, “x sees that such and such is the case” as opposed to 
extension – the y in “x sees y”), which is apparent from the fact that he takes the problem 
in question to be a first-person internal problem. I pointed out earlier that intensionality 
and first-person point of view are closely connected in the sense that in semantics, for 
example, intension is a psychological state or the way one understands the meaning of a 
term. So what Searle sets out to investigate is how a sensory state with an intensional-
propositional content can be about Sally, rather than twin Sally. My main objection is that 
the stipulation that content must be intensional-propositional is too restrictive with 
respect to what kind of answer Searle will consider acceptable. His dissatisfaction with 
the causal response stems from the fact that it does not explain how causal factors, which 
are extrinsic to the experience, enter into the intensional-propositional intentional content
and thus does not explain how these third-person facts make a difference from first-
person point of view. But, as I stressed above, externalism does not purport to succeed in 
doing this. What Putnam attempted was not to show that the fact that thoughts containing 
‘water’ on earth are about H2O rather than XYZ makes a difference to how Oscar 
understands the term. He still understands it as ‘transparent, odourless liquid that fills 
rivers and lakes’, which is exactly the same as how twin Oscar understands it. On the 
externalist’s proposal, these extrinsic facts do not enter into the intensional-propositional 
content, they are constitutive of content, which means that, if true, content is not what 
Searle takes it to be, it is not intensional. Searle and the externalist work with different 
notions of content, which I think Searle tends to overlook. Therefore, he first merely 
assumes that his own construal of content is correct and only then rejects externalism. 
What is Searle’s solution to the particularity problem? We learn that intentional 
contents do not determine their conditions of satisfaction in isolation. What enters into 
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the content of his experience of Sally are the contents of a set of past experiences caused 
by the same woman, which are now memory contents. Thus the content of Jones’ present 
experience of Sally is that a woman with identical Sally-like features is before me and her 
presence and features are causing this visual experience and that woman is identical with 
the woman whose presence and features caused his past experiences of a woman whom 
he has known as Sally. Searle adds that if Jones is transported to twin earth the content 
expressed in the last sentence is not satisfied because the woman he now has an 
experience of (twin Sally) is not identical with the woman whose presence and features 
caused his past experiences of a woman whom he has known as Sally. If Jones is 
transported to twin earth at birth then the content is satisfied because the content of his 
present experience matches the contents of his past experiences (he has only had 
experiences of twin Sally). Such outcome implies that even though experiential content is
determined internally on Searle’s view, its conditions of satisfaction are particular rather 
than general. He calls the set of contents of the relevant past experiences ‘the network’. 
Note that facts about the network are extrinsic to the present experience, however, they 
are not external facts and hence Searle’s appeal to the network should not make us doubt 
that he is a proponent of (1b).
Given that facts about the network and facts about causal factors are both extrinsic to 
the experience, one may wonder for a moment why Searle is willing to allow the former 
to get into the experience’s content but not the latter. Yes, the former ones are internal, 
while the latter ones are external, but why should this be so decisive? As it was pointed 
out earlier, Searle thinks that only the former ones are significant as far as first-person 
point of view is concerned. But now, is such a great deal of focus on  first-person point of 
view justifiable? His answer to this question is to be traced back to the manner in which 
he poses the problem: “The question, in short, is not “Under what conditions does he 
(Jones) in fact see Sally whether he knows it or not?”, but “Under what conditions does 
he take himself to be seeing that Sally is in front of him?”” (p.64, italics original) I think 
this is dubious because it seems that experiences will be left to carry too much cognitive 
burden. We can imagine a creature who enjoys the same range of qualitative states as 
humans do, but possesses no cognitive capacities and hence never takes himself to be 
seeing anything. Such possibility certainly weakens the whole intuitive appeal of first-
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person point of view. However, this is not deny that experiences are conscious states, that 
they are, as Joseph Levine (2003) would put it, bits of awareness and that externalists do 
not have questions to answer themselves. My aim in this discussion of Searle has been to 
show that externalism is in principle defensible against his objections and that it is 
possible to move on from (1b), if his body of arguments is taken as a sole basis for 
supporting (1b). A final remark, a rather interesting one in these circumstances, should be 
added. One staunch externalist, Fred Dretske (1995), does not feel disturbed by the 
particularity problem, from which Searle launches his criticism of externalism, at all. His 
claim is that there is nothing in the experience that tells me whether it is this object, rather 
than some other object the properties of which are represented in the experience. 
According to him, experiences have certain informational functions, just as thermometers 
have the function of informing about temperature. But there is no part of the thermometer 
that indicates which object it measures the temperature of. Insofar as Dretske’s position 
can be made tenable, it is possible for someone to be an externalist and at the same 
maintain that experiences do not have particular conditions of satisfaction, in which case 
an advocate of (1b) would be forced to abandon the particularity problem as a basis for 
criticizing externalism.
If we accept that the particularity issue does not necessarily undermine externalism 
either because we believe that Searle’s objections are grounded in a false assumption or 
because the issue may not be an issue after all, and yet want to preserve (1b), then we 
have at least two more alternatives to consider. The first one is Stephen White’s notional 
content (1994). Its departure from Searle’s position lies in contents’ not being determined 
phenomenally. According to White, sensory states do not have the contents they do in 
virtue of their phenomenal properties. Rather, contents are individuated based on the 
subject’s discriminative skills. Hence this is clearly a relationalist account of content. It is 
similarity and dissimilarity relations among sensory states that categorise them in terms 
of content. 
White’s departure from Searle’s views will not be genuine until we’ve shown how it 
handles these prime facie difficulties: Firstly, it seems that in making similarity and 
dissimilarity judgements that express the relations in question, a subject relies on the 
phenomenal properties of his experiences. If it is inevitable that the subject attends to the 
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phenomenal properties prior to making out similarity and dissimilarity relations among 
them, why not simply say, like Searle, that content is determined phenomenally? In other 
words, the mention of such relations would appear superfluous, and thus the relevant 
discriminations must rely on some other method, even though such method turns out to 
class the same set of states as similar or dissimilar as the ‘phenomenal’ method would.
Secondly, providing the first obstacle is circumvented, imagine that experiences as of 
something red and as of something green are the entire range of visual states one is 
capable of being in. A relationalist would be committed to claiming that his green
experiences have ‘green’ as their content because they are distinct from red experiences. 
But this leaves the content of the experiences intolerably underspecified. If another 
person saw things only as either yellow or red, the answer again would be that his yellow
experiences are about something yellow because they are distinct from red experiences. 
‘Being distinct from red’ would fail to secure a sufficiently determinate content. Austen 
Clark’s (1993) is also a relationalist project and the fact that his theory applies solely to 
the entire spectrum of hues in addition to another two dimensions of brightness and 
saturation comes as no surprise. Working with the whole spectrum is to eliminate 
underdetermination as much as possible. What may come as a surprise at a first glance at 
least, is that a relationalist like White, although not making explicit reference to Clark’s
work, gives a clear indication that he wouldn’t regard such project as promising: 
Of course, the same object (allegedly) cannot be, and cannot be seen as, 
completely red and completely green at the same time, colors can be categorized 
along the dimensions of hue, saturation and brightness, and so forth. But it seems 
clear that adding these constraints to the intentionalist version of the secondary 
quality characterization of color properties cannot provide the content that would 
distinguish red from green. In other words, the holistic characterizations of beliefs 
and desires seem to involve enough content to define the relevant notions; for 
colors the opposite is true. (p. 3-4)
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Thus White obviously doesn’t feel that with his version of relationalism he should be 
under pressure to make what he calls the ‘circles’ of colour terms as large as possible, 
for notional content does not depend on doing so for its tenability. These circles 
arguably cannot come much larger than three full spectra of hues, levels of brightness 
and levels of saturation. As it is suggested in the cited text, he nonetheless doubts that 
they suffice to ‘fix’ content. Having said this, Clark does manage to overcome the 
first of the two difficulties above. According to him, colour qualia and, as I will 
assume, the contents of the corresponding visual state-types are individuated by their 
locations in such three-dimensional quality space. To oversimplify a little, we might 
think of this as a structure consisting of slots each occupied by a colour of a specific 
shade and level of brightness and saturation. Since a state’s content is individuated by 
its spatial relations to all the other states within the structure and not by its 
phenomenal properties, Clark’s account is past the first hurdle.6
So how does White’s version of relationalism regarding content sidestep the first 
difficulty, and what makes it independent of the size of the quality space? Central to 
his proposal is what he calls a file-keeping metaphor. For instance, under normal 
circumstances, a yellow object emits light of wavelength in band Y, excites receptors 
of type Y, which results in an image being stored in file Y. The image is not literally 
coloured, nor do we have anything like files in our heads. We are to think of the 
image in terms of specific receptive sensitivity, in this case receptors of type Y.
Notional content is then assigned on the basis of which type of receptors process the 
stimulus. So the notional content of the state in the present example is ‘yellow’ not 
because it is caused by a physically yellow object, but because the impulse travels via 
receptors of type Y, or metaphorically again, because it is stored in file Y. This 
mechanism allegedly underlies our discriminative judgements. To spell this out, 
another experience is deemed identical by the subject if it also ends up in file Y, that 
is, if the same receptors (type Y) are stimulated. Now, to contrast Searle’s and 
White’s positions, Searle would say that the experience is about something yellow 
6 I must point out that Clark’s quality space is a theory of qualia and not of content. I discuss the problem 
of content in connection with his theory only for the sake of exposition. White’s objection would have 
some weight only if quality space was adduced to solve the problem of content as well. But Clark’s 
treatment of qualia does not preclude him from proposing a different solution for content.
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because it has such and such phenomenal properties; White claims that it is about 
yellow because it is put away in the same file (file Y) as some other previous 
experiences and not in files R, B, G, etc. (i.e. it does not excite receptors of type R, B, 
G, etc.). 
Hence the answer to the first part of the above question is that the relations among 
states described here are not posterior to phenomenal properties in individuating 
content, they are, rather, what similarity and dissimilarity judgements translate into 
and, moreover, they are meant to constitute the contents of the states. In the second 
part of the question we were asking how, on White’s relationalism, the content of a 
state can be independent of the number of other states the state is compared to. In 
other words, we want to know how notional content accommodates cases where 
subjects perceive things in just two colours. This does not appear to be a problem 
since White ‘pins’ content down on receptive sensitivity. So if someone only has two 
files, say O and R, the images kept in O, for example, will have a sufficiently 
determinate content because they are associated with receptors of type O, even 
though they are only contrasted with a single file (file R) as well as to each other.
In the remainder of this section I shall, once again, adopt the viewpoint of content 
and qualia externalism, and press a case against ‘pinning’ content down on receptive 
sensitivity to account for qualia – a move that commits White to (1b). White, for 
whatever reasons, follows representationalists in maintaining that qualia are 
intentional, he is only reluctant to go as far as saying that perceptual content is wide. 
Indeed, he writes as if the only way for the identity of qualia and intentional contents 
to emerge unscathed from the Inverted Earth experiments is to abandon the claim that 
perceptual content is wide. He retells the story of Inverted Earth incorporating 
notional content into it to show how much better it fares as an account of qualia than 
wide content. I’ll now set out to examine whether the identity can really be preserved 
only by dropping wide content in favour of notional content. Towards the end of this 
section I’ll also attempt to dispel some other worries voiced by Georges Rey in 
(1998) who is another author to put narrow representationalism forward as a serious 
contender. His proposal (set out at more length in his (1997)) only differs from 
White’s in certain details which have little or no bearing on the key points of the 
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discussion that follows. Where White speaks of file keeping, Rey likes to speak of the 
characteristic processing of a restricted predicate in the language of thought. But, to 
repeat, the difference is largely cosmetic, for note that “each type predication is 
correlated with specific proximal stimulation conditions” (Rey 1997, p.296), which is 
strikingly in tune with White’s ‘pinning’ notional content down on receptive 
sensitivity.
Inverted Earth, as considered at face value, is widely held to present insuperable 
problems for qualia externalism and it appears to be the main motivation behind
White’s and Rey’s ‘going narrow’ (Rey in fact lists a number of reasons besides 
Inverted Earth. I’ll address them below). The thought experiment seems to become 
notably more benign once we join White and Rey in claiming that qualia are narrow 
contents. However, I’ll argue that this is a mere semblance and that a thorough 
evaluation of the experiment reveals that, contrary to what many think of the matter, 
it is narrow representationalism that it is more likely to topple. It is easy to fall into 
thinking that retreating to narrow representationalism makes the identity of qualia and 
contents less vulnerable. Let’s go along with White and suppose that perceptual 
content is narrow in the sense that it is determined by receptive sensitivity (or, 
alternatively, by proximal stimuli). The sky on Earth stimulates receptors of type B in 
Ned’s visual system, therefore the narrow (as well as wide) content of his state is 
‘blue’. He is moved to Inverted Earth and has had inverting lenses put in. The Twin 
Sun (which is blue) stimulates receptors of type Y, meaning that the narrow content 
of his state is ‘yellow’, therefore, as some like to put it, qualitative differences don’t 
outstrip differences in narrow contents – there is a qualitative difference, but also a 
difference in (narrow) contents. As for his wide contents (if, of course, we can show 
that there are such contents in connection with sensory perception), these are initially 
false, but we are told that when his use of ‘yellow’ comes to accord with that of the 
natives, when he starts to use it to mean blue, we have a proof that qualitative 
differences can outstrip differences in wide contents – his state as he looks at the 
Twin Sun is qualitatively identical to the one he was in when he was looking at the 
sky on Earth, yet its wide content has changed. 
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Since the publishing of Block’s (1990), numerous replies have been made to the 
experiments by representationalists, of which Michael Tye’s ones (1995, 1998a) stand 
out as particularly elaborate. Two alternatives are on offer. The first one draws on his 
externalist treatment of memory contents (see his (1998b)). Given that it is non-
teleological, it grants that Ned’s perceptual contents shift alongside the contents of his 
thoughts. The key idea is that the contents of his past experiences prior to his move 
shift as well. Consequently, when Ned begins to use ‘blue’ to mean yellow, and says 
that the sky is as blue as it was thirty years ago, what he actually expresses is that it is 
as yellow as it was thirty years ago. The other reply exploits the fact that Ned’s 
receptors have been tampered with, which, it has to be said, arouses rather wittily the 
odd, gnawing feeling many of us have when first reading Block’s paper – that 
representationalism would actually be worse off if the lenses had no impact on Ned’s 
sensory states. Both replies seem highly plausible and coherent, but I won’t go further 
into them. I’m interested in the teleological response, also placed into the debate by 
others, one which Tye eventually abandons. Why I want to focus on this particular 
response is that its alleged failure to handle the problem known as Swampman is, 
among other things, what drives Rey to embrace narrow representationalism instead. 
What is more, I believe that it can not only be made effective, but it can also be 
turned against Rey and narrow representationalism generally. The teleological 
response begins by disentangling perceptual contents from thought contents in the 
experiment. It doesn’t grant that the former shift alongside the latter. The reasoning is 
straightforward: sensory states are the result of phylogenetic development, while 
concepts are acquired in the course of the development of an individual. It would 
require an evolutionary adjustment in humans as a species for the contents to change 
accordingly. And this would take tens, if not hundreds of thousands of years of 
further evolution. Rey makes the obvious move - an accidental replica without 
evolutionary background would have sensory states with indeterminate contents and 
qualities. Given that ‘indeterminate phenomenal properties’ is unintelligible, it is 
concluded that Swampman has no experiences at all. But what argument shows that 
he would have inner states, let alone inner states that match those of humans? All we 
are told is that denying Swampman inner life runs counter to certain intuitions. Well, 
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intuitions are what they are because they are unarticulated, inexplicable hunches. 
Sometimes intuitions can be supported by compelling arguments, but very often they 
can’t and must be dissolved. Rey, as well as all who take the issue of Swampman 
seriously, carry the burden of proving that the latter isn’t the case. Let’s begin with 
our unarticulated hunch that Swampman would have inner life. We are told that 
Swampman is a replica of a human being, so the relevant intuition is that he does 
have experiences and that they match those of a human being. But in what respect is 
he a replica of a human being? Is he a mere physical duplicate of a human being, or a 
minimal functional duplicate, or a maximal functional duplicate? It is perhaps in the 
spirit of the objection that he is physically indistinguishable (a molecule-by molecule 
duplicate) from a normal human in the first place. Rey’s original proposal is that 
intentional contents and qualia are determined by proximal stimuli, hence he will 
want to credit Swampman with the same wealth of qualitative states as humans on the 
basis that he is a minimal functional duplicate of a human. On the teleological 
response we are considering, Swampman’s being a maximal functional duplicate of a 
human is out of the question. His lack of evolutionary history blocks any description 
of his phenomenal states which essentially involves a reference to the environment. 
Should this be seen as the very reason that the teleological version founders? I doubt 
that the matter can be settled so comfortably, for it could alternatively be seen as 
evidence that, provided that representationalism is otherwise (i.e. independently of 
the Swampman issue) the correct account of qualitative states of creatures with
evolutionary history, there can’t be accidental maximal functional duplicates of 
human beings. Thus the teleological version can be vindicated by suggesting the 
following: “If my theory (i.e. representationalism) is true of humans and sentient 
creatures with evolutionary history (that is, if it’s true prior to the Swampman 
objection being raised), then he is not a replica of a human or any other sentient 
creature with evolutionary history in the most important respect.” 
Before this is dismissed as too bold and difficult to swallow, I would like to make 
two points. Firstly, it is part and parcel of the meaning of ‘replica’ that there is always 
an intention to copy and, naturally, an original to copy. The Swampman example is 
devoid of both. All that takes place is a lightning hitting a swamp. There is no 
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original, no intention to copy. Only if the two elements were present would we be 
justified in claiming that he is like humans in one particular respect rather than 
another, that, for instance, he is a physical but not a minimal functional duplicate of a 
human. In other words, it does not follow from the meaning of the term as it is used in 
the example, as opposed to ordinary use, that he should resemble humans in one 
respect and not another - there is no intention to link certain features of real humans 
with features of our ‘replica’. So the dubious intuition under scrutiny really is that 
Swampman can have ‘human’ qualia because he can happen to resemble humans in 
whatever accounts for qualitative states in humans. As a consequence, an awful lot 
will depend on what one already believes to be the correct account of qualia. To 
repeat, a physicalist will regard Swampman, as far as his qualia are concerned, to be 
like humans as soon as he is a physical duplicate of a human. A narrow 
representationalist like Rey or White will regard him (again, as far as his qualia are 
concerned) to be like a human being if he is at least a minimal functional duplicate of 
a human being and his physical features will be of secondary importance. Crucially, a
representationalist should say, as I suggested, that Swampman is not a replica of any 
sentient creature in any relevant respect. For if it is true of subjects with evolutionary
history that any correct account of their qualia essentially involves a reference to the 
subject’s environment, the possibility of the existence of an artificial replica with
evolutionary history is necessarily ruled out – any artificial ‘replica’ necessarily lacks 
evolutionary history and there can be no reference to the ‘replica’s’ environment. If 
(and only if) otherwise true, the teleological response simply rules out that our 
protagonist can happen to be a replica of a human in the requisite way. It must now 
be acknowledged that the Swampman objection, by introducing him as a creature that 
accidentally replicates the features that explain qualia in humans, is contaminated 
with internalistic affinities that make it unacceptably charitable towards positions 
such as Rey’s and White’s, while keeping externalism about qualia, quite unfairly, 
out of contention. It unjustly disqualifies rather than soundly refutes it. And it can’t be 
reutilised by shaking off these affinities, either. What we would be left with would 
have to be discarded as utterly innocuous. 7
7 Here I part ways substantially with Dretske (1995) who, while holding that qualia are teleo-
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Perhaps the case could be recast along these highly hypothetical lines: we imagine 
that science develops a method that establishes firmly that our Swampman genuinely 
undergoes experiences identical to ours. Would this reinstate the objection and favour 
Rey’s and White’s positions? A persuasive answer to the contrary requires that I 
connect my last argument with another one: I’ll begin with the aid of a little 
digression and will rejoin the main discussion as soon as its import is clear. It is 
surely correct to say that the prevalent species taxonomy in biology derives from the 
theory of phylogenetic development that’s along the lines of Darwin’s work. For 
instance, in our ordinary use of the word ‘bird’, we rely on certain manifest properties 
of birds, such as the ability to fly, being covered in feathers and so on. At the same 
time, in certain odd cases, such as when something which has wings, a beak, etc. 
never flies, it is also true that we ultimately defer to biologists in deciding whether 
this something really is a bird. The widely accepted classification of species groups 
together various forms of organisms according to what species they evolved from, 
what species followed in order of evolution, and what type of environment they have 
adapted to. It is the structure of their organs, the level of complexity of their 
physiology, the diversification of the tasks they perform in order to survive and 
prosper and so forth that are essential to the classifications, and the manifest features 
such as the ability to fly are significant only as far as they are what these essential 
features show up as. Hence penguins are birds even if they are far too ‘overweight’ to 
ever take off. The use of the word ‘bird’ is ultimately in accordance with expert 
taxonomies and thereby the best theory of living organisms we currently have.
Imagine that the biology community have among them a counterpart of the 
philosopher whose concern about (teleological) representationalism is that there could 
be swamp replicas. The strayed biologist is contemptuous of the theory of evolution 
of species, the theory which provides the building blocks of the expert taxonomy, due 
to the worry that there could be swamp replicas of birds, and indeed of any species 
biology has thus far recorded. It is clear from what has been said that insofar as it is 
representational contents, does not call into question Swampman’s being a replica and on that basis accepts 
the consequence that he would have no experiences. My argument has been that the truth of the teleological 
version of qualia externalism (independently argued) turns the phrase “accidental replica without 
evolutionary background” into a contradiction.
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rooted in the theory of evolution, the current taxonomy makes reference to certain 
extrinsic facts: organisms are classified as birds because they evolved from reptiles, 
because such and such species evolved from birds (unless birds are at the end of one 
of the branches of the evolution ‘tree’) and, finally, because they have adapted to such 
and such type of environment. These extrinsic facts are an integral part of the 
meaning of ‘bird’ as introduced by the community of experts we defer to. I think it is 
reasonable to say that even expressions for certain individual organs such as ‘four-
chambered heart’ incorporate such extrinsic facts – having a heart with four chambers 
marks a certain stage in evolution. Now, our strayed biologist has us imagine that on 
some distant planet there is a lake that is continuously battered by lightning, as a 
result of which the lake churns out birds in large numbers (male birds only, I should 
add, to prevent breeding). Yes, in this scenario all the extrinsic elements are missing, 
but even if something similar was actually taking place somewhere in the universe, it 
would be preposterous to see it as evidence that the current taxonomy pertaining to 
living organisms on Earth (and the theory of evolution upon which it is based) is 
fundamentally misguided and in need of radical revision. The capacity of our 
imagination for severing all links to extrinsic factors by confronting us with 
accidental ‘replicas’ does not render concepts such as ‘bird’ or ‘four-chambered 
heart’, which incorporate such extrinsic facts by virtue of the nature of the taxonomy 
they originate in, as empty and detached from reality as ‘phlogiston’ (an imaginary 
fundamental particle existing alongside electrons, protons and neutrons) or ‘pineal 
gland’ (wrongly believed by Descartes to be the ‘seat of the soul’, where data from 
the senses were received) are. 
Just as biology identifies certain physiological features that explain differences 
between, say, reptiles and birds, and in so doing it adduces to the relevant extrinsic 
facts (one set of these facts are facts about the environment a given species developed 
in), representationalism identifies environmental stimuli as the factors that explain the 
differences among qualitative properties of experiences. The concepts ‘reptile’ and 
‘bird’, as used by biologists, reflect different stages in the global evolution of species
as well as the different environments they evolved in. Analogously, 
representationalism is a proposal that we view the concepts we use to capture 
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qualitative differences among our sensory states, such as ‘blue’, ‘green’, etc., as 
reflecting real differences in our environment. That we possess the capacity to 
envisage physical and minimal functional duplicates in the absence of the relevant 
extrinsic facts has no implications whatsoever for the claim that the kind of thought 
contents that derive from perceptual contents, i.e. the contents of thoughts which 
contain ‘blue’, green’, etc., are grounded in such extrinsic facts; the appeal to such 
capacity is innocuous as a counterargument to representationalism.
One expository advantage of the comparison with biology is that biology is not 
fraught with the difficulties of having to deal with phenomena which are publicly 
inaccessible and thus enables us to test the intuitions regarding Swampman and his
qualia. Would biologists be reluctant to say that swamp birds are birds? Well, swamp 
birds would arguably be susceptible to the same diseases, have a proclivity for mating 
with ‘normal’ birds, and so forth. Yet, as I have argued, this doesn’t imply that the 
meaning of the term ‘bird’ as applied to the species on earth should not be grounded 
in the aforementioned extrinsic facts – adhering to the theory of evolution doesn’t 
compel scientists to be chauvinistic towards swamp birds. It turns out then that 
representationalism does not lead its adherents to chauvinism with respect to 
Swampman. They may concede unreservedly that Swampman would be 
overwhelmed by grief over a loss of his close pal, feel joy or sympathy in other 
situations, or even enter qualitative states, without recanting the claim that the 
meanings of ‘blue’, ‘green’, etc. as featured in thoughts occurring in subjects with 
evolutionary history, as well as the intentional and qualitative contents of the sensory 
states that trigger such thoughts are deeply rooted in the subjects’ environment. 
Furthermore, the human eye is a bodily organ in precisely the same sense as four-
chambered heart is. As I have already remarked, four-chambered heart clearly marks 
a certain stage in evolution and thus integrated into the meaning of ‘four-chambered 
heart’ are a number of extrinsic facts, the environmental preconditions for its 
development in a group of organisms being among them. Since the human eye is just 
another example of a biological organ, certain form of environmental preconditions 
(those that led to the development of the human visual system) are present in the 
meaning of ‘human visual system’ in a similar fashion. And when this is combined 
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with the supposition that the human visual system is an instance of an information-
processing system, it will only be a short step to realising that these environmental 
preconditions must also figure in some way in determining the contents of the outputs 
of the system (i.e. the contents of visual states).
So the upshot appears to be that the representationalist may concede that 
Swampman can enjoy the inner life of humans without sacrificing any important part 
of his view. However, this by no means runs counter to the main point of the previous
discussion: that he nonetheless can’t be a maximal functional duplicate of a human 
being precisely because, owing to the absence of any evolutionary history, he lacks 
maximal functional organisation entirely (at least on the teleological version). The 
semblance of a contradiction is swept clear as soon as we recall that 
representationalism is a claim that two maximal functional duplicates must
phenomenally identical (even when their physical compositions or minimal functional 
organisations differ). This doesn’t commit the representationalist to claiming that, for 
instance, the experiences of creatures whose maximal functional profile is distinct 
from that of humans can’t feature exactly the same range of qualia as the sensory 
states of humans. Imagine that evolution has equipped the inhabitants of Inverted 
Earth with natural inverters to the effect that their sensory states are qualitatively 
identical to ours. Their states would be qualitatively identical despite their maximal 
functional profile being different. And, finally, the same holds of creatures with no 
maximal functional profile whatever; representationalism does not entail that such 
creatures can’t have experiences that are qualitatively identical to ours. The 
comparison with biology is an alternative route leading to the same conclusion – that 
Swampman poses no threat to teleological representationalism even if his inner life is
as rich as ours.
The argument that teleological representationalism is immune to the possibility of 
swamp creatures warrants the representationalist’s holding on to the initial grievance
that the Inverted Earth experiment illegitimately tangles up contents which are 
phylogenetically fixed with contents which are acquired in the course of individual 
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development. Inverted Earth does little to motivate a retreat to the positions of narrow 
representationalism.8
On page 30., immediately after outlining White’s proposal, I said that in the  
discussion of Inverted Earth that followed I would adopt the point of view of qualia 
externalism and that that would enable me to press a case against tying content to
proximal stimulation conditions – a move that committed him (as well as Rey, due to 
his account’s bearing the requisite similarities to White’s one) to (1b). This is of 
course in line with my overall strategy in this chapter, which is to wade, step by step, 
through what lies between (1a) and (3). I also added shortly afterwards that I 
suspected, and would attempt to show, that the Inverted Earth experiments were more 
likely to prove damaging for narrow representationalism than for the view which I 
then set out to defend (that is, representationalism) and which was their original 
target. I now want to highlight and articulate those consequences of my discussion 
that substantiate both claims.
It is more than remarkable that Rey and White are silent about the possibility of 
Block’s inverter being implanted behind the retina, or even higher up the stream of 
visual processing. This subjects them to precisely those problems that they thought 
fatal for representationalism. The teleological route remains accessible to the 
externalist regardless of where the inverter is put in. With the inverter in, say, his 
optic nerve, he can go on insisting: 
I am a living creature with an evolutionary history; the environment in which I 
find myself on Inverted Earth is not my natural habitat, … . So, on Inverted 
Earth, optimal conditions do not obtain. The brain state in me that tracks 
blueness in optimal conditions (and thereby represents blueness) now tracks 
yellowness. But it does not now represent yellowness (Tye, 1995, p.207, 
italics original).
8 I still waive the inclusion in the debate of the two non-teleological replies made by Tye in (1998a) 
which I think are just as effective against Inverted Earth. More on these replies in the next section. 
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But (narrow) intentional contents determined by receptive sensitivity and qualia 
conceived in terms of such contents will in this setting come apart. On Earth, the sky 
stimulates receptors in band B and a state that is qualitatively blue occurs. The sky on 
Twin Earth excites receptors in band Y, which results in a state which is qualitatively 
blue again. Plainly, teleology isn’t there to come to the rescue: Clinging on to the 
narrow intentionalist version, one can not coherently claim that on Twin Earth his 
qualitatively blue state continues to represent blueness (or, more precisely, that on 
Twin Earth it misrepresents blueness), despite excitation of receptors in band Y, for 
our protagonist’s receptors do not undergo a change on his arrival on the alien planet.
It is only his environment that does so.9 So it would be hard to see why a 
phenomenally blue experience, one that is now caused by stimulation of receptors of 
type Y should suddenly (mis)represent something as blue, rather than continue to 
represent something as yellow.10
That we now find it difficult to anticipate what Rey’s and White’s reply to this 
scenario should perhaps be taken to mean that these remarks are not a knock-down 
argument against narrow intentionalism and that they merely transfer the burden of 
counter-response back on to their shoulders. But I have already stressed that since 
they saw no way out for representationalism, we have every reason to be sceptical 
that any viable effort to salvage their position is forthcoming. At any rate, it seems
indisputable now that we are justified in claiming that the Twin Earth examples could 
prove considerably more damaging for the narrow version of intentional reduction.
Rey sums up the position I have been criticising as follows:
I hasten to add that my endorsement of narrow content in cases such as 
indexicals and qualitative experience does not entail an endorsement of 
narrow content across the board. The viability of a notion of narrow content 
9 In the quoted passage, saying that the state “does not now represent yellowness” has the same effect as 
saying that it now misrepresents blueness, that blueness remains its intentional content, even though the 
content is false.   
10 A more fundamental reason that Rey and White can’t talk of misrepresenting and the related notion of 
falsity is that the type of narrow content they advocate doesn’t produce the kind of truth-conditions which 
would warrant such talk in the present context. They can’t distinguish experiences in terms of true/false, at 
least not in the required way. My current argument can dispense with this point. However, the lack of such 
kind of truth-conditions will shortly be brought up as a serious drawback (see p. 44).     
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seems to me to turn entirely on the degree to which there actually exists a 
stable, internal functional role peculiar to a term (1998, p. 451). 
In light of my remarks, it becomes clear that isolating such a stable narrow functional 
role for every type of visual quality is unlikely to be feasible.  
Finally, is there any remaining motivation for tying perceptual content to proximal 
stimulation conditions even if reducing qualia to such content has probably failed? It 
appears that neither is there an isolable internal functional role that would at least 
capture perceptual content. The point that Block sought to bring out from his 
experiments is that qualia are narrow in the sense that they supervene on molecular 
constitution. I argued that qualia, when viewed as teleo-representational, and wide 
contents do not come apart on Inverted Earth, but this defence of qualia externalism
did not amount to a refutation of Block’s supervenience claim, for, trivially, 
molecular constitution and qualia do not diverge on the alien planet either. These are 
the alternatives, indeed, the only alternatives that the experiments license. And note 
that either alternative (either view of qualia) rules out pinning content down on 
proximal stimulation (i.e. on internal functional role). 
Consider now the first alternative, that is, qualia being supervenient in the way that 
Block would like them to be. It is prima facie plausible to hold that if qualia are thus 
supervenient, contents can be narrowly functional. But closer scrutiny reveals that, 
combined with this view of qualia, they can’t. Again, on arriving on Twin Earth, our
protagonist has an inverter in his optic nerve. The sky excites receptors in band Y 
(causing a phenomenally blue experience and a thought that, say, the sky is dark blue 
today). Does he suddenly, for that sole reason, begin to use the word ‘blue’ to mean 
yellow? Hardly so. Being unaware of having been transported, the person continues 
to use it to mean blue until its meaning gets assimilated to that of its native 
counterpart. Could Rey say, instead, that that the (narrow) intentional content of the 
person’s state remains blue, and that it is only that that content is false until his use of 
the word accords with that of the natives? The answer, again, is negative. Such 
narrow content is unsuitable to yield the kind of truth conditions which would entitle 
one to say this. The requisite kind of true/false distinction is inapplicable here. 
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Consider now the second alternative, one on which qualia are wide. Seeing that if 
qualia are wide, content can’t conceivably be narrow doesn’t require an additional 
argument: if qualia are taken outside, contents will have to go with them – qualia can 
only be taken outside as intentional contents. It turns out now, rather interestingly,
that while Block’s experiments fail as a rebuttal of qualia externalism, they make at 
least a strong case for wideness of experiential intentional content. He would
certainly not disagree about the latter.
This brings my discussion of Rey and White to an end. I conclude that their appeal 
to proximal stimulation patterns/internal functional roles holds out little promise 
whether as an account of qualia or merely as an account of perceptual intentional 
content. Having dealt with (1a) and (1b), we have now progressed to the final stage of 
the reversal the completion of which I committed myself to in the opening paragraphs 
of this chapter. (2), the last obstacle to be overcome, is in fact a slightly more generic 
version of what Block saw as the only position licensed by the Inverted Earth 
scenarios. Although not its main focus, the preceding discussion brought to light (3) 
as a claim that gets an equal licence. It did not, however, go far enough to lead to a 
refutation of (2). This is the task to be taken up in the next section, at the end of 
which we should have (3) firmly in place. 
1.2 Intentional Content of Experience is Wide, but Qualia are Narrow
To indicate clearly enough how the discussion in this section should resume, I need to 
be a little more specific than above about what has been achieved so far and at which 
precise point in the course of our reversal we now find ourselves in view of these 
achievements. The conceptions that fall under (1b) were irreconcilable with 
representationalism primarily because of how they approached the issue of experiential 
intentional contents. Needless to say, their advocates were automatically precluded from 
agreeing with representationalists on the problem of qualia too, since, to repeat, we can 
only take qualia outside as intentional contents, discarding any notion of narrow content 
as we do so. As on all instances of (1b) I have scrutinised content is narrow, reaching (2) 
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required establishing that nothing of significance (i.e. no arguments those instances rested 
on) obstructed the route towards conceiving content as externally determined. Searle’s 
self-referential content was first in focus. He was of the view that, by virtue of their 
phenomenal properties, experiences determine content entirely independently of anything 
extrinsic. It remains less than clear, somewhat mysterious even, just how they can do so 
(not least because the phenomenal properties of experience would play a role of 
unexplained explainers). Towards the end of the discussion it was observed that Searle 
himself allowed some extrinsic factors (indeed, he could not dispense with them), such as 
‘the network’, among others, to aid phenomenal properties in determining content. This 
rendered his original claim untenable. Then the focus shifted on internalists (i.e. Rey and 
White) who, perhaps on the same grounds, recognised that phenomenal properties could 
not be prior to intentional content in order of determination and instead tied contents to 
internal functional roles. This strategy, however, was shown to be flawed too. 
It appears now that there is no major obstacle to embracing content externalism, which 
is what (2) partly reflects. What remains to be seen is whether there is anything that 
threatens to undermine the prospect of embracing qualia externalism. Some of the work 
has already been done above – narrow representationalism, which embeds sensory 
qualities in internal functional roles, does not pose such a threat. But rejecting this theory 
does not suffice to pave the way for qualia externalism: a little later, another internalist 
position regarding qualia cropped up (purported by Block to be the inevitable 
consequence of the Inverted Earth story), one which my discussion at the time lacked the 
resources to refute, namely, that qualia supervene on molecular constitution. Although I 
defended representationalism against this consequence to the effect that it was no longer 
seen as inevitable and that representationalism seemed equally legitimate in light of the 
story, I provided no additional clues as to why representationalism ought to be favoured 
over it. I shall make this final step in this section. 
Peacocke (1983), Shoemaker (1982, 1990) join Block (1990) in accepting the kind of
detachment of qualitative contents from intentional contents stated in (2). Although they 
have been dubbed ‘qualia realists’ in the literature, suggesting that their opinions 
emerged from disputes over whether qualia exist or not, I will follow my preferred use of 
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‘qualia’ and say that they are those who maintain that experiences have qualia as their 
intrinsic properties.
Before I begin my criticism of Block’s supervenience claim, I want to focus first on 
what (2) and representationalism agree on, that is, wideness of content. In particular, 
what I wish to spell out at length is that to hold that qualia are wide amounts to 
construing them as individuated by so-called long-armed functional roles (or distal or 
wide functional roles – I will use these terms interchangeably). None of my previous 
discussions were dedicated to discerning the logical relations that experiential contents 
enter into through being understood as having a long-armed functional role peculiar to 
each of their types. Doing so here will, on the one hand, prepare the ground for deciding 
between representationalism and Block’s supervenience claim (which are, remember, the 
only two options left at this stage): identifying qualia with such functional roles will seem 
to be the obvious choice. On the other hand, as in this chapter I am also in the business of 
characterising externalism about qualia, discerning those logical relations will finally 
make explicit what qualia are being identified with and thus what consequences we can 
rightly attribute to the theory. For until now I have mostly been referring to 
representationalism as a view that external causal factors determine qualia and little has 
been said to explain that they are only intended to do so through being the input
component of long-armed functional roles. They are not claimed to play such a 
determining role through forming mere input-output relations (that is, in isolation from a 
subject’s underlying functional make-up), which were central to behaviourism, let alone 
independently of anything. 
1.2.1 Functionalism and Intentional Contents
Functionalism about intentional contents can be formulated in the following way:
(A) All differences in intentional contents are differences in functional roles, and             
conversely.                                                                                                                  
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The description of the functional role of an experience is fairly complex and involves 
three types of relations. It relates a state to its perceptual input, to other (relevant) states 
of the perceiver, and to its behavioural output. Let two experiences be the states of two 
creatures who belong to the same species and whose visual systems are sensitive to all 
‘physical’ colours and who also have identical functional profiles. Further, the 
individuals are members of the same linguistic community, which prevents them from 
expressing different meanings by uttering the same words, as well as from expressing the 
same meanings by uttering different words. Now, suppose that all we know about their 
current states is that they have elicited different verbal responses, which we take to be the 
relevant outputs, and that we have been told neither what the inputs were nor how the 
states are (functionally/causally) related to other (relevant) states of the individuals. From 
this we can nonetheless infer that their states are related to different inputs, and, on the 
other hand, that they also differ in how they (functionally) relate to the other (relevant) 
states of the individuals. The states will thus have different functional roles in their 
subjects and, according to (A), different intentional contents. Another alternative to 
consider is that all we are told about our subjects’ states is that they differ in the second 
type of relations – (functional/causal) relations to the other (relevant) states of the
subjects. Again, this much suffices for us to judge that the states have different inputs as 
well as outputs, thereby securing a difference in functional roles and, if (A) is true, 
intentional contents.
Note that this is not a defence (or anything of the sort) of the above description of 
functional role. The three types of relations it involves are simply there and one does not 
have to be a functionalist to acknowledge their existence. What makes someone a 
functionalist (or a quasi-functionalist) is a belief that these relations give an experience its 
qualitative (or intentional – if one endorses at least (A)) identity. My present remarks are 
only intended to illustrate what trivially follows from the description in the current 
setting; that a difference in one of the three types of relations results in a difference in 
overall functional roles of the states being considered. Hence, to sum up, a difference in 
outputs points to a difference in overall functional roles, and so does a difference in the 
states’ functional/causal relations to other (relevant) states. And, yes, in the example I 
arranged things in such a way that even a difference in inputs sufficed to immediately 
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distinguish the states with respect to their functional roles and, more importantly, with 
respect to their intentional contents, provided that (A) is true.11 In particular, the 
arrangement that guaranteed this is that the visual systems of the subjects in question 
belonged to the same species as well as the same linguistic community, and, crucially, 
had highly idealised discriminatory powers. Therefore, even the slightest difference in the 
‘physical’ colours of the samples they are shown produces a difference in the other two 
types of relations, and thereby their functional roles. The same does not hold for humans
- certain subtle variations in the wavelengths of the light that reaches our eyes remain 
undetected. I will, however, limit our protagonists’ discriminatory powers more 
dramatically to make obvious the reason why the above description of the functional role 
of an experience does not imply, except in highly idealised situations such as the one we 
have here, that distinct (external) inputs necessarily bring about distinct overall functional 
roles.
Suppose there exists a species of beings who are exactly like us, except that their 
visual systems are incapable of detecting differences between red things and green things. 
Furthermore, suppose they see both as red, call them ‘red’, with the rest of their colour 
vocabulary being exactly like ours. The only word they lack compared with us is ‘green’.
Now, two of these creatures are brought together and one of them is shown a red object, 
while the other is shown a green object. Despite a clear difference in (external) inputs, 
their states will have identical functional roles – they will be related to other (relevant) 
states in the same way and trigger the same verbal responses. This is due to the fact that 
their experiences function in the same way with respect to red things as they do with 
respect to green things, and are used in thought and action in the same way, regardless of 
whether they are caused by red things or green things. Such outcome is to be traced to the 
creatures’ specific underlying functional profiles. It is functional profile that establishes 
links between inputs and outputs. In this particular case it establishes that a variety of 
inputs are subsumed under the same response. Hence, knowing that inputs differ is not 
sufficient to conclude that the states are not functionally identical when this kind of 
scenario takes place. What is the content of these two experiences? For (A) to preserve its 
consistency, it must imply that the states have the same intentional contents, otherwise it 
11 Throughout the example it has been assumed that the relevant inputs are external too. 
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would allow for two experiences to be alike in their functional roles and yet have 
different contents. But what are they? We have seen that it cannot be red for one of the 
states and green for the other. The most sensible answer would be that the content of each 
of the states is red or green, or, to put it more emphatically, red-or-green.12
Although such sensory organs will probably never evolve in any species, this example 
is merely to bring out a point which can then be carried over to humans and presumably 
all other creatures, for there is undoubtedly a threshold, albeit much less conspicuous, to 
how subtle differences among shades of colours we detect. Now, how does this 
functional individuation of intentional contents compare to how externalism is typically 
stated, that is, that intentional contents are individuated by causal factors? This was also, 
except on several occasions, how I referred to the view before I began to discuss 
functional roles. The formulation of externalism about experiential intentional contents
which does not mention functional roles can be rephrased as follows:
(B) All differences in intentional contents are differences in external/causal factors.
How is the example with creatures who are ‘blind’ to differences between red and green
things to be dealt with if (B) is adopted? The word ‘blind’ in the last sentence is of course 
flanked by quotation marks because it should not be understood literally - as suggesting 
that there is a real impairment. Every part of our two individuals’ visual systems is intact, 
which makes them perfectly normal perceivers in the context of their own community. 
The visual systems reliably perform all the functions they have evolved to perform.
These functions include representing both red and green things as being the same colour. 
Let us consider again the case in which one of them is viewing a red object and the other 
a green object. The outcome is that they are in identical states. However, some may be 
tempted to conclude that, on a causal theory, the states will have different intentional 
contents, given that they are caused by different objects. But this would be a confusion of 
(B) with this claim:
12 I do not wish to comment on whether the issue of conjunctivism versus disjunctivism arises here.  At 
any rate, the content of these states can also be expressed as ‘red-and-green’, without this shifting the 
course of the argument. 
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(B’) All differences in external/causal factors are reflected in intentional contents.
One of the factors that might nurture the temptation to attribute (B’) instead of (B) to 
externalism is that the essential contribution of Putnam’s Twin Earth experiments briefly 
mentioned in section 1.1 consisted in showing that indistinguishability in terms of 
perceptible properties does not guarantee indistinguishability in terms of contents. Thus
the word ‘water’ as used by Oscar on Earth and Twin Oscar on Twin Earth refers to H2O 
and XYZ respectively, despite the fact that their grasp of the concept is rooted in the 
perceptible properties of the liquids, which are exactly the same. A difference in 
meanings was explained by an appeal to a difference in external factors. It is certainly 
true that for our two individuals, the objects are indistinguishable, although one of them 
is in fact physically red, and the other physically green. The experiences are qualitatively 
indistinguishable, but are caused by different objects. So can it be objected that the 
experiences should have different intentional contents if Putnam (and externalism 
generally) is right? My example, however, is by no means parallel to Putnam’s Inverted 
Earth.13 Oscar did not grow up on a planet on which both H2O and XYZ can be found. 
Neither did Twin Oscar. Throughout his entire life, Oscar has causally interacted only 
with one of the substances. And so has Twin Oscar. If, for instance, the rivers on Earth 
were filled with H2O and the seas with XYZ, Oscar’s concept ‘water’ would indeed cover 
both H2O and XYZ.14 Only such embellishment of Putnam’s thought experiment would 
make it parallel to my present example. But now the thought expressed by ‘The water is 
incredibly clear’ when he stands on the bank of a river has the same content as ‘The 
water is incredibly clear’ when he is on the seashore. Thus, there is nothing in Putnam’s 
experiments that tips the scales in favour of (B’). (B’) is not the correct statement of 
externalism.
The task of providing a satisfactory answer to the above question now comes to 
comparing (A) with (B). Note that, in contrast to (B), (A) does entail that 
13 Putnam’s experiments, of course, address the issue of conceptual content, not experiential content. 
However, the point about to be stressed does not depend on this difference between the experiments and 
my present example and can be ignored in these circumstances.
14 On condition that there would not be a separate concept for XYZ, thus reducing ‘water’ to mean H2O.
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(A’) Differences in functional roles are reflected in intentional contents.
But this feature of (A) has no direct relevance to the kind of comparison in question, 
mainly because the notion of functional role it includes is further analysed. It is analysed, 
as we have seen, into three types of relations. We must look at one of the contained 
relations, namely the one between the experience and its input in order to find the 
relevant feature. So what interests us is in fact whether (A) entails (B’), that is, whether it 
entails that all differences in external/causal factors are reflected in intentional contents. 
This possibility was already ruled out in the example with red/green ‘blind’ creatures (so 
this only repeats the point made above), where it was shown that it does not follow from 
the description of a functional role that
(B’’) All differences in external/causal factors are reflected in functional roles.
We only need to substitute ‘functional roles’ with ‘intentional contents’ (the substitution 
is warranted by (A)’s individuation of intentional contents by functional roles) in (B’’) to 
see that (A) does not entail (B’). 
Regardless of whether we choose (A) or (B) as a formulation of our theory of 
intentional contents, we will always get the same results after applying them to a variety 
of concrete scenarios. The only stipulation that needs to be added to (A) is that the kind 
of functional role it mentions has to be an instance of what I have been calling, together 
with Block, ‘long-armed’ functional roles, although this has apparently been assumed all 
the way through. Long-armed functional roles are roles that have worldly objects as their 
inputs and outputs, as opposed to short-armed functional roles, the inputs and outputs of 
which do not reach beyond the boundaries of the body.15 So if (A) is associated with 
long-armed functionalism, it amounts to claiming that intentional contents are wide. And 
this is why Block shares with representationalists his views regarding intentional 
contents. His functional roles are, again, long-armed functional roles. Hence the 
agreement between (2) and (3) on wideness of content.
15 Alternatively, some authors speak of distal and proximal roles, or wide and narrow roles. 
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Further, we now have a full grasp of why representationalism is a branch of 
functionalism and also what branch it is. If the representationalist grants that intentional 
contents are individuated by long-armed functional roles, rather than short-armed ones,
and then proceeds to identify qualia with intentional contents so defined, his claim will 
have exactly the same consequences as (3) ((3) was a claim that intentional contents are 
wide and qualia are intentional contents). Thus, we can modify (3) as follows,
(3’) Intentional contents are wide, for they are individuated by long-armed functional 
roles, and qualia are intentional contents.
without thereby affecting its tenability. (3’) finally articulates what it is exactly that the 
representationalist reduces qualia to. (3) then should be seen as a compressed version of 
(3’).
Another, and equally acceptable, way of decompressing (3) besides (3’) by exposing
the functionalist dimension of representationalism is this formulation:
(3’’) Maximal functional duplicates must be phenomenally alike.
In view of this alternative statement, which compares entire functional profiles, a number 
of other features and relations are to be discerned, as so far I have only discussed 
intentional contents in the context of a single such profile. Some were already adduced to 
in connection with teleo-representationalism when I, bearing (3’’) in mind, raised doubts 
about the possibility of accidental maximal functional duplicates in section 1.1.2. I said 
there that representationalism, as stated in (3’’), did not imply that subjects with distinct 
functional organisations could not have qualitatively identical range of experiences, let 
alone that any of their states could not share their qualitative aspect. Some weighty 
support for this can be drawn from my considerations in this sub-section. 
Let us consider qualia and intentional contents at once. Earlier I envisaged a creature who 
was exactly like us, except that it perceived both physically red and physically green 
things as red. While this phenomenal property is what we and the subject in question 
have in common, a state with such a property plays a different role within that system – a 
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system with a distinct functional make-up. And since in that system the state plays a role 
different from that of a phenomenally identical state occurring in us, its content differs 
too – I characterised it as red-or-green. In sub-section 1.1.2 I also imagined that Inverted 
Earthlings have natural inverters in their visual organs (ones which they acquired in the 
course of evolution), in which case their visual states would feature the same range of 
phenomenal properties as ours, despite their functional make-ups being radically 
different. As for the contents of their visual states, these would be reversed with respect 
to those of ours to the effect that, for example, their phenomenally green experiences 
would be about red things. But I hasten to stress, and this is an important point, that 
although I called the experience ‘green’, it is not to suggest that there is a 
misrepresentation - red is what a green experience tracks under the design conditions of 
their visual system. What follows from this is that even if members of a species whose 
qualitative life we know nothing about respond discriminatively to the same variety of 
external stimuli as we do, thereby enabling us to attribute a spectrum of contents which 
matches ours (i.e. neither would there be any ‘red-or-greens’ etc. to narrow their
spectrum in relation to ours, nor any finer discriminative responses to widen it), the 
representationalist can not extrapolate from human qualia to theirs purely on the basis of 
having attributed to them an identical range of contents. Categorise them in terms of 
those wide contents is all he can do. He has nothing more informative to say here.
Bringing to light the precise commitments and, no less importantly, exemptions that
result distinctively from scrutinising the functionalist dimension of representationalism
makes a substantial contribution to my characterisation of the theory, and has at the same 
time prepared the ground for contesting Block’s supervenience claim. On challenging the 
claim I shall now concentrate my efforts.
1.2.2 Against Block’s Supervenience Claim
Why should Block’s supervenience be rejected in favour of assimilating qualia to the 
kind of intentional contents discussed above? To begin, recall his grounds for endorsing 
the supervenience: he urges that it is possible to implant an inverting device in the optic 
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nerve, or even further up the stream of visual processing. He then conjectures that a 
portion of the brain with clearly defined boundaries, one which he calls a ‘visual 
sensorium’ could be discovered. Its boundaries would mark the end of the ‘transduction’ 
process of an impulse and the beginning of the construction of a visual image. 
Nevertheless, he adds, this would be of no comfort to the functionalist, since there could 
be a person with no such clearly defined sensorium, which possibility reinstates his 
objection. Hence the conclusion that qualia are entirely non-functional, making the case 
for the supervenience thesis appear compelling. Drawing on his familiar doctrine of 
continuity of levels of nature in his (1987, chap. 8), Lycan (1996) dismisses the
conclusion arguing that the supervenience claim is nonetheless additional. According to 
the doctrine, 
Neither living things nor even computers themselves are split into a purely
structural level of biological/physiochemical description and any one “abstract”
computational level of machine/psychological description. Rather, they are all 
hierarchically organized at many levels, each level functional with respect to 
those beneath it but structural or concrete as it realises those levels above it (p. 
118-119).  
His thought is that Block’s inference to non-functionality of qualia rests on the two-level 
picture of functional organisation that the quoted passage casts doubt over, one which  
recognises a single (with however wide or narrow functional roles) software/functional
level and a single hardware/structural level, and can only be accepted by those who buy 
into it. Thus to keep narrowing the functional role that one takes to be peculiar to a 
certain type of quale in order to escape Block’s inverter, only to reach the sensorium with 
(possibly) vaguely defined boundaries and wrongly find Block’s conclusion inevitable is
merely to proceed horizontally along the highest levels of functional description. Should 
there turn out to be such a multitude of computational levels, we could equally well
proceed vertically and identify qualia with the functional roles at a lower level. The 
advantage of this approach in contrast with the two-level picture is that even though 
Block could successfully attempt to fashion an inversion scenario for each of the higher 
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levels of description, similar attempts, Lycan points out, would become increasingly 
contentious as we come near the bottom levels. “For example, we would reach the level 
of neurochemistry, and the relevant inversion hypothesis would have to be that two 
subjects could be neurochemically identical yet experience different Strange Qualia” (p. 
120). Lycan himself does not of course hold that phenomenal properties arise at such a 
basic level of functional description. 
Let me first say that while this line of argument does put considerable strain on 
Block’s prospects of toppling any version of functionalism with his inversions, it is not 
fatal, for much to swallow as that particular inversion hypothesis may be, it is not 
inconceivable. Well, Lycan says that “Block himself, at least, evinces no attraction to any 
inversion hypothesis of that strength” (p. 120). However, I don’t believe that the 
inversion is out of the question, although it is hardly feasible using an inverting device. It 
has been established that most narcotics, some of which may affect perception of colours, 
share a high percentage of their characteristics with neurotransmitters (which certainly do 
figure in neurochemical functional descriptions) and have an impact on the brain by 
taking over their function. It can be assumed, then, that the inversion in question would 
be achieved in some such way. 
Second, in this sub-section I seek to rebut the claim that qualia supervene on 
molecular constitution and the argument merely defends functionalism against it. Now, 
the main reason that I mention Lycan’s doctrine (besides its being profoundly insightful 
in the present context) and, together with it, the neurochemical level of description is this: 
There are considerations which show that Block must admit that qualia are functional at 
least at the level of neurochemical description – and that is enough to make him fall prey
to his own objection, given that already at that level an inversion is conceivable. 
According to Block’s supervenience thesis, only for molecule-by-molecule duplicates 
is it necessary that they have the same experiences. As cases where a molecular duplicate 
of a human differs with respect to his experiences or lacks them altogether are 
notoriously difficult to bring out, a successful challenge to his position has proved 
elusive. I will therefore begin with a more modest point: Consider a person who has just
been pronounced brain dead but whose heart continues to pump blood around his body. 
Suppose that his condition was not caused by an extensive mechanical damage to the 
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brain, but instead by its, say, having been starved of oxygen. The person, of course, can 
not strictly be a molecule-by-molecule duplicate of a healthy human, as some of the 
complex compounds in his brain degraded during the time when supply of oxygen was 
interrupted. Plainly, few would deny that he lacks experiences. Now, is it the mere fact
that the person’s molecular constitution has been altered that explains the difference 
between brain dead people and healthy humans as far as their experiences are concerned, 
or rather that the compounds that are essential in realising mental capacities in humans
can no longer perform their function? For example, think of neurotransmitters as being 
among those molecules. While the latter answer is no doubt intuitively more apt, Block 
would have to insist that the former is the case. 
The evidence of multiple-realisibility exhibited by the human brain makes the answer 
I attributed to Block more than just intuitively dubious. Even prior to the findings being 
available, positions such as Block’s were often subjected to charges of chauvinism by 
philosophers, who protested that on those views some imaginary silicon-based creatures 
could not become objects of sympathy even if their behaviour strongly suggested the 
presence of a highly sophisticated inner life. Shewmon’s (1999) is a study of 
hydranencephalics, people whose cortex is severely underdeveloped, or in some cases is 
missing altogether. He found that, with only their brainstem fully grown, they were 
capable of perceptual discriminations, a capacity to which only certain regions of the 
cortex are dedicated in normal children and adults. The chemical description of a
hydranencefalic’s brainstem when he is in a perceptual state M is hardly identical to that 
of a healthy person’s relevant cortical region when in the very same phenomenal state. So 
Block now must concede that mental qualities are functional at least at a level where they 
are already susceptible to inversions, in other words, that the molecular constitution of 
the brainstem is of secondary importance insofar as those molecules, as it is the case in 
Shewmon’s findings, take over the function of the molecules in the cortex which create 
perceptual images in normal subjects. Thus the absence of experiences in patients who 
are in a vegetative state is not down to mere alterations in the chemical constitution of 
their brains, but rather to the fact that the relevant functional relations no longer obtain.
Having said this, it remains to be the case that, even having acknowledged the existence 
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of a whole hierarchy of functional levels with varying degrees of abstractness, qualia 
externalism is the only branch of functionalism impervious to inversions.   
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2. Developing the Challenge
I began Chapter I. with a modest attempt at a diagnosis of our pre-theoretic inclination
to regard qualia as intrinsic properties of experiences. The idea was that the entire 
background of the inclination is given its most faithful expression in a model on which 
having conscious visual experiences, of both veridical and non-veridical variety, comes 
down to nothing more than viewing a two-dimensional picture located in the mind. The 
model would seem to be the default option for anyone uninterested in the science of 
sensory perception and until some time ago even for many philosophers, since what 
appears to be going on when - to use that much-worn example once again - I’m having a 
pink after-image, is that the patch I’m seeing is evidently a part of me, floating there 
regardless of what’s around me or what other states it brings about in me, with pinkness 
as its phenomenal property, which I simply ‘see’ that it possesses independently of 
anything extrinsic. A straightforward extrapolation then fashions the same model for 
other, less conspicuous kinds of non-veridical perception as well as veridical perceptions. 
The model squares neatly with the fact that even prior to any schooling in philosophy 
many of us wondered whether others see common objects in the same colours – if I 
simply ‘see’ that pinkness is a property of the patch that I believe to be a part of me, 
which it ‘evidently’ possesses independently of anything else, it seems reasonable to 
think that it may have this property entirely arbitrarily, that is, that others may see it 
differently under the same circumstances. And it is easy to understand how the 
preconception stokes the philosophical anxieties (i.e. conceivability of zombies and 
qualia inversions, direct and infallible access) known as ‘the hard problem of qualia’. 
This picture of conscious perceptual states finds its most congenial counterpart among 
philosophical views in a version of the sense-data theory, some details of which were 
discussed in section 1.1.1. The view marked the starting point in the process of gradually 
shifting qualia-determining factors from inside to the environment. A version of the 
sense-datum theory was chosen as the initial stage due to it being a mirror image of 
qualia externalism, or better perhaps, its reversed form: we have (perceptual) access to 
the outside world only via the phenomenal properties of a two-dimensional image, i.e. 
through sensing sense-data; on representationalism, what we have such access to also 
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determines the qualitative aspect of our sensory states. The two thus lie at the opposite 
ends of the spectrum. The kind of spectrum that I have in mind, one which I proceeded 
through in Chapter I. in pursuit of shifting qualia-determining factors outside as noted 
again just above, is of course only made up of those views of mental qualities that are 
located in representationalism’s immediate vicinity, i.e. those that are interpretable as 
taking a stand on wideness vs. narrowness of content and whose at least one identifying 
feature is the way they relate qualia to whatever they believe the correct account of 
perceptual content to be. 
My approach in Chapter I. was largely negative: I simply outlined and rejected several 
positions in the spectrum until qualia externalism seemed to be the only viable alternative 
and I may have fallen far short of making a truly positive case for the account I 
eventually endorsed. But my project in this thesis as set out in the introduction does not 
demand that I do so. This should become much clearer when the main line of argument 
starts to develop later in this chapter. Suffice it to say now that all that was required there 
was, firstly, to show that a move from sense-data and then along our entire spectrum to 
representationalism can succeed, and, secondly, to extract in the process a number of 
essential characteristics of representationalism to be adduced to in the remainder of my 
work.
Mentioning at the outset the pre-theoretic pictorial model of perception and its 
philosophical counterpart – the sense-data theory – will help introduce the subject matter 
of this chapter. Among the positions considered in Chapter I. the sense-data theory is the 
odd one out in a sense that is crucial for my purposes here. It was presented as falling 
under (1a), on which sensory experiences make us aware of internal occurrences and so 
their intentional contents as well as qualitative properties are narrow. The feature that sets 
the view apart from the other ones considered in chapter I. is that the kind of 
intentionality involved in (1a) is in fact higher-order intentionality, for those who once 
held a version of the theory would be reluctant to say that sense-data are intentional. The 
source of higher-order intentionality here is the fact that sense-data themselves are sensed 
– they do not constitute perceptual awareness, rather, it is the ‘inner eye’ that does so. By 
contrast, the other competitors of (3) that I dealt with after dissolving mental objects of 
perception with a Lycan-style counterfactual analysis only involved intentionality of first-
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order variety. Well, some may protest that sense-data do not generate genuine higher-
order contents just by being targets of sensing – they are to be conceived of as (mental) 
objects rather than first-order states and thus it would appear less than reasonable to 
speak of higher-order intentionality in absence of first-order states; the theory, as the 
objection might continue, merely transfers objects of sensing inside the subject (or more 
precisely, to the mind). Similarly, the fact that my aching stomach is inside me does not 
make the relevant pain-state a higher-order one. Though I grant that there are less 
contentious instances of higher-order states (which is another testimony to how difficult it 
is to come to grips with sense-data theories), we do have an overriding principle to 
invoke which rules that the state of sensing a sense-datum falls into that category after all. 
Note that sense-data are purported to carry qualitative properties and are therefore, unlike 
my aching stomach or common worldly objects, items belonging to one’s psychological 
life. Hence higher-order states ought to be defined as what facilitates the mind’s 
awareness of what it comprises. 
Since sense-data are by no means first-order states and yet generate suitable higher-
order contents, such arrangement would perhaps be most appropriately labelled as a 
‘proto-higher-order account’ of conscious experience. In other words, it’s an early 
version of - and this is what I aim to highlight in relation to the central focus of this 
chapter - detaching the state which constitutes perceptual awareness on the one hand, 
from the qualities-bearing component on the other. The objective in this chapter is to 
argue that the detachment is a substantial leap forward and that any viable conception of 
the architecture of phenomenal consciousness must incorporate higher-order awareness 
into it. However, once we have this point firmly in place, it will transpire that the only 
plausible candidates for providing vehicles for higher-order awareness (those directed at 
lower-order qualitative states in particular) are natural-language sentences, the semantic 
properties of which derive from the role they play in inferences. Consequently, the kind 
of semantics we shall adopt for what (i.e. natural-language sentences) lends states of 
awareness their shape, structure and, most importantly, their identity will inevitably 
produce a view on which the only genuine form of awareness we know of and recognise 
is one which amounts to a move in a ‘logical space of reasons’. Of course, at this stage in 
the argument, Sellars will already be engaged in the debate. In the latter sections of the 
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chapter I will explain how this approach to higher-order awareness, even when paired 
with externalism about qualia to provide a complete architecture of phenomenal 
consciousness, collapses into something which very closely resembles the sense-data 
theory of sensory perception. Rather dauntingly then, the present paragraphs are not the 
last time I’ve mentioned sense-data; and when they are reinstated in the way I’ve just 
indicated, it will seem utterly futile to seek to dissolve them with Lycan’s counterfactual 
analysis again and proceed towards qualia externalism, for we will risk getting entrapped 
in the very same circle.
2.1 Worldly vs. Experiential Subjectivity     
Externalism about qualia - the position we arrived at in the previous chapter - was 
stated as follows:
(3) Experiential intentional contents are wide and qualia are intentional contents.
The standard definition of qualia – or at least that endorsed by “qualia realists” - is 
that they are intrinsic properties of experiences in virtue of which experiences are 
conscious. And an experience counts as conscious only if there is something it is like to 
have it. I said already at the beginning of chapter I. that my use of the term throughout the 
chapter would not entail that they were non-relational and that my discussion would be 
that of their status (intrinsic vs. relational) rather than their existence. However, for the 
sake of the overall argument in chapter I. as well as the present one, the second part of the 
definition was retained in that qualia were understood as what accounts for “what-it’s-
likeness” of experience’ (see page 1.). On such understanding of ‘qualia’ in (3), the claim 
can only be attributed to first- as opposed to higher-order representationalism. For 
convenience, following other works on the subject, the acronyms FOR (first-order 
representationalism) and HOR (higher-order representationalism) will also be adopted.  
If chapter I. was a first point of departure from the “qualia realist’s” construal of 
qualia in that the most plausible view out of those considered there (i.e. 
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representationalism) diffused intrinsic qualia in one’s maximal functional network, then 
in this chapter a further deviation from it will be encouraged, one which leads to denying 
that a state’s possessing qualia is a sufficient condition of phenomenal consciousness, 
thereby paving a way towards a HOR theory. But I must stress that although having 
ditched the belief that qualia explain “what-it’s-likeness” of experiences does amount to 
rejecting first-order representationalism, many fundamentals of it will be built into the 
resulting higher-order view: once we have stripped qualia of phenomenal consciousness 
as HOR theorists recommend, the residue (I will also call it ‘residual qualia’), taken now 
only as a necessary condition, will still be identified with wide contents. Having said this, 
I by no means wish to recant the claim I made at the end of chapter I.: that out of those 
positions to which the way they relate qualia to first-order contents (with the exception of 
sense-data theories, which, due to their anomalous nature, presuppose higher-order 
contents) is somehow essential or are at least so interpretable, first-order 
representationalism is by far the most acceptable one. 
Carruthers (1996, 2000), Lycan (1996), Armstrong (1984), Rosenthal (1986, 2005), 
and Dennett (1991) are the most prominent authors who hold or in some way sympathise 
with higher-order approaches to phenomenal consciousness. Only the first two can rightly 
be regarded to be intentionalists about qualia (understood here as “stripped” of 
consciousness) carried by first-order states. Carruthers is in fact an internalist about these, 
appealing to the type of functional roles (of first-order states) that Rey and White (see 
section 1.1.2) thought generated phenomenally conscious experiences. Incidentally, the 
ground that Rosenthal occupies in his (2005) at the first-order level bears a striking 
resemblance to Austen Clark’s (1993) quality space touched on briefly in 1.1.2 too, 
although he prefers to call it a ‘homomorphism theory’. 
Since it is intentionalism regarding consciousness that I’m concerned with in this 
work, we will set aside the varying details of these authors’ approaches to first-order 
representations, and whatever turns out to be the most suitable candidates for serving as 
vehicles for higher-order states will be conjoined solely with externalism about (residual) 
qualia so as to provide a complete picture of phenomenal consciousness. And, to 
reiterate, I already went to some lengths to argue for externalism in the previous chapter, 
even though there qualia were not bereft of the conscious component. But again, 
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essentially the same arguments could be deployed to support externalism about residual 
qualia. 
Thus in most generic terms, higher-order approaches to consciousness are ones on 
which a conscious experience comes into existence over two isolable but more or less 
coinciding stages: a qualitative one and a conscious one. Now, showing the following 
claims to be true would facilitate mounting a powerful case against first-order 
representationalism and for higher-order representationalism at the same time: (i) that 
there are qualitative states that occur in absence of consciousness, (ii) that there are states 
that are genuine instances of perceiving, to which the FOR theorist would have no choice 
but to attribute wide perceptual contents or face charges of inconsistency, but which 
nonetheless lack phenomenality altogether, (iii) that HOR has the resources to explain the 
difference between states such as those described in (i) and (ii) on the one hand, and 
conscious experiences on the other, and finally (iv), that only a HOR theory and not first-
order representationalism is in a position to explain why my experience as of something 
yellow should feel like this rather than like something else. That (iii) and (iv) are included 
is to pre-empt objections that, even if proponents of HOR do manage to substantiate (i),
adding HOTs (higher-order thoughts) would shed light on just one kind of consciousness, 
that is, what Block (1995) calls access consciousness, while it leaves the problem of 
phenomenal feels untouched. Furthermore, even (i) seems highly unintuitive at the first 
glance, for many would take the view that what is distinctive of qualitative states is that 
access consciousness is inherent in them – it is not conferred upon them from outside, 
whether from upper levels or elsewhere. Positing HOTs, they would urge, is a plain 
redundancy, a duplication of what is already installed in experience anyway. Thus Levine 
writes: 
The inadequacy of both HO and the access/phenomenal distinction manifests the 
paradoxical duality of qualitative experiences: there is an awareness relation, 
which ought to entail that there are two states serving as the relevant relata, yet 
experience doesn't seem to admit of this sort of bifurcation. Let's call this the 
problem of “duality.” That qualia have this dual nature, and that certain conscious 
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thoughts are phenomenally constituted, are clearly intimately connected. (2001, p. 
168)
Carruthers clearly acknowledges that addressing these worries satisfactorily must be 
among the desiderata for HOR:               
For why should an analog, but non-conscious, perceptual representation suddenly 
acquire the subjectivity distinctive of phenomenal consciousness merely because 
it causes a higher-order belief about itself? How can the mere fact that I have non-
inferential knowledge of the occurrence of a certain experience make it the case 
that there is suddenly something which it is like to undergo that experience? And 
how can the phenomenally conscious differences between distinct phenomenally 
conscious states be explained, on this account? For it looks as if those differences 
can only be differences between the contents of the first-order states targeted by 
HOTs in each case. The difference between having a HOT that I am undergoing a 
state with the analog content reda, on the one hand, and having a HOT that I am 
undergoing a state with the content greena, on the other, can only reside in the 
differences between the first-order contents reda and greena, but these differences 
are already there in the non-conscious perceptual states which become targeted! 
(2000, p. 239)
Carruthers’ body of arguments covers all of the above four points. As for (ii), he is the 
only higher-order theorist who invokes some compelling evidence for perceiving without 
phenomenality reported in cognitive science literature to argue for a higher-order 
account. Lycan (1996) and Rosenthal (2005) would have something to say about (i), (iii) 
and (iv), but these alone would surely suffice for FOR to be superseded by HOR. 
In the remainder of this section I shall look at what justification for (i) – (iv) is 
provided by advocates of HOR and in so doing I will seek to elucidate how they jointly 
lend themselves to Carruthers’ distinction between worldly and experiential subjectivity, 
and the more or less parallel qualia/“what-it’s-likeness” and thin/thick phenomenality 
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distinctions drawn by Lycan and Rosenthal respectively. These distinctions will then give 
the idea that phenomenal consciousness emerges at the second-order level a very solid 
footing.
Rosenthal’s, Lycan’s and Carruthers’ arguments for (i) are in large part a reflection on 
what Armstrong (1981) termed ‘minimal consciousness’, describing experiences of an 
absent-mined driver. This is a common phenomenon, one that is particularly likely to 
occur when we go about the most tedious of our daily routines, when our thoughts drift 
away from what we are currently doing. So Armstrong’s long-distance truck driver may 
happen to be day-dreaming while he continues to drive safely, negotiates a roundabout, 
stops at traffic lights and follows road signs. Rosenthal mentions prolonged headaches to 
bring out the same point. A headache can last for hours, but we repeatedly forget about it 
or something sufficiently entertaining takes our mind off the discomfort. Despite feeling 
a momentary relief on such occasions, we would not say that we had a “sequence of 
discontinuous, brief headaches” (p.39). These are just some of the familiar cases pointing 
towards a dissociation of qualia from conscious awareness. One might still ask: “If you 
are unaware of a quale, how do you know it’s there? Well, consider the long-distance 
driver whose thoughts have drifted away from driving. It is certainly correct to say that, 
as long as his eyes stay open, his visual system continues to process stimuli and create 
visual images, and that these stand readily available regardless of whether his thoughts 
wander around. Were this not so, one would be obliged to claim that when the driver 
chooses to concentrate on driving again, his attention mechanism somehow issues an 
instruction to the visual system to resume construction of images. But during the time 
when he drove absent-mindedly, he acted on what his visual images presented him with 
anyway. 
Although explaining the significance of these examples for HOR will be postponed 
until we get to (iii) and (iv), it is immediately obvious that they, and the fact that we form 
thoughts about and act upon the contents of non-conscious perceptions in particular, will 
prove awkward for the FOR theorist. Recall from section 1.2.1, where I examined in 
some detail the consequences of functionalising contents, that a state’s intentional link 
with external objects (i.e. its wide content) is set up by the unique long-armed functional 
role which that state-type occupies, for if an account of wide content failed to involve 
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functionality and instead attributed contents solely on the basis of (external) inputs and 
responses, the result would be a simple input-output behaviourism. For that reason, (3) 
was said to be equivalent to the following:
(3’) Intentional contents are wide, for they are individuated by long-armed functional 
roles, and qualia are intentional contents.
Now, tokens of the same experience-type are invariably accompanied by certain other 
mental states as well as actions, beliefs and verbal reports, many of which are classifiable 
as either first- or second-order. Functionalists are typically selective about which of these 
causal links should make a contribution to defining a state’s functional identity, as some 
are deemed marginal or entirely irrelevant as far as its role in the system is concerned.16
Which get selected of course very often varies wildly from author to author, but of those 
states, actions, etc. which are classifiable as either first- or higher-order, the first-order
representationalist, whose claim (3’) is, will only be keen to include certain members of 
the former category, otherwise he would adulterate his account with elements of HOR. 
Therefore the P in Tye’s PANICs stands for ‘poised to have an impact on first-order
beliefs and actions’. The problem then is that quite irrespective of which first-order 
states, actions, etc. are granted the privilege of forming constitutive functional relations 
to, say, my conscious experience as of something pink, it is hard to see how at least some 
of those relations could fail to obtain when an experience of the same type occurs non-
consciously.      
Imagine that while the truck driver drives absent-mindedly, there is a person in a pink 
tracksuit crossing the road. With his thoughts far away, he brakes to let him cross. It 
makes perfectly good sense to say that this (non-conscious) first-order action resulted 
from a (non-conscious) first-order belief that there is a person in pink crossing the road, 
and yet neither of them guarantees that the visual state that had caused them was 
conscious. Even an appeal to functional relations to first-order verbal reports would not 
16 For instance, a processing unit in a computer is usually connected to a indicator light which tells the 
user when it is in operation, but if the computer had been built without the light, that would not have altered 
its role in the system or made it any less clear. It is relations to certain other components that define its role 
as a processor and hence the functional term ‘processing unit’.
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do, however strongly we are inclined to think that we can only report those experiential 
contents that we consciously attend to. Suppose that the driver, while, for example, 
overcome by sorrow at the thought of some tragic recent event, non-consciously 
misjudges his distance from the pedestrian in proportion to his speed, so when the truck 
suddenly screeches to a halt, he shouts: “Thank heavens I noticed he was too close and 
started braking harder!” Though he would surely have ‘come round’ by this point, the 
utterance may well originate in a visual state which occurred prior to his coming round, at 
the time merely causing him to think non-consciously that the man was too close and that 
he had to brake harder. For when later asked about when exactly he noticed that the man 
was too close, which he must have done judging by, say, the skid marks, he might answer 
that he doesn’t remember because he was still overwhelmed by memories of the tragic 
event and that it was the spontaneous verbal reaction that really drew his conscious 
attention back to the dangerousness of the situation. 
True, few would be prepared to accept an account which makes the presence of 
phenomenal consciousness contingent upon the capacity to produce verbal reports, but it 
is considered here to help emphasise the fact that the search for such functional links to 
first-order states that would clearly differentiate between conscious and non-conscious 
instances of the same experience-type is futile. All conditions for the presence of 
phenomenal consciousness that the representationalist can legitimately put forward 
within the confines of a first-order theory are equally well satisfied by the kind of non-
conscious states described above.  
It is easy to unwittingly slip into thinking that here I simply overlook the fact that it is 
the absence of first- and not higher-order attention that explains why the driver’s 
experiences are non-conscious. His attention - and this is surely correct - shifts from the 
contents of his experiences rather than the experiences themselves to, say, his empty 
stomach and thoughts about food. Does this mean that the situation can be dealt with in 
purely first-order terms by claiming that only those perceptual states are conscious whose 
(wide) contents become targets of first-order attention? To ask this is to already lose sight 
of what has just been said in connection with (3’). According to (3’), an experience’s 
wide content (attributed on the basis of its long-armed functional role) accounts for what 
it is like to have it. Bearing this in mind, if the first-order representationalist believes that 
71
the answer to the question is ‘yes’ and takes the view that there is nothing it is like to 
have an experience when it is not accompanied by first-order attention, then the 
consequence to which he commits himself is that the driver’s experiences somehow cease 
to be contentful states the moment he stops concentrating on his driving. If they didn’t, 
wide contents and what-it’s-likeness would come apart, thereby undermining the identity 
of contents and qualia asserted in (3’). The only way to avoid the consequence would be 
to make attribution of content conditional on the presence of first-order attention by 
integrating it into the functional roles peculiar to each perceptual state. But this is a 
failure to appreciate the significance of the notion of contentfulness in theorising about 
mind - a failure to appreciate why we attribute content at all. The notion of contentfulness 
is intimately connected with behavioural discrimination. To say that a state is contentful 
is in effect to credit its subject with the ability to show discerning behaviour with respect 
to the environment. It is difficult to see how attention could figure in this conceptual 
connection and be decisive in drawing a divide between contentful and contentless states. 
Followers of Block’s typology of consciousness would take a different tack and, as it 
was previously anticipated, protest on behalf of FOR that states with unheeded contents 
merely lack access consciousness not phenomenal consciousness. On such 
(terminological) rearrangement, the fact that much of the behavioural pattern unique to a 
certain state is preserved in absence of attention would prove favourable for FOR. The 
move, however, is forestalled by (ii).                   
(ii) was a claim that there are states that are genuine instances of perceiving, to which 
the FOR theorist would have no choice but to attribute wide perceptual contents or face 
charges of inconsistency, but which nonetheless lack phenomenality altogether. The 
claim, provided that its truth is beyond doubt, will bring out another sense in which an 
experience can be non-conscious. The perceptions of the absent-minded driver were non-
conscious due to (first-order) attention-shifts, but they possessed phenomenality - their 
contents continued to be accessed (intended here more broadly to include access by non-
conscious thoughts; not to imply the sense of ‘access’ intended by Block) as contents of 
qualitative states. Disputing this would mean that the visual system ceases construction of 
images whenever attention shifts elsewhere, or so I briefly argued. (ii), by contrast, is 
about perceptions whose contents are not accessed as contents of qualitative states, 
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whether the kind of access in question is achieved through attention or when in absent-
minded mode. 
I have already remarked that it is Carruthers (1996, 2000) who, from the perspective 
of HOR, has recast a set of findings reported in cognitive science literature (particularly 
(Milner and Goodale, 1995), (Marcel, 1998) and (Weiskrantz, 1986)) as an argument for 
(ii). In the next few paragraphs I shall follow how the evidence is transcribed in his work 
into the terminological framework that is home to the kind of philosophical issues of 
consciousness which are currently under scrutiny. To begin, he explains that stimuli 
picked up by the retina are handled along not one but two distinct routes. However, 
contrary to what was previously assumed, the information travelling through the two 
transduction channels does no end up being integrated to form a single visual 
representation. Rather, the streams terminate in spatially different, and, more importantly, 
functionally dissociable regions of the brain. We can dispense here with the 
neurophysiological details about the two channels of processing and the precise locations 
of the corresponding terminal regions and concentrate instead on their functional 
description in Carruthers’ text, as this will help make intelligible the idea of perceiving 
without phenomenality. Distinctive of one of the channels is the fact that its stimuli flow 
towards the regions believed to be dedicated to generating visual images (in the temporal 
cortex), where those states are subsequently available for conceptualisation and 
reasoning. The areas associated with language are also thought to be linked to these 
regions on the functional map of the brain. On the other hand, the second route leads to 
the evolutionarily inferior parts of the brain designated on the map to control 
instantaneous motor responses (in the parietal cortex), such as grasping or catching a 
moving object. 
Based on the copious dissociation data he rehearses, Carruthers feels entitled to speak 
of the processing paths and their terminal regions as discrete visual systems. Predictably 
enough, the end products of the former are what philosophers of mind would label 
“qualitative”, while the system which controls execution of swift motor reactions 
involves no qualities at all. The close connection between the ‘qualitative’ system and the 
concept-wielding faculty and language on the functional map of the brain is interpreted as 
suggesting that qualitative states are mainly required for deployment of concepts in 
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identification and recognition of objects, which on many occasions involves lengthy 
examination and assessment of the perceived scene. The motor system comes into play 
when, for example, the object that has just been identified is in motion, and the need 
arises for whatever reason to alter with great speed and accuracy the position of one’s 
body or limb in relation to the object. So when trying to stop a mosquito from disrupting 
my sleep, the ‘qualitative’ system facilitates my identification of that thing as the insect 
that is being the nuisance, but then, once it’s been identified, it is the motor-control 
system that assists my attempts to follow its frantic movements with my hand as I prepare 
to swat it. Carruthers mentions taking part in fist-fighting or sprinting over uneven terrain 
as cases when the latter is engaged. 
Besides the hypothesis that only object-recognition and not instantaneous and accurate 
execution of motor responses should be aided by qualitative states, there are reasons for 
the motor system’s lack of phenomenology which have more directly to do with the 
purpose it has been designed for. It seems natural, or so we are told, to think that one’s 
ability to adjust effectively the position of one’s limb in relation to a moving object is 
enhanced if his motor system by-passes, so to speak, construction of images and its 
functional accompaniment – conceptualisation and reasoning. Of course, delivering 
sensory images would in itself cause at most a negligible delay even when the swiftness 
of accurate motor reactions is at stake. But I think the following analogy will bring out 
nicely why qualitative states should nonetheless be an impediment: At the most basic 
level, operations in computers are carried out in the so-called machine code. The units or 
symbols over which it computes at that level are sequences in binary code. The computer 
also has an interface, whereby certain information is available in the form of a graphic 
layout on the screen to be utilised by the user. But regardless of how the information is 
graphically presented to the user, the computer stores and handles it as sequences in 
binary code. Corresponding to such information in the visual system would be 
stimulation patterns moving up the ‘qualitative’ route while carrying information about 
the environment. 
As it could be guessed, I want to suggest that qualitative visual states (i.e. visual 
images) are in their own characteristic way the brain’s interface with the mind (this is of 
course not to indicate an ontological split between the brain and the mind). The first point 
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to be made is that visual images cannot directly cause action, prior to some aspects of 
their contents being conceptualised, otherwise it would be utterly mysterious why some 
particular perceptual contents result in this and not some other course of action being 
taken (or alternatively, why only some and not other aspects of an experience’s contents 
are acted on at a particular time t). Plainly, I can attempt to swat something only if I have 
identified what I see as the insect that is causing my annoyance. But if I instead identify 
what I see there as a speck of dust that’s gone airborne, a different course of action will 
be taken – I will simply look elsewhere for the mosquito I am after. So qualitative states 
lead to action only insofar as they are transformed into perceptual beliefs, thoughts, etc. 
In other words, they are only available to be utilised in or via conceptualisation and 
belief-formation. I mean ‘belief’ in a broader sense here to include the perceptual beliefs 
of the absent-minded driver or even beliefs made up of more primitive concepts 
attributable to animals. When the absent-minded driver steers around a hole in the 
tarmac, he is credited with the belief that there is a hole in the tarmac. To be more 
precise, and this is another point to highlight, he is in fact credited with a whole set of 
beliefs at once, for example, that driving over holes wears the suspension, that he will 
spill his drink if he doesn’t avoid it and so on, as well as, needless to say, the possession 
of a wealth of interdependent concepts. The same arguably holds for all cases of 
exploiting the contents of qualitative states – in order to be of any use at all to ‘the user’, 
they must bring into play not just one belief, but an entire network of inferentially 
connected beliefs (and concepts). Similarly, no further processing of the information 
shown up in the computer interface will take place until the user decides what to do with 
it, and what decision is made will very much depend on his current needs and beliefs. 
In light of these points, it is understandable that the visual system should delegate the 
task of controlling instantaneous or instinctive motor reactions to a subsystem which by-
passes construction of images. In short, qualitative states cannot result in action without a 
body of concepts and beliefs having been applied, and with them they are much to go 
through before their contents are acted upon. Perhaps the absent-minded driver’s situation 
is fairly straightforward to deal with, and, in addition, steering around the hole by 
continuously conceptualising the changing scene as he approaches it at a normal speed 
would not be a hindrance. 
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But consider, as Carruthers does, catching a ball, especially when it is thrown with 
power and takes a deflection, or an awkward bounce as it spins. We often speak of 
instinctive reactions, and rightly so, given that every time a ball is thrown in this way, it 
comes at a different speed, has a different trajectory, spins differently, etc. It is 
questionable whether we can even conceptualise and put together in the form of beliefs 
the countless variables and their values according to which we adjust the position of our 
hands, and which values, let alone their combinations, are never repeated with a new such 
throw - not to mention the cognitive burden on us if we could and did; and yet in most 
cases the adjustment is well-timed and made with remarkable precision. We would feel 
strongly here that the only explanation for such a high rate of success is that the visual 
system must, in the proper sense of the word, take account of those innumerable factors 
in guiding the movements of our limbs - it is only unlikely that the subsystem which 
allegedly guides those movements should make them and their values available, by 
displaying them in an ‘interface’, to ‘the user’, that is, to the conceptualising a 
deliberating self.
These remarks are primarily intended to outline the role of non-qualitative perception 
within a sentient creature provided that there does turn out to be such mode of perceiving. 
It can be taken as a sketch of an argument for its existence only if it is underpinned by 
weighty experimental evidence. Without it, many would consider it vague and largely 
anecdotal. Carruthers draws on a number of studies in which one system is dissociated 
from the other in various impairments, and even experiments with healthy people which 
point towards this qualitative/non-qualitative division in the visual system. I will focus on 
just one clear-cut case where the ability to act on perceptual contents is preserved while 
phenomenality is partially missing – a now familiar disorder known as blindsight.
To begin, note that there are other examples of sensory ‘representations’ without 
phenomenality such as those involved in early visual processing. Neander (1998, p. 412) 
takes HOR theories to be partly an answer to the question as to why those representations 
aren’t conscious. It would be a mistake, however, to think that this question alone calls 
for a distinctively higher-order answer. Representations built in the early stages of the 
processing of a stimulus fail to satisfy at least the P in Tye’s set of requirements 
abbreviated to PANIC. They are immediately followed by further processing of stimuli, 
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not by beliefs and actions.  The stipulation that qualitative states be poised is to mark the 
point where the non-conceptual and the conceptual meet – the point where 
representations acquire phenomenality. This is akin to the idea laid out above that 
qualitative representations are in their own characteristic way the brain’s interface with 
the conceptualising self. 
As in the case of representations constructed in the early stages of processing, Tye’s 
response to the facts of blindsight is that the states they undergo in their blind region 
aren’t suitably poised; they aren’t apt to produce beliefs in their subjects, since, on being 
prompted, blindsighters merely guess what’s before them and are taken aback when they 
learn about the accuracy they achieve. Although he is right that they do not form beliefs 
with respect to those states, Tye’s notion of poisedness (as well as the rest of the 
requirements), I will argue, fails to pinpoint the difference between blindsighters and 
normally sighted people. It fails, that is, unless he wants to be understood as saying that 
beliefs, or, rather, dispositions to produce beliefs somehow endow perceptual 
representations with qualitative status. A further elucidation of his notion of poisedness 
will reveal why this is so. 
Consider first the following passage:
… representations are built up of distal features of the surfaces of external objects 
in mechanical fashion by computational processes. The initial, or input, 
representations for the visual module track light intensity and wavelength, 
assuming nothing is malfunctioning. The output representations track features of 
distal stimuli. Thereby, it seems plausible to suppose, they represent those 
features. It is here that things initially acquire their looks, here that basic 
perceptual experiences are found. Likewise, for the other senses. (1996, p. 293)    
The passage summarises the computational processes which take place in the visual 
system. The computations are performed automatically, independently of the upper levels 
of cognition in the subject. The early symbolic representations that are constructed carry 
information about proximal stimuli and are converted over several intermediate 
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computational steps the character of which need not concern us here into symbols 
carrying information about distal stimuli. Sets of symbols become phenomenal states the 
moment they come to represent distal features, the moment they acquire wide contents. 
Note that there is no mention of beliefs or actions yet.
There is, however, a second line of thought and it is here that the functional link to 
beliefs and actions that he calls ‘poisedness’ comes into play. Later in the same article 
Tye speculates about which simple creatures have states with PANIC, in other words, 
which simple creatures can be plausibly thought to entertain qualitative states on the 
PANIC theory. His conjecture is that the presence of suitably poised states in creatures 
lower down the evolution tree is invariably manifested in behaviour with a certain degree 
of flexibility. What underlies flexible behaviour is the ability to access, by means of 
forming beliefs, the contents of one’s perceptions and discard certain other beliefs in light 
of those contents. Thus Tye has it, for instance, that caterpillars’ states lack qualitative 
aspects. When foraging, they move, without exception, towards the brightest light source. 
If a sufficiently bright artificial light with nothing edible around it is placed nearby, they 
will be attracted to it and stay there until they starve to death. There is no learning and 
therefore no behavioural flexibility to warrant attribution of beliefs (e.g. beliefs that there 
is a light source with such and such a degree of brightness). To put it in the spirit of the 
quoted passage and show how this second line of thought connects with it, since all their 
arguably primitive visual system registers is light intensity, i.e. features of proximal 
stimuli, they cannot be said to act upon or have beliefs about wide perceptual contents; 
the computations of what is initially proximal stimuli do not reach the stage where 
representations of distal stimuli are generated. This must not to be confused with the case 
of a person whose vision is so severely impaired that he can only make out crude 
differences in brightness between objects, for even though his discriminatory powers 
would not be far superior to those of, say, caterpillars, he continues to have widely 
contentful representations, albeit substantially impoverished. The motion of the 
caterpillar’s body, by contrast, is the result of a brute-causal connection with the features 
of a proximal stimulus. 
Compare this with what Tye says about fish. Some predatory fish can, for example, 
learn to avoid artificially coloured fish that have been injected with a chemical to make 
78
them unpalatable despite otherwise being included in their diet. Having mentioned 
several other experiments, he concludes that their behaviour exhibits the kind of 
creativity or flexibility which can only be explained by an ability to form novel concepts 
and beliefs (e.g. such and such is no longer edible), and that the formation of those must 
be facilitated by their genuinely examining or assessing a scene as it is laid out before 
them – as opposed to displaying mere brute-causal input-output transitions.
So here is why, at least on my reading of Tye, the term ‘poised’ in his theorising about 
phenomenality is intended to mean ‘poised to make a difference in beliefs (and actions)’ 
rather than just ‘poised to make a difference in actions’: the former expresses the thought 
that when a representation of distal stimuli occurs, the transition from the (external) input 
to behavioural output is never brute-causal, but is instead mediated by beliefs. And 
although such representations do not always cause beliefs with respect to their contents, 
the fact that they are so poised is purported to capture something which is essential to 
qualitative states, something which the latter doesn’t, for it would apply equally well to 
the visual states of caterpillars or to yet simpler organisms that react to light in even more 
primitive ways. 
I very much agree that ‘poised to make an impact on beliefs’ thus understood succeeds 
in capturing the difference between us and far simpler organisms whose visual systems 
are not sophisticated enough to generate spatial representations. Nevertheless, I shall 
argue, it falls short of identifying what is essential to qualitative states precisely because 
it does not differentiate between us and blindsighters. Carruthers calls attention to 
experiments reported in Marcel (1998) where blindsight subjects attempt to reach out to 
grasp objects with somewhere between 95 and 98 per cent of normal precision.
Think how sophisticated the perceptual processing must be in these cases. When a 
blindsight patient reaches out for a cup placed at a certain distance on the desk
beside him, he has to be able to estimate the size, shape and orientation of the 
object, as well as its distance from him. But all this is done, remember, while the 
patient thinks he is guessing randomly. (2000, p. 156)
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Let me first stress that my interpretation of Tye’s notion of poisedness differs from 
Carruthers’ in that he is prepared to grant that the states blindsighters undergo in their 
blind region aren’t poised (to make a difference in beliefs). But, according to him, this 
just shows that the functional connection with beliefs is superfluous. Given that, as it is 
clear from Marcel’s findings, blindsighters’ perceptual discriminations are almost as fine-
grained as those made by healthy people, he wonders how the absence of beliefs could 
account for the lack of qualitative states in the former, or, how their presence in us could 
turn those states with similarly rich contents into qualitative ones. 
Although, again, Tye’s response to the facts of blindsight is that they are not poised 
since there are no genuine perceptual beliefs, I doubt that he wishes to be understood as 
maintaining that beliefs impart phenomenality to otherwise non-qualitative sensory states. 
Rather, it follows from the above elucidation of ‘poisedness’ that its role in Tye’s 
reasoning is to mark the point where computations of what is initially features of 
proximal stimuli generate representations of distal stimuli. For the idea is that this is also 
the point where distal properties become available and accessible to belief-forming 
processes (i.e. the point is the interface between the non-conceptual and the conceptual 
realms). So I take it that the claim Tye commits himself to by denying that their states are 
poised is that they aren’t (at least not directly) sensitive to distal properties – lack of 
beliefs, as in his example with caterpillars, indicates lack of access to external features. 
It should now become apparent that Tye is entitled to the response he gives provided it 
is determined unequivocally that blindsighters are sensitive to their surroundings by 
means of their motor reactions being guided by features of proximal stimuli. Justified as 
he may feel in moving from the absence of beliefs to the lack of distal representations 
even in the case of such anomalous phenomena as blindsight, a definitive answer is 
hardly to be provided on theoretical grounds. The question is just how great (indirect) 
sensitivity to one’s surroundings proximal representations could support. For instance, 
what colour an object is perceived as having depends on what band of wavelength the 
light reflected by it is in, so an organism could be said, in one sense of the word, to detect 
colours while lacking spatial representations of colours completely. But there is a general 
consensus in the literature including (Tye 1996) (see, for example, Marr’s influential 
(1983)) that detection of edges and surfaces requires computations over symbols which 
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represent beyond the properties of proximal inputs; such symbols appear in the latter 
stages of processing. And highly accurate estimation of shape and orientation, which - as 
highlighted by Carruthers in the above quotation - blindsighters are capable of, must 
presuppose access to shapes and surfaces as represented by their visual systems. It is 
therefore in this context that Carruthers’ complaint that Tye simply overlooks how fine-
grained their discriminations are seems particularly apt.
It turns out then that Tye must acknowledge that the undoubtedly non-qualitative 
states of blindsighters would qualify as qualitative ones on the PANIC theory in spite of 
their not lying at the interface between perceptual and belief-forming processing unless, 
to reiterate, the P is intended to imply that the latter processing renders the outputs of the 
former qualitative. Consequently, he will be compelled to attribute a range of wide 
contents where subjects are aware of seeing nothing at all. 
This brings us back to the qualitative/non-qualitative division within the visual system 
the reality of which Carruthers argues for. What is preserved in blindsight is the non-
qualitative route of processing where representations of external features are built and 
exploited in certain specific ways described above without acquiring phenomenality, 
without ever being displayed in ‘the user interface’. 
The interpretation of the experimental data on which Carruthers relies has been 
contested (see, for example, (Dulany, 2004) for alternatives), although it has to be said 
that its critics are in the minority. At any rate, we would be rightly inclined to suppose 
that perceiving without phenomenality may be widespread in nature. As it is clear from 
my presentation of the notion of poisedness, I take it to involve the following three 
claims: a) if the outputs of a visual system are representations of the properties of 
proximal stimuli, their link with actions will be brute-causal, b) phenomenal states would 
be of no use to creatures with no cognitive capacities (i.e. thoughts, beliefs, etc.), and c) if 
the outputs of a visual system are representations of distal stimuli, their link with actions 
is never brute-causal but is instead mediated by perceptual thoughts and beliefs. I have 
already indicated that I agree with b), for I believe that the only way phenomenal states 
can be exploited in a creature is by virtue of some aspects of their contents becoming 
contents of perceptual thoughts and beliefs. Neither is it reasonable to deny a), since it is 
hard to imagine how one could have qualitative representations of proximal stimuli; 
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patently, we do not see lightwaves and their properties such as wavelength and intensity. 
But c), in my view, is highly unlikely to hold for all types of visual systems which 
generate spatial representations. An organism’s survival may depend on detecting the 
shape and orientation of objects but not on the ability to conceptualise perceptual 
contents. Such (non-qualitative) representations could still be causally efficacious in that 
system by virtue of their structure, that is, the transition from their being constructed to a 
behavioural output could be a matter of simple computations which are sensitive to what 
sets of symbols they are built from. Such transitions would certainly dispense with mental 
qualities. The situation is not dissimilar to that of, say, a photosensitive device which 
produces an electrical signal indicating the number of sides a polygonal figure placed in 
front of it has, or perhaps that of a bar code scanner. I struggle to find anything in Tye’s 
account which convincingly rules out or at least undermines such possibility.  
I conclude that there is nothing mysterious or contentious about the suggestion that 
there is a non-qualitative stream of visual processing in humans the existence of which is 
uncovered in numerous dissociation cases such as blindsight, and that one ought not to 
dismiss the interpretation of the experimental data to which Carruthers adheres as 
unintuitive, for an organism can be coherently imagined to exploit spatial visual 
representations to good effect even if they possess no phenomenal properties. 
The argument so far has been that an appeal to Block’s distinction between 
phenomenal and access consciousness fails to sustain FOR accounts due to the apparent 
difficulties in distinguishing qualitative perceptions from non-qualitative ones. Hence it 
will not do to say in response to the inattentive blindness objection that the absent-
minded driver’s experiences remain phenomenally conscious and that it is this type of 
consciousness that FOR is a theory of. Why is it much more fortunate to approach the 
problems of qualitative/non-qualitative perception and inattentive blindness from a 
higher-order perspective? I will now be concerned with the first one – seen, naturally, as 
the more fundamental one – and will then show how the treatment extends to inattentive 
blindness. 
So we have, on the one hand, a first-order representational theory, on which the state 
that carries qualitative properties and the state that realises conscious (to mean 
phenomenally conscious) awareness are one and the same, and a higher-order 
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representational theory on the other, according to which they are two separate states, with 
the latter being a higher-order state aimed at the former. This difference between FOR 
and HOR is crucial for my purposes and it will be useful to introduce a distinction 
between qualities-bearing states and awareness-realising (again, intended to mean 
phenomenally conscious awareness) states lest we lose sight of it. First-order 
representationalists’ contention that the two exist in unity is, of course, rooted in the 
thesis that mental qualities are represented properties - that they ‘ain’t in the head’, as 
Putnam believed was true of the meanings of a certain type of linguistic expressions. It is 
then concluded that the (first-order) state which does the representing must 
simultaneously be an awareness-realising state.
In the preceding paragraphs attention was drawn to the possibility of non-qualitative 
spatial representations. They are genuine mental representations in the sense that they are 
involved in transitions which are sensitive to their contents. In particular, in the case of 
blindsight their contents have been found to play an essential role in guidance of fine-
grained motor reactions. Proponents of FOR would be obliged to say that they are both 
qualia-bearing and awareness-realising even though, as an empirical matter, they are 
neither. Now, while, unlike FOR, HOR accounts do not merge the two into a single (first-
order) state, both of them must nonetheless be present in order for conscious experience 
to arise, in other words, they both remain an integral part of conscious experience. 
How does HOR accommodate non-qualitative perception? Firstly, it is important to 
appreciate the fact that it is open to proponents of HOR to claim that higher-order 
awareness-realising states cannot be tokened where the qualia-bearing component is 
missing. Blindsighters, of course, are not blind in their entire visual field and the 
suggestion does not apply beyond the region in which they are aware of seeing nothing. It 
is not the case that they are not subjects of higher-order states at all; rather, they do not 
enter higher-order states with respect to the perceptual intake in the blind region. I don’t 
see how this idea can be disputed except on the grounds that neither purely recognitional 
higher-order concepts nor phenomenal concepts which are untranslatable into public 
language exist, but this will be the subject matter of the forthcoming sections where 
Sellars’ story of how come to be aware of experiential inner episodes will be retold. 
Hence, these remarks provide the first clue as to the advantages which HOR brings in 
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comparison with FOR. Where advocates of FOR were found to be under a considerable 
strain in attempting to identify the difference between qualitative and non-qualitative 
perception drawing solely on the theoretical resources they are entitled to avail 
themselves to, the HOR theorist has identified a significant difference at a higher-order 
level. What is being proposed is that a perceptual state is qualitative if it is available to 
be picked out as the content of a higher-order state.  
Before it is replied that it is unacceptable that a difference at the higher-order level 
could be of any importance as far as states at the first-order level and their phenomenality 
are concerned, let me contrast the kind of availability that is under discussion here with 
Tye’s notion of poisedness. I pointed out that ‘poisedness to make a difference in beliefs’ 
is intended to mark the point where spatial representations are constructed, for, according 
to him, it is also the point where distal properties become available to belief-forming 
processes. Then I went on to say that if Tye resisted crediting blindsighters with PANICs 
despite their apparent (direct) sensitivity to distal stimuli, he would have to be interpreted 
as insisting that beliefs confer phenomenality on otherwise non-qualitative perceptions.
Since HOR too is a representational account, one might wonder whether the current 
proposal adds anything substantive to what Tye has already said about qualitative states, 
for if a state is poised to cause a first-order belief about its content, it will also be poised 
to cause a higher-order state about itself. The objection would therefore be that if I was 
reluctant to admit that blindsighters’ states too would count as qualitative on this 
proposal, I could be understood as insisting that higher-order states confer phenomenality 
on otherwise non-qualitative perceptions.
But this rests on an oversimplification of HOR and it overlooks the crucial difference 
between HOR and FOR. Unlike Tye’s poisedness, the kind of availability in question 
does not to establish a ‘mere’ functional link. In contrast to first-order perceptual beliefs, 
(higher-order) awareness-realising states are what FOR theorists thought was the same as 
the qualities-bearing state – they are an integral part of the architecture of phenomenal 
consciousness. We can also put this, as I did above, by saying that the (higher-order) 
awareness-realising state is what was held by FOR theorists to exist in unity, so to speak, 
with the qualities-bearing state. Although this, of course, cannot be taken literally – it is 
not that first-order representationalists discern an awareness-realising component and a 
84
qualities-bearing component within the same (first-order) state - it still makes sense to 
say that HOR separates the former component from the latter and shifts it ‘upstairs’ to the 
second-order level. Thus the relation between the two within the HO picture of 
consciousness is far stronger than the functional relation qualitative states bear to first-
order beliefs, for the suggestion is that when such relation obtains, conscious experience 
occurs.
The outcome of this discussion is, then, that HOR does succeed where FOR fails, that 
is, in marking the difference between qualitative and non-qualitative perceptions in a way 
which sheds much light on what it is for a state to be phenomenal. To say that 
phenomenal perceptions are those which are available to be targeted by higher-order 
states is to say something substantive (i.e. it does some genuine explanatory work) about 
mental qualities because the state to which it is so available realises, or constitutes, 
conscious awareness, where ‘conscious’ amounts to ‘phenomenally conscious’. And all 
this is claimed without being pushed into saying that the presence of higher-order states 
turns an otherwise non-qualitative state into a qualitative one. 
In arranging the argument for HOR as I did I part ways with Carruthers in that he 
thinks that the kind of second-order contents which first-order perceptions yield on 
becoming available to higher-order states are also perceptual (or analog).17 But nothing 
in my argumentation prevents me from maintaining alongside FOR theorists that the only 
genuinely perceptual contents are the contents of first-order perceptions and, 
consequently, that the relevant higher-order state is a thought of the form ‘I am in a state 
with such and such represented properties’.18 Despite this difference, I am prepared to 
embrace his distinction between worldly subjectivity and experiential subjectivity, as it 
expresses rather pithily what the advantage of any version of HOR over FOR (and indeed 
any first-order theory) consists in – it is in shifting the ‘locus’ of phenomenal 
consciousness to a higher-order level, where one, as he puts it, takes a subjective 
perspective towards his own experiences.
17 He does not object to being called a closet higher-order perception theorist after all, which is an 
approach also adopted by Lycan.
18 The issue of what kind of states they should be will be addressed at some length in the sections to 
follow.
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This last argument substantiates the last two of the four claims listed at the beginning 
of this section. These were as follows: the claim (i) that there are qualitative states that 
occur in absence of consciousness, (ii) that there are states that are genuine instances of 
perceiving, to which the FOR theorist would have no choice but to attribute wide 
perceptual contents or face charges of inconsistency, but which nonetheless lack 
phenomenality altogether, (iii) that HOR has the resources to explain the difference 
between states such as those described in (i) and (ii) on the one hand, and conscious 
experiences on the other, and finally (iv), that only a HOR theory and not first-order 
representationalism is in a position to explain why my experience as of something yellow 
should feel like this rather than like something else. 
With this HO picture of consciousness in place, I shall conclude this section by 
showing, briefly, how the treatment extends to inattentive blindness. This can be easily 
anticipated. We saw that the first-order representationalist’s appeal to first-order beliefs, 
actions, or even verbal reports could not distinguish between the non-conscious 
experiences of the absent-minded driver and those accompanied by attention, since all of 
those were attributable to him while drove in absent-minded mode. What goes on when 
he switches to absent-minded mode is that, firstly, his (first-order) attention shifts from 
the contents of his perceptions to the contents of his memories, imaginations, etc., and, 
secondly, the perceptions themselves cease to be targeted by (non-conscious) higher-
states. So there is no need to go down the precarious route and insist that his perceptions 
cease to be contentful states the moment he stops concentrating on his driving. They, 
however, retain their phenomenality precisely because they continue to be poised to 
cause higher-order states about themselves.
This completes the defence of HOR in this section. I shall now begin to set the stage 
for showing how Sellars’ thought bears on the question of what kind of states realise 
higher-order awareness.        
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2.2 Higher-Order States as Internalised Public-Language Sentences 
2.2.1 Subject-Dependence of Qualia
Lycan (1997) stresses that his higher-order sense theory makes no pretence of explaining
qualia:
There may be Inner Sense theorists who believe that their views solve problems 
of qualia; I make no such claim, for I think qualia problems and the nature of 
conscious awareness are mutually independent and indeed have little to do with 
each other (p. 756).
Given the possibility of non-qualitative perceptions which represent properties of distal 
stimuli (their edges, orientation, etc.), it seems that Lycan is unduly modest about the 
scope of a higher-order theory. The insurmountable difficulty for the first-order 
representationalist brought out by Carruthers lay in his inability to rule out cases of 
perceptions where it was perfectly legitimate to ascribe wide contents by the criteria of 
his own theory while those states were devoid of phenomenal features. I added that even 
undermining the received reading of the blindsight data would be small consolation for 
the representationalist, since organisms which exploit non-qualitative perceptual 
representations of distal properties may be widespread in nature. 
In the latter parts of the preceding section I outlined a certain pattern of higher-order 
explanation (of phenomenal as opposed to access consciousness) which successfully 
overcomes the difficulty. We may call it a ‘generalised pattern of higher-order
explanation’ as it makes no assumptions about the nature of the relevant introspective 
states, that is, it remains neutral on the question of whether such states are themselves 
experiences or thoughts. The explanation proceeded as follows: a HOR theory separates
out the awareness-realising component (to mean phenomenally conscious awareness), 
which was held by representationalists as well as all other first-order theorists to exist in 
unity with the qualia-bearing component within a first-order state, and shifts it to a 
higher-order level. The (first-order) representationalist does not of course discern the two 
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components within one state. He holds that qualia are contents and contents are 
outwardly directed. Hence a state which carries qualia as its contents also realises one’s 
awareness of them (and since it is qualia that the state carries as its contents, their 
awareness amounts to phenomenally conscious awareness). He would feel that no 
explanatory ground would be gained by understanding these two features of the same 
state as discrete components, if any such understanding can be made intelligible at all. 
Still, there is nothing unintelligible in stripping perceptual states of their 
(phenomenally conscious) awareness role (or feature) and relocating it to the second-
order level where it becomes a component occurring alongside what has remained at the 
lower level – a qualia-bearing component. Note that once we operate within this HO 
picture and we have qualia as our explanatory target, that target is no longer what it was 
when approached from a first-order perspective. Having removed the awareness role, we 
are now dealing with the residue (earlier I called it ‘residual qualia’). In other words, our 
claim is that states with qualia are less than phenomenally conscious when not 
complemented by introspective states, while the relevant introspective states do more 
than render the lower-order ones access conscious. So the generalised pattern progresses
by disintegrating the original target of explanation.
It becomes apparent that the reason why Lycan believes that the scope of his inner 
sense theory does not reach beyond the conscious/non-conscious distinction (in the sense 
of access conscious) and that qualia problems are independent of this is that he leaves the 
original target unscathed, with the faculty of inner sense being an addition. FOR’s appeal 
began to falter when the set of perceptions which satisfy its characterisation of qualitative 
states was found to include the kind of contentful states which do not require phenomenal 
properties in order to be utilised to good effect in an organism. The proprietor of such 
non-qualitative states is not precluded from displaying perceptual sensitivity to distal 
properties (i.e. shape, orientation, etc.), as opposed to the properties of proximal stimuli, 
if those states are symbolic structures whose symbols encode distal properties and appear 
in subsequent computations leading to a sufficiently accurate motor response in order for 
it to survive and thrive in a given environment. Let us label a representational system 
whose sensory apparatus, as well as that system as a whole, dispenses with mental 
qualities an ‘unconscious perceiver’.
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Suppose that, as my generalised pattern of higher-order explanation recommends,     
the question of why certain contentful perceptions are qualitative while other equally 
contentful perceptions aren’t reduces to the question of why a certain class of 
representations have residual qualia while others don’t. The pattern will differentiate 
between them on the basis of availability to introspection (or higher-order awareness-
realising states). Given that the absent-minded driver happens to be blessed with the 
relevant capacity to introspect, his unheeded perceptions will stand ready to attract 
introspective attention to themselves, thereby retaining their residual qualia. On the other 
hand, the unconscious perceptual systems in the example given two paragraphs above 
would lack the requisite higher-order states, meaning that their perceptions would not be 
so available. Consequently, their perceptions would be bereft of residual qualia.19
But what line of thought reveals that all qualia are to be treated as residual and that the 
awareness-realising role should be transferred to the upper level? Is such treatment not a 
matter of stipulation which secures that my pattern of explanation differentiates between 
us and unconscious perceivers but is otherwise unsupported? Furthermore, how can an 
account on which qualia (or residual qualia) are construed in terms of their availability to 
introspection be a substantive explanation of qualia?
I believe the desired reinforcement is supplied by certain reflections on subjectivity. 
Dennett’s observations in his (1978) are a useful starting point:
Functionalist theories are theories of what I have called the sub-personal level. 
Sub-personal theories proceed by analysing a person into an organization of 
subsystems (organs, routines, nerves, faculties, components – even atoms) and 
attempting to explain the behaviour of the whole person as the outcome of the 
interaction of these subsystems (p. 153).
19 Carruthers would here encourage us to bear in mind the distinction between worldly and experiential 
subjectivity. According to him, blindsighters’ states possess the former, but lack the latter type of 
subjectivity, which, again, is an ability to “take a subjective perspective towards one’s own experiences” 
(2000). Therefore, ‘phenomenal consciousness’ must stand for experiential subjectivity rather than worldly 
subjectivity. However helpful Carruthers’ worldly/experiential distinction with respect to subjectivity is in 
making intelligible the claim that my generalised pattern of higher-order explanation is at least an 
approximation to a theory of qualitative properties, there are significant differences between my proposal 
and his dispositionalist higher-order thought view. The differences will be brought into focus below. 
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And several lines below he adds that … “they would characterise relations not between a 
person and a body, or a person and a state of affairs or a person and anything at all, but 
rather, at best, relations between parts of persons (or their bodies) and other things” 
(p.153). In this last sentence he talks about relations characterised by his notions of 
computational access simpliciter, which is the kind of access the executive unit in a 
computing machine has to the outputs of its subroutines, and computational access of a 
print-out faculty which is analogous to access afforded by verbal reports of lower-order 
states in humans. He then embarks on the project of carving “a full-fledged ‘I’” – the 
experiencing self - out of these notions. Notwithstanding the peculiarities of Dennett’s 
project, his remarks that the totality of sub-personal relations seemingly omits the 
experiencing self extend to all versions of functionalism, with the intuitive consequence 
that
At best a sub-personal theory will seem to give us no grounds for believing its 
instantiations would be subjects of experience, and at worst (as we have seen) a 
sub-personal theory will seem to permit instantiations that obviously are not
subjects of experience (p.154, italics original).
I do not wish to assess functionalism’s prospects of harnessing the self, although at this 
stage I do not see any reasons why such accounts should not be worth pursuing. 
However, I take Dennett’s observations in these passages to show that functionalist 
approaches which do not even pursue the self with whatever resources they have 
available can make no legitimate claim to have an answer to the problem of qualia. 
Theories of qualia which leave the questions to do with the self-reflexive ‘I’ which 
grounds higher-order (introspective) states aside are typically those on which such 
questions are unrelated to qualia (Tye’s and Dretske’s positions are an example of this,
whereas Lycan does give a theory of introspective access, but thinks it is irrelevant to 
qualia); by doing so, I will argue, they misconceive what is unique to experiences and 
what sets us apart from unconscious perceivers and simple photosensitive devices. And if 
their negligence of the personal level does lead to a misconception, then qualia will 
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inevitably be residual, with the higher-order level grounding phenomenally conscious 
awareness. 
Lycan and Carruthers are among the functionalists who do set out to give an account 
of the self and join Dennett in his belief that it must somehow precipitate out of sub-
personal parts. Lycan’s organ of inner sense, as well as Carruthers’s mind-reading
module, is just one of those sub-personal parts listed by Dennett. Take, for instance,
Lycan’s inner sense. Saying “My inner sense is in me” would appear as innocuous as 
saying “My kidney is in me”. Nor does “My inner sense is in me” entail “I am in me”, let 
alone that all of the functions which the organ performs are realised in one particular 
corner of the brain with clearly defined boundaries to the effect that if it was surgically 
removed I would cease to be a person and would be legally treated as a population of 
cells. The realisers of its functions may be scattered around the entire brain.
But when one’s description of how the organ interacts with other modules, routines, 
etc. is sufficiently exhaustive, we can be hopeful that we have at least an approximation 
to a theory of the personal level, despite the fact that the organ continues to be 
describable, from a certain perspective, as a sub-personal part.20 A functional nature of 
the former description ensures that the above entailment does not obtain. “My inner sense 
is in me” is embedded in the latter one, under which it is a sub-personal part, while the
way the organ functions renders “I am my inner sense” false, i.e. it functions in such a 
way which guarantees that I take myself to be what I pre-theoretically took myself to be –
and I certainly never believed I was an inner organ in this body. But of course the very 
challenge for these functionalist conceptions is to come up with descriptions of causal 
interactions, whether of the inner sense or the computational access of a print-out faculty 
or else, which mirror the logical behaviour of the first-person pronoun (see John Perry
(1988) and Castañeda (1966) for an extensive treatment of so-called de se ascriptions of 
knowledge).
Having made these points, I can begin to formulate my argument for residual qualia. 
First-order representationalists’ portrayal of phenomenal properties makes no mention of 
20 That we can have a description under which the organ is a sub-personal part alongside one under which 
its interactions with other modules constitute the self is of course a commonly appreciated advantage that 
functionalism brings in contrast with identity theories. Such result would be unattainable if the truth of an 
identity theory was assumed.
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a self-reflexive capacity and the higher-order states it facilitates. Plainly, the account 
being first-order, we should expect it to reach its explanatory target while staying within 
first-order confines. Moreover, it is not difficult to see that virtually any such mention 
would also threaten its bare existence. Even inclusions of fairly flimsy connections with 
introspective states would amount to making concessions to HOR’s proponents, thereby 
gradually heading towards abandoning the theory that the representationalist has under 
construction. For some HOR theories, such as Carruthers’, are dispositionalist rather than 
actualist and do not demand that a higher-order (introspective) state be actually present in 
order for a higher-order content to be created in an experiencer whereby he becomes 
introspectively aware of his perceptions. A dispositionalist would only insist on as little 
as a relatively tenuous functional connection with the mind-reading module. Take the 
example with carburettor, often used to test basic functionalist intuitions. A carburettor 
does not cease to be a carburettor when the engine stops. It remains one for as long as it is 
connected to certain other units in the right way and does what it was designed to do 
when the engine starts. Those other units need not be in operation in order for a 
carburettor to ‘persist’, just as the mind-reading faculty need not be in operation in order 
for higher-order contents to persist.
That the self-reflexive ‘I’ can barely play even a minor role in FOR’s characterisation 
of mental qualities is its major deficiency. This is because the omission of the self 
deprives the representationalist of any means of moving from “There is a visual
representation of something red in me” to “I visually represent something red”. Consider 
the two statements as alternative descriptions of my current experiential situation in 
which I find myself by being presented with a red object. On representationalism, my 
perception is a qualitative one provided the former description is satisfied and applies to 
my experiential situation. The representationalist would of course add that only 
representations of properties of external objects (rather than of properties of proximal 
stimuli) qualify as qualitative, so let the term ‘representation’ as it appears in the 
description refer exclusively to such representations. However, only the latter description, 
which can be attributed to HOR, entails that I am visually conscious of something red. It 
is a basic fact about phenomenal states – at least if the truth of the claim that perceptions 
are intentional is assumed – that they make their subjects (non-conceptually) conscious of 
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what they represent. On the other hand, “There is a visual representation of something red 
in me” by no means entails that my perception performs its representing function for me 
to the effect that I can be described as “I visually represent something red” or “I see 
something red”. It entails, at best, that I am an observer of my perceptions rather than 
their subject.
The other, and more serious, consequence of the failure of the desired entailment in 
the case of FOR is somewhat harder to bring out. The following is my best effort. We are 
often tempted to think of qualitative properties as mental paint, and this is perhaps 
innocuous, if only as part of some pre-theoretic rumination. We then go on to ask 
ourselves how our states can acquire mental paint. If I’m right in my suspicion that the 
representationalist puts us in a position of observers rather than subjects of our sensory 
states, he will tacitly allow the pre-theoretic inclination into his theory of qualia. He will 
of course insist that it only makes sense to speak of mental paint in so far as it is 
construed as content. But, contrary to his insistence, it appears that something which has 
phenomenal properties, but lacks a proper subject and can only be observed instead 
comes curiously close to what phenomenalists wanted to say about mental paint. It is as 
though I, or, for the sake of illustration, my ‘inner eye’ stands at a distance from my 
representation observing the representation’s ‘mental paint’, and I proclaim, having 
representationalism as my background theory, that that ‘mental paint’ is in fact its 
intentional content. In other words, it is as though ‘mental paint’ is already present in its 
full richness as a lower-order representational content and introspecting it consists in 
merely exposing one’s inner eye to it.
Such picture is fallacious and ought to be discarded. I do not stand at a distance from 
my (qualitative) representation of something red, for what really takes place is that I
visually represent something red. I, or my self, is submerged, figuratively speaking, in 
that ‘mental paint’.
So my objection is that first-order views of all varieties preserve the pre-theoretic 
tendency to believe in mental paint. “There is a visual representation of something red in 
me” implies that I am related to phenomenal properties in a way analogous to someone 
scrutinising a painting in that phenomenal states can exist in representational systems 
where nothing can be properly identified as the subject of those states, just as real paint 
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exists regardless of anyone scrutinising it. The representationalist should find such 
implication disconcerting. On the one hand, he will be eager to hold on to the claim that 
qualia are intentional and that the two cases are disanalogous in this regard, since it is
absurd to say that real paint is a painting’s intentional property, but on the other, having 
given the self the role of an ‘external’ observer in relation to qualia, he accords qualia the 
kind of objective and independent status which only a phenomenalist would be 
comfortable with. As a relationalist, he would surely resent any association with 
phenomenalism. Phenomenalists take it that qualitative properties are not the product of 
one’s perceptual contact with (external) objects which are by no means literally coloured, 
rather, they themselves are sensed. On this naïve realist view, sensing is an act of 
exposing oneself, or one’s senses, to what is phenomenal in its very essence prior to that
act. We now have every reason to suspect that prising the self from qualitative properties 
puts an initially relationalist project at risk of being assimilated to a naïve conception of 
qualia, the claim that qualia are intentional losing all significance.
Unless we are naïve realists about phenomenal properties, we should not accept that 
they can be found in creatures who are not subjects (or selves), to whom the description 
“I visually represent something red” does not apply. The fact that the personal level is 
integral to mental qualities in the way just outlined is the primary reason that they resist 
reduction more than many other natural phenomena. It is not that the phenomenal redness 
that I have in front of me has an objective status in the sense that I can coherently wonder 
whether, for example, it has a mass, and that my enquiry is similar to that of a physicist 
who wonders whether photons have a mass. The redness is a subject-dependent property 
and our enquiry must start at the subjective or personal level if we are to arrive at an 
understanding of why it appears to me that there is a patch of redness with this particular
phenomenal ‘feel’. Some naïve realists may of course object that phenomenal properties 
are mind-dependent. But I see no obvious move from mind-dependence to subject-
dependence.
Further, unless we aspire to give an account of the personal level, whether we seek to
build it from sub-personal material or otherwise, we will not move beyond giving an 
account of such representational systems as unconscious perceivers and photosensitive 
devices. I do not wish to deny that our experiential situation continues to be describable 
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as “There is a visual representation of red in me”, just as Lycan’s inner sense continues to 
be describable, from a certain perspective, as a sub-personal part even if it is granted that 
facts about its causal interactions with other modules and subroutines exhaust facts about 
persons; for this much (i.e. “There is a visual representation of red in me”) we have in 
common with unconscious perceivers who replicate our first-order functional 
organisation. But as soon as the observation that my self is woven, so to speak, into my 
perceptual representation’s fabric receives full appreciation, only facts about the 
representation’s interactions with the relevant self-reflexive states such as “I see 
something red” or “I visually represent something red” can begin to explain why it is a 
qualia-bearing state with this particular ‘feel’. Therefore, again, qualitative states cannot 
occur where descriptions such as “I visually represent something red” do not apply.  They 
cannot occur in creatures which are not endowed with a faculty of introspection.
My generalised model of higher-order explanation accommodates the extent of 
qualia’s dependence on one’s ability to introspectively focus on his perceptions by 
characterising qualitative states in terms of availability to introspection. Now that it 
seems undeniable that the self is inextricably involved in experience, we should be 
prepared to acknowledge that the model’s appeal to availability (together with its 
representationalism about residual qualia) does express something substantive about what 
makes a certain class of sensory representations qualitative and that the model serves at 
least as an approximation to a theory of qualia – provided it is underwritten by a fully 
developed account of the personal level.
The availability relation of course requires further elucidation and it will be the subject 
of a more extensive discussion in chapter 3. Here I restrict myself to making the crucial 
point. It is instructive to return to inattentive blindness again. As I drive absent-mindedly, 
I stop at traffic lights. It is uncontroversial to say that the perceptual representation whose 
content I absent-mindedly act on is a qualitative one. The point to emphasise is that the 
description “I visually represent something red” is true of (or applies to) my present 
situation irrespective of whether or not I attend to the perception. It applies because I’m 
the subject of the state – and to say that I’m the subject of the state is to say that I can, 
should the need arise, form a higher-order thought about it, one that is equivalent to the 
theoretical description “I visually represent something red”, such as “I see something 
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red” or “I am visually conscious of something red”. The theoretical description can be 
true of situations in which introspection lies idle. Someone who is already sceptical about 
the soundness of my argument might point out that an appeal to introspection does not in 
itself differentiate between my model of explanation and the picture of qualia as mental 
paint that I criticise. The kind of access the self understood as an observer has to 
qualitative properties also qualifies as introspective after all. But there is an important 
difference between introspecting my state as the subject of that state and introspecting it 
as its observer. It is the former that I appeal to.
My argument against FOR is also a robust justification for treating qualia as residual.
Since only “I visually represent something red” can be an adequate description of our 
experiential situation, and the first-person pronoun it contains is a product of a self-
reflexive faculty, it appears natural that the awareness-realising component should be 
found at the higher-order level, meaning that a state’s possessing qualia is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition of phenomenal consciousness. That their presence is only a 
necessary condition is of course all I had in mind when I called them ‘residual’.
Incidentally, I believe that an approximation is as much as the model ultimately has to 
offer. It points us, however, in the right direction. In the final chapter I will attempt to 
make my own proposal concerning the nature of phenomenal properties, one which
escapes the rather far-reaching consequences of the issue I raise in this work. We will see 
that my proposal draws much of it strength from the model currently under discussion. In 
addition, the problems (to be discussed in the next two sub-sections) the model, as well as 
all other HOR theories of qualia, encounter and are ill-equipped to deal with provide 
some vital insights to be taken account of when formulating my alternative proposal.
So the upshot, to reiterate, was that representationalism fails to identify the subject of 
experience, as indeed all first-order theories do, and is therefore vulnerable to 
counterexamples involving representational systems which realise our first-order 
functional organisation but experience nothing at all. And if one continues to insist that 
phenomenality can be found in them despite their not being subjects (despite knowledge 
de se not being ascribable to them under any circumstances), he will face the charge of 
being a closet phenomenalist postulating subject-independent mental paint.  
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As for HOR, devising a suitable counterexample in which an imaginary system also 
replicates our higher-order functional organisation would be a more laborious task. But 
Dennett’s worry was that in principle the task is never an impossible one if the theory in 
question is a functionalist enterprise building the personal out of sub-personal material; 
HOR theories are functionalist in their core. After all, computers can scan themselves, 
search for damaged files, or sort stored images according to their various features, 
without becoming subjects of experience.
This, finally, brings us the topic of recognitional concepts. A proponent of HOR may
try to dispel Dennett’s worry by suggesting that introspective thoughts directed at 
experiences embed a special kind of concepts – so-called phenomenal concepts which are 
essentially recognitional. As I will explain at some length below, phenomenal concepts 
are recognitional in the sense that they are acquired solely by means of a subject’s
acquaintance with his experiences and their phenomenal properties, and so are grasped 
independently of any public-language or language of thought concepts. Their 
independence permits, or even presupposes, diversification of the self into the 
experiencing self and the conceptualising self – the experiencing self deploys 
phenomenal concepts, thereby allowing for the possibility that pre-linguistic children too 
are such selves, whereas the conceptualising self forms concepts whose reference and 
meaning are at least partly determined by their inferential roles and emerges exclusively 
when one acquires such concepts. Inferential roles can of course be understood 
computationally (in some Fodorian sense (1975)) or normatively (i.e. prescriptively –
Sellars (1997), Brandom (1998), Gibbard (1994), etc.), in which case the conceptualising 
self emerges either when one acquires concepts belonging to the language of thought, or 
when he learns a public language. But this is a marginal issue in the present context as
either alternative contrasts sharply with what is supposed to be true of concepts belonging 
to the experiential domain – that their reference and meaning is fully determined by 
causal relations with their referents; and if they do begin to figure in inferential
transitions on one’s acquisition of a language, their inferential roles make no contribution 
to determining their meaning and reference.
Thus a proponent of HOR seemingly regains his footing by introducing recognitional 
concepts into the HO picture of phenomenal consciousness. The presence of the 
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experiencing self together with its unique set of concepts suffices for the description “I 
visually represent something red” to apply and distinguishes sentient selves from 
unconscious representational systems equipped with self-scanning modules. The 
approach has the virtue of narrowing our explanatory target by not demanding that 
sentient creatures also be sapient. Sapience and rationality, which are the characteristics 
of conceptualising selves, are deemed irrelevant to what we share with small children and
many higher animals – a somewhat more primordial form of subjectivity. However, after 
making a few introductory remarks about recognitional concepts of experience in the next 
sub-section, I will exploit Sellars’ distinction between observational and theoretical 
discourse to argue that recognitional concepts are an epistemologist’s fiction; a story of 
how we actually come to form a conception of our experiential states makes no room for 
recognitional concepts. I will then hope to show that the HO structure of phenomenal 
consciousness collapses when unsupported by phenomenal concepts (I use the terms 
‘phenomenal’ and ‘recognitional’ with regard to our concepts of experiential states 
interchangeably). 
Before I move on, let me indicate briefly which stage in my overall argument we now 
find ourselves at. The argument was made up of the following inconsistent set of claims:
(i) Qualia are not intrinsic properties of perceptual states, and if so, they must be wide 
contents.
(ii) The thesis that qualia are wide contents can be plausibly held only as a claim of 
higher- rather than first-order intentionalism.
(iii) To have a higher-order thought about one’s perceptual state is to token an 
internalised public-language sentence whose meaning is holistic and normative.
(iv) Since higher-order perceptual thoughts are internalised public-language sentences, 
qualia are intrinsic properties of experiences.
In chapter I. I defended (i) against certain rival views of perceptual content and its 
relation to qualia. I made no attempt at a full defence as the claim is intended to serve 
mainly as a working assumption for the sake of my argument. However, a full defence of
(ii) was my objective in the first section of chapter II. as well as the present section up 
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until this point. A sellarsian-style argument of the sort presented below will inevitably 
lead to (iii). In the final section of this chapter I will undertake to show that (ii) and (iii)
together result in the claim that qualia are intrinsic properties of experiences – a
consequence expressed in (iv).
I shall now focus on the subject of recognitional concepts.
2.2.2 Recognitional Concepts
Recognitional concepts of phenomenal properties are not a higher-order 
representationalist’s invention. The proposal that we possess such concepts traces its 
origin to the dispute concerning the metaphysical consequences of the so-called 
conceivability argument formulated by Jackson (1982 and 1996), and Chalmers (1996).
While Jackson and Chalmers hasten to draw firm ontological conclusions from 
conceptual possibility of absent qualia, a number of authors (Levine (1993) and (1998), 
Loar (1990 and 1996), Papineau (1993a) and (1993b), Sturgeon (1994 and 2000), Tye 
(1999), for example) have been more than reluctant to attach any ontological import to it. 
The source of the notorious explanatory gap between phenomenal properties and 
physical/functional properties is, according to them, the unique nature of the concepts we 
deploy to refer to phenomenal states as their subjects. Thus recognitional concepts of 
phenomenal properties are introduced as a means of blocking the inference from 
conceivability (i.e. conceptual possibility) of absent and inverted qualia to metaphysical 
possibility of absent and inverted qualia and sustain the gap only in some weak 
epistemological sense.
The term ‘recognitional’ is only used by Brian Loar, but the essential characteristics of 
experiential concepts that the term is to help make explicit are, as we shall see shortly, 
also highlighted under various guises in the works of the other authors listed above. In 
order to get a grip on these essential characteristics, we need to understand how they 
undermine the conceivability argument. To begin, Levine (1998) notes in his lucid 
exposition of the argument that it relies on what he calls ‘the distinct property model’
(DPM) of explaining “a priori ignorance of an identity” (p. 455). These are cases of a 
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posteriori identities such as “Water is H2O” the truth of which one may fail to realise 
despite possessing both of the concepts appearing in the identity claim. 
The following is the line of reasoning that the model would licence: On a certain 
(rather traditional) conception of the semantic properties of concepts, concepts have an 
extension (or a reference) and a mode of presentation. Mode of presentation is also 
referred to in the literature as ‘intension’, ‘connotation’ or ‘inferential role’ (whether 
computational or normative). The intension of ‘water’ is expressed along the lines of 
“transparent, odourless liquid, etc. which fills rivers and lakes” but the details may vary 
from thinker to thinker depending on what inferential role the concept ‘water’ has in 
them. The mode of presentation of ‘water’, whatever its precise details are in a thinker, is 
only contingently related to the mode of presentation of ‘H2O’. If it was necessarily 
related, the identity “Water is H2O” would be knowable a priori; surely, scientific 
identities are established as empirical discoveries, not as outcomes of a priori analyses, 
which obviates how an identity can be unknown to one despite his having the concepts of 
properties that have been successfully identified within a certain field of science. And, 
Levine continues, if the point about contingency is combined with an internalist view of 
meaning (assumed by the DPM), on which the sum of observable properties expressed in 
the mode of presentation of ‘water’ exhausts the meaning of the concept, then “Water is 
H2O” can at best be a nomologically necessary identity. For although “transparent, 
odourless liquid, etc. which fills rivers and lakes” would pick out H2O in our world 
(considered as actual), it would pick out XYZ on Twin Earth (a world considered in this 
context as counterfactual). Hence the inference from conceptual possibility (i.e. 
conceivability) of water not being H2O to metaphysical possibility of water not being 
H2O. 
It was an insight of Kripke’s that proven scientific identifications are metaphysically 
necessary and that ‘water’ refers to H2O in every possible world in which it is a referring 
expression at all and it is now common ground between materialists and anti-materialists. 
Jackson and Chalmers do not of course question metaphysical necessity of “water is 
H2O” and the above is only an illustration. Their claim is that the inference goes through 
for pairs of properties such as phenomenal property R (red) - physical/functional property 
P. It is identifications of these that can at best be nomologically necessary. Since the 
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mode of presentation of ‘phenomenal property R’ is only contingently related to the 
mode of presentation of ‘physical/functional property P’, it follows from conceivability 
of R not being P that it is metaphysically possible that R is not P. “Water is H2O” 
allegedly differs from “R is P” in that a description of the observable properties of water 
can be formally derived from the relevant chemical description (of H2O) if the non-rigid 
reference-fixer of ‘water’ in the above example is rigidified as what Chalmers and others 
call ‘primary intension’, associated (in his (2006)) with ‘fregean’ intensions. Block and 
Stalnaker (1999), however, reveal serious flaws in employing derivability as a measure of 
identification’s success. Moreover, given Jackson’s and Chalmers’ method of isolating
the primary intension of a concept – i.e. as a function from centred worlds to extensions –
they quite rightly see no reasons why primary intensions with a similar degree of rigidity 
could not be assigned to concepts referring to phenomenal properties to the effect that 
they would designate the same physical/functional properties in every (centred) possible 
world, thereby meeting the criterion of formal derivability. Jackson and Chalmers, they 
conclude, fall short of showing an asymmetry between “Water is H2O” and identities 
such as “R is P”.
Levine does not attempt to undermine the conceivability argument by disputing 
whether the primary intension of ‘phenomenal property R’ is any less rigid than the 
primary intensions of standard natural kind concepts. Instead, he considers dropping 
altogether the internalist assumption about meaning in the DPM on which the argument is 
heavily reliant. Neither primary intensions nor modes of presentation as they are 
traditionally understood make any contribution to the meaning of introspective concepts 
of phenomenal properties. He states this by saying that such concepts have non-ascriptive 
modes of presentation:
An ascriptive mode is one that involves the ascription of properties to the referent, 
and it’s (at least partly) by virtue of its instantiation of these properties that the 
object (or property) is the referent. A non-ascriptive mode is one that reaches its 
target, establishes a referential relation, by some other method. The object isn’t 
referred to by virtue of its satisfaction of any conditions explicitly represented in 
the mode of representation, but rather by standing in some particular relation to 
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the representation. The mode of presentation is the relation itself. The usual 
candidate for such a relation is some causal or nomic relation, such as covariation 
between representation and referent that meets certain constraints (1998, p. 457).
If the concepts in question do have non-ascriptive modes of presentation, drawing any
ontological conclusions from conceivability of absent and inverted qualia becomes a far 
more troublesome business. My concept ‘red’ as I apply it introspectively may refer to a 
physical/functional property without this fact ever showing up in my set of introspective 
beliefs about the property and its distinctive ‘feel’, in other words, without my 
introspection supplying any information about the physical/functional state my brain is in
at the time of my having the sensation. Likewise, my concept ‘water’ designates H2O 
without this fact necessarily showing up in my corresponding narrow psychological state, 
i.e. in my grasp of the concept. The inferential role of my introspective concept 
‘phenomenal property R’ differs profoundly from the inferential role of 
‘physical/functional property P’, and yet this does not preclude the statement “R is P” 
from expressing a metaphysically necessary truth.
We can see already from the brief outline in the quoted text the connection between 
non-ascriptive modes of presentation and Loar’s phenomenal concepts which are 
recognitional in that they are acquired by means of one’s acquaintance with phenomenal 
properties. The following is just some evidence of the parallels:
A recognitional concept may involve the ability to class together, to discriminate, 
things that have a given objective property. Say that if a recognitional concept is 
related thus to a property, the property triggers applications of the concept. Then 
the property that triggers the concept is the semantic value or reference of the 
concepts; the concept directly refers to the property, unmediated by a higher 
order reference-fixer (Loar 1990, p. 87, italics mine).
“Directly refers to the property, unmediated by a higher order reference-fixer” is to say 
that a phenomenal concept does not attach to its referent “by virtue of its satisfaction of 
any conditions explicitly represented in the mode of representation” (previous quotation). 
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If we are to state this in terms of the two-dimensional intensional framework, we may say 
that the meanings of phenomenal concepts are fully determined by their secondary 
intensions, ones which are isolated as functions from uncentred possible worlds to 
extensions and which Chalmers associates with ‘russellian’ intensions.  
So what we have here is a radical form of externalism with clear atomistic 
implications, recognising of course that if it is put forward exclusively for concepts of 
qualitative properties, it will be a theory of referential relations to properties which are 
internal to the subject. We should perhaps call it ‘extensionalism’ instead to avoid the 
superficial contradiction of terms and to place emphasis on the fact that, at least as far as 
concepts of qualia are concerned, it equates meaning with reference. Nothing with 
atomistic implications is defended by Putnam (1975) or Burge (1979); their version of 
externalism is reconcilable with meaning holism as well as molecularism (Putnam’s
(1991), for example, is a blend of externalism and normative holism) – the meaning of a 
natural kind concept is a result of a joint contribution of contextual factors and inferential 
roles.
There is a further motivation for the idea that concepts of qualia refer directly, without 
the aid of a reference-fixing mediator, besides its merits in weakening the conceivability 
argument. The point is a familiar one but it is particularly illuminating in this context to 
borrow Sturgeon’s terminology (2000) to bring it out. A concept is canonically linked to 
evidence for its application if the evidence is (at least partly) individuative of the concept. 
Canonical evidence acts as an intermediary between a concept and the property it applies 
to. Further, where there is an evidential intermediary, there are conservative defeaters, 
meaning that canonical evidence is always in principle defeasible; a concept can be 
misapplied even when canonical evidence for its application is available. Sturgeon gives 
this example: Let ‘red’ be a concept which refers to properties of external objects rather 
than to properties of experiences. My experience with a red quale acts as an evidential 
intermediary between my concept ‘red’ and the (external) property referred to, and the 
evidence is canonical (i.e. at least partly individuative of the concepts), as ‘red’ would not 
be the concept it is if it wasn’t warranted by such experiences at least in certain 
paradigmatic cases of its application. The evidence is defeated when an object of a 
different colour, due to unusual lighting, produces a red sensation in me. 
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The terminology can be used to highlight a number of epistemic and semantic 
characteristics of ‘water’ in a similar fashion. A set of observational properties such as 
being colourless, odourless, liquid, etc., is an evidential intermediary between my concept 
‘water’ and the property it refers to. The evidence is in principle defeasible – a substance 
with all of the properties which make my central beliefs about water true (suppose, for 
simplicity, that I have no knowledge of chemistry) could nonetheless fail to be water (i.e. 
H2O), although ‘water’ would not be the concept it is if it wasn’t warranted by the 
presence of these properties at least in some standard cases of its application. The 
defeasibility of such evidence stems from the fact that ‘water’ designates rigidly and 
invariably picks out H2O. ‘Red’ too, as it appears in ordinary usage, is a natural kind 
concept after all. It denotes a physical kind – a kind of surface reflectance producing a 
range of states which their subjects classify as red. The surface-reflectance property of 
objects in question is, as the referent of ‘red’, stable across all users of the concept. This 
ought to be conceded even by those who take the possibility of qualia inversions with all 
seriousness – even if the state on the basis of which I apply it differs qualitatively from 
the state which normally warrants someone else’s application of it under the same 
(standard) circumstances. 
There is a notably strong correlation between a concept’s canonical evidence, 
understood as a defeasible intermediary, and its contingent reference-fixing mediator. 
The property the presence of which I take to be evidence for applying a concept is also 
mentioned in the description that expresses the mode of presentation of the concept and 
states, at the same time, its contingent reference-fixing condition. If the presence of a red 
sensation is the canonical evidence for ‘red’, then ‘the cause of red sensations’ expresses 
the concept’s mode of presentation and states its contingent reference-fixing condition. 
Plainly, what one takes to be evidence for a concept’s application is part and parcel of his
grasp of the concept, of its mode of presentation.
The correlation between the two is also apparent from the fact that if canonical
evidence for applying a concept does not act as a (defeasible) intermediary between the 
concept and the denoted property, the concept refers directly, unmediated by a contingent 
reference-fixer. Absence of an evidential intermediary indicates absence of a contingent 
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reference-fixer. Qualitative concepts, unlike ‘red’ and ‘water’ in the previous examples 
lack evidential intermediaries:
Introspection disallows conservative defeaters. …when I introspectively notice 
one of my mental states is q-red, my canonical evidence for this isn’t some 
evidential intermediary between the q-redness of my mental state and my 
introspection-based belief about that q-redness. My evidence just is the q-redness 
of the mental state. Introspection moves directly from the phenomenon in 
question to our conception of it. This is why it feels immediate (Sturgeon 2000, 
p.48, italics original). 
Sturgeon does not associate this fairly trite point about introspective concepts with talk 
of contingent reference-fixing conditions. But it is nonetheless easy to see how it 
motivates the view that there is nothing in one’s grasp of a qualitative concept which 
makes reference to a contingent reference-fixing description. The possession-conditions 
for any introspective concept make reference solely to the causal relation between the 
concept and the property that triggers its application, since introspection is not defeasible 
and “moves directly from the phenomenon in question to our conception of it”.  
It seems that these rather trivial remarks about introspection are the key source of 
support for the idea that we have recognitional concepts of experiences. And many would 
of course feel that no additional support is required – only those approaches which view 
concepts of qualia as being formed on the basis of one’s direct acquaintance with their 
referents, without the aid of higher-order reference fixers, can do justice to the kind of 
immediacy peculiar to our knowledge of mental qualities. I will argue shortly that the 
same impression of introspective immediacy can be created by reconstructing our 
conception of experiential states, as Sellars does, out of certain objective and 
intersubjective elements. Moreover, Sellars’ argument that experiences and their 
properties initially play the role of theoretical postulates within a person’s conceptual 
scheme, and enter into observational discourse only after a further enrichment of the 
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scheme provides overwhelming reasons to favour such reconstruction. Recognitional 
concepts will then turn out to be nothing more than an epistemological fiction.  
2.2.3 HOR’s Commitment to Recognitional Concepts
Contextual determinants of referential relations go undetected by users of concepts for 
which externalism was proposed. No amount of scrutiny of the internal component of 
meaning uncovers any traces of what lies at the outer end of a referential relation. This, 
after all, is why the position is known as ‘externalism’; if contextual factors could be 
gleaned from the purely narrow component of meaning and were somehow implicit in it 
(whether ‘narrow’ stands for ‘inferential role’, ‘intension’, ‘mode of presentation’ or 
other), then that component alone would surely individuate concepts finely enough to do 
justice to modal intuitions involving superficially matching counterfactual worlds with 
different chemistry. If this was the case, no need for an externalist alternative would ever 
arise. 
There has been much bewilderment among authors as to how a concept’s referent can 
be concealed from its competent users that led to objections that externalism is 
incompatible with privileged access (see McLaughlin and Tye (1998) for possible 
responses). In sub-section 1.1.2 I evaluated the argument from incompatibility in the 
form it takes in Searle’s (1983) regarding perceptual content. Searle swiftly dismisses 
externalism on the grounds that external factors do not enter into a perception’s intension 
and therefore, assuming that only intensions are psychologically relevant, it has no role to 
play in individuating content.21 But the key insight of externalism is that external 
determinants and intensions are virtually independent of each other, that the former are
ex-ternal to the latter while being individuative of content, not that they should be 
discernible within the narrow component. Searle’s misgivings about contextual factors 
not entering into intensions place an impossible demand on externalism; if intensions did 
incorporate contextual factors, the resulting position would remain internalistic, and so
21 The belief that only narrow content is relevant to psychological generalizations is subjected to 
compelling criticism in Burge’s well-known paper Individualism and Psychology (1986).
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what he is in effect demanding, somewhat paradoxically, is that externalism can be true 
only if internalism is true.
Externalism’s alleged clash with intuition stems from the widely shared conviction 
that we, as competent speakers, ought to be accorded the ultimate authority in decisions 
on what our concepts designate. The conviction becomes still deeper in the case of 
qualitative concepts which, being a species of introspective concepts, apply to items 
which are proprietary to the subject and are themselves thought to be known with 
absolute or near-absolute authority, in other words, we do not just have direct and 
infallible knowledge of the internal or a priori component of introspective concepts, as it 
is believed to be the case with all other concepts, we also have such knowledge of the 
essence of what they apply to. So if privileged and immediate access and undetectability 
of contextual determinants from the speaker’s perspective are seen as two conflicting 
ideas as far as the referents of concepts such as ‘water’, ‘gold’, ‘mammal’, etc. are 
concerned, we should expect any attempt to reconcile them in a theory of qualitative 
concepts to be rejected out of hand. And many authors with anti-materialistic sympathies
have indeed been scornful of the suggestion that the true nature and ontological status of 
the referents of qualitative concepts is concealed from their possessors – that they may 
designate physical/functional properties without their possessors having any knowledge 
of this fact from inspecting their experiences.
However, the purpose of my connecting Sturgeon’s observations about introspection 
with Loar’s thought that qualitative concepts do not designate via contingent reference-
fixers was to show that, in the case of qualitative concepts, not only does the idea of 
immediacy cohere with undetectability of contextual determinants, but it is also the 
primary source of motivation for radical form externalism, or ‘extensionalism’, regarding
these concepts. Introspection feels immediate because, as Sturgeon writes, canonical 
evidence for applying a qualitative concept is not an intermediary between the concept 
and the property it applies to, rather, it is the phenomenal property itself and therefore, in 
introspecting, we move directly from the phenomenon in question to our conception of it. 
This is arguably akin to the sense of ‘immediacy’ to which anti-materialists would 
appeal. 
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Now, if my concept of, say, a purple quale is formed in such a direct fashion, it 
follows that the sole constraint on my possession of it is that I stand in an appropriate 
causal relation to the property. All of the reference-fixing that is necessary in order for 
that concept to be the concept it is, with its specific degree of abstractness or 
determinateness, the range of shades it covers, etc., is done by the causal relation, leaving 
no room for a narrow and contingent description to share, so to speak, some of the 
reference-fixing tasks; and since there is nothing in my manner of possession of it except 
that causal contact, the concept is devoid of an analysable purely internal or a priori 
component.
This deprives Searle and others of any grounds for complaining that contextual factors 
do not enter into intensions. For, owing to the absence of an a priori component, there is 
nothing for them to enter into; or, alternatively, there is nothing – no intensions, that is –
they are ex-ternal to, except the concept itself. Bearing in mind the extent of the 
conceivability argument’s reliance on internalist semantics, as it was clear from Levine’s 
exposition, it also deprives anti-materialists of any means of arguing from cognitive 
independence of qualitative and physical/functional conceptions to ontological 
distinctness of their referents. The narrow components having been removed, there is 
nothing a priori left in phenomenal conceptions to dictate that they cannot share their 
extensions with physical/functional ones.
A corollary of a treatment of qualitative concepts which abandons all internalist 
assumptions about their meaning is that it inevitably severs whatever a priori links we 
might have supposed exist among them. Those who believe that they have a method of 
isolating a purely internal or a priori component of concepts will want to say that one is 
capable of inferring a priori from, for instance, “x is a square” to “x is polygonal” 
because the fact that all squares are polygonal is contained, in one way or other, in his 
grasp of the concept ‘polygonal’. But if one, on the other hand, introspects a state with, 
say, a dark red quale and exercises the type of recognitional disposition I have been 
discussing, as a result of which he acquires the concepts ‘crimson’ and ‘red’ (as applied 
to experiences), the fact that whatever feels crimson also feels red cannot be extracted 
from his grasp of ‘red’, since there is nothing in his grasp of it over and above his direct 
acquaintance with the property. Carruthers (2004) shares this understanding of 
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recognitional concepts, although he prefers to call them purely recognitional, presumably 
so as to distinguish them from certain ordinary observational concepts the learning of 
which is assisted by perceptual acquaintance:
A concept is recognitional when it can be applied on the basis of perceptual or 
quasi-perceptual acquaintance with its instances. And a concept is purely
recognitional when its possession-conditions…make no appeal to anything other 
than such acquaintance. A concept is purely recognitional when nothing in the 
grasp of that concept, as such, requires its user to apply or appeal to any other 
concept of belief. A purely recognitional concept of experience is then a higher-
order recognitional concept, which applies to another mental state (viz. an 
experience), and whose possession conditions don’t presuppose any other mental-
state concepts (not even the concept experience) (p. 320, italics original).
Much of the foregoing then points firmly towards ruling out the existence of necessary 
intralinguistic connections within the introspective domain. It need not of course reinstate
the rather stark thesis of atomism across all conceptual domains. Local atomism, as it 
were, imposed exclusively on the cluster of concepts formed in introspection is as far as 
one’s commitment to recognitional concepts goes. 
Some may perhaps embrace this and set out to explain away the intuitive semblance of 
necessary a priori connections among these concepts by restating them as metaphysically 
necessary connections. Extensional logic treats extensions of predicates as sets of items 
which, at a given time, have the properties expressed by the predicates in question. So the 
inference from “x is crimson” to “x is red” could simply be a matter of the extension of 
‘crimson’ being a sub-set of the extension of ‘red’ to the effect that the inferential link is 
accounted for by the fact that it is metaphysically necessary that something which is 
crimson is also red, for it is undoubtedly its sub-set in every possible world. If the option 
of establishing a conceptual necessity by an analysis of the purely conceptual components 
of ‘crimson’ and ‘red’ (as applied to experiences) is unavailable because recognitional 
concepts are stripped of the internal component to be analysed, it nonetheless seems, at a 
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first glance, that conceptual necessities may in these circumstances be replaced with 
metaphysical necessities without anything being lost in the process. Fodor, one of the few 
authors nowadays who thinks it worthwhile to defend semantic atomism, argues in his 
quite recent book Concepts (1998), if I read him correctly, along some such lines.
Concepts which are formed independently of one’s other concepts and beliefs and can
in principle be in place prior to his learning a language is precisely what the higher-order 
representationalist needs introspective states aimed at perceptual qualities to embed. In 
order to appreciate HOR’s heavy reliance on the purported autonomy of phenomenal 
conceptions (i.e. their local atomism), let me summarise the points made in the present 
section so far. I began by noting that first-order representationalism is ill-equipped to 
identify the subject of experience, as it does not have the resources to move from “There 
is a visual representation of something red in me” to “I represent something red”. 
Suppose I only instantiate the first-order functional organisation of a healthy human 
perceiver, while lacking everything else, so that the former but not the latter description 
applies to my perceptual situation. Would my perceptual states be qualitative? Would 
they be experiences? The FOR theorist is bound to answer in the affirmative. But now if 
we replace the words ‘representation’ and ‘represent’ in the two descriptions with 
‘experience’ – a substitution warranted by the claim that experiences are representations
– it follows that FOR cannot move from “There is an experience of something red in me”
to “I experience something red”, which commits its proponents to holding that 
experiences can occur where nothing is identifiable as their subject, in other words, it 
commits them to holding that there can be experiences without experiencers. This is 
incoherent, I hope to have shown, and it neglects the fundamental fact that qualia are 
subjective properties – at least in the sense of ‘subject-dependent’ properties. Such
subject-dependence means that the experiencing self and mental qualities are two sides of 
the same coin, so to speak, that the self is woven into the experiential fabric, and hence an 
inquiry into the nature of the concepts that facilitate the self’s access to phenomenal 
properties must figure prominently in an account of why certain representational systems 
enjoy the privilege of inner life in its full richness while others don’t.
But to see that higher-order representationalism stakes its tenability on the claim that 
the concepts in question are recognitional, we need to be more specific. I contended that, 
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unlike FOR, HOR merits our approval for doing justice to subject-dependence of 
phenomenal properties. It distinguishes qualitative sensory representations from non-
qualitative ones in terms of availability to introspective or self-reflexive states. This 
constraint on a state’s possession of qualia then banishes the unwelcome implication that
experiences can exist in absence of selves which would fill the role of experiencers.
Causal relations between the self-reflexive faculty (whether thought of as Carruthers’ 
mind-reading module or Dennett’s print-out faculty or else) and the various sense 
modalities, such as those obtaining when an instantiation of a quale elicits the application 
of a qualitative concept from the higher-order module, are an important building block in 
the functionalist project of constructing the self from sub-personal material. Recall that 
Dennett thought it difficult indeed to resist doubts that a system wired up so as to realise 
a causal network consisting of connections among sub-personal parts would either give 
us no reason to believe that it is a subject of experience, or would obviously not be a 
subject of experience. As HOR is a functionalist enterprise seeking to identify the subject 
of experience, it too is inevitably beset by these doubts, the self escaping its mesh of sub-
personal interactions. 
Now, it is open to the HOR theorist to postpone addressing these daunting problems 
directly, and take instead an indirect route via addressing the question as to whether there 
is anything unique about the concepts a genuine experiencing self forms on being 
presented with a quale. Given the difficulty of the subjectivity-related issues raised by 
Dennett, this alternative inquiry should prove more immediately rewarding, as it will at 
least yield a statement of conditions concerning possession of concepts formed by 
subjects undergoing experiences. The outcome will then lead to a revised characterisation 
of the causal relation between the mind-reading module and lower-order perceptual states
with a view to building it into the sub-personal causal network from which functionalists 
seek to construct the experiencing self; so, for instance, if it is a recognitional concept 
that a qualitative property elicits from the introspective module, then this characterisation 
will provide some leverage for the HOR theorist in addressing Dennett’s worries, since it 
is far from obvious that a possessor of recognitional concepts does not undergo 
experiences.
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One may retort that to say that something has recognitional concepts is already to 
presuppose that that something is a subject of experiences. But while this is certainly true,
as the characteristics that have been stipulated for them ensure that they invariably pick
out phenomenal properties, we mustn’t forget that there are other candidates for playing 
the role of qualitative concepts. Let me explain. Those other candidates are public-
language and language-of-thought concepts which differ from recognitional concepts in 
that their meaning and reference is at least partly determined by their inferential roles (or, 
if you prefer, by their contingent reference-fixing conditions), and therefore bring with 
them a wealth of other concepts out of which the premises and conclusions in the 
meaning-constitutive inferences for a given concept are composed. The higher-order 
representationalist, however, must claim that qualitative concepts are recognitional, with 
all the characteristics listed in the preceding sub-section and at the beginning of the 
present one, namely, that they are non-ascriptive, unanalysable, acquired on the basis of 
brute acquaintance and hence autonomous in relation to any other concepts and beliefs
one happens to have. For – and this is the key point – the possession-conditions for, say, 
public-language higher-order concepts are such that they could in principle be satisfied 
by a subject who displays perceptual sensitivity to his environment but does not 
experience anything. Demonstrating that there is a distinct possibility that this is the case 
with public-language concepts is the central focus of Stephen Leeds’ (1993). Bear in 
mind here that I’ve been considering HOR as a theory of phenomenal consciousness not 
as a theory of access consciousness, on which higher-order states realise phenomenally 
conscious awareness rather than afford mere access to a (lower-order) state that is already 
phenomenally conscious. That the higher-order states accomplishing conscious 
awareness should contain concepts that can also apply to perceptual states which are not 
experiences would be something of an embarrassment for its defenders. 
Leeds explains that acquisition of public-language introspective concepts – public in 
the sense that they are used in reports to others and verbal communication in general – is 
a process that begins by learning, when under a perceptual illusion, to momentarily 
suspend one’s belief that he is under an illusion, and declare instead that the worldly 
object being perceived does have the property that is non-veridically presented to him. He 
describes such suspension of belief as ‘bracketing of collateral information’.
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Reporting one’s visual impressions can be taken as a matter of learning to 
‘bracket’ collateral information: instead of reporting the straight stick in water one 
knows is before one, one learns to report the bent stick one would have reported if 
one had known nothing about refraction. So if you are to imagine having the 
ability to report your impressions, what you must imagine is being able to decide 
certain counterfactuals about your beliefs – e.g. if you had been told that what was 
before you was a picture, would you have reported it as containing a straight line? 
I believe that we can in fact imagine this by assimilating it to other cases in which 
we know – ‘just know’ – what we would have believed had we not known X (p. 
309).
It is in deciding these situations that the question of inner perceptual episodes comes to 
the fore in one’s conceptual scheme. Leeds, unsurprisingly, invokes blindsight as an 
example of perceiving without experiencing. Since blindsighters are capable of making 
perceptual discriminations, albeit with much greater difficulty, they too can be subjected
to perceptual illusions, and hence it is conceivable, according to him, that they can be 
trained to bracket collateral information in the above way to enable them to report their 
‘sensations’ in the blind region of their visual field. If, Leeds continues, the only kind of 
concepts we apply to experiences were such public-language concepts, being affected by 
blindsight would hardly make the profound cognitive difference we would expect when
someone loses a substantial portion of their visual field, since his beliefs would not differ 
dramatically from ours. 
To show in what way we differ from blindsighters, it is not enough to point to 
some difference between their impressions (or sensa) and ours: one needs to point 
to a difference which matters to the character of their mental lives in the way that 
it matters whether or not we are blindsighters. Blindsighters can identify the 
missing portions of their visual fields; if they have only recently become 
blindsighters they know that they are no longer as they were, and long to have 
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their sight restored: so whether or not one is a blindsighter can make a difference 
to what one believes and desires. Likewise, of course, we know that we are not 
blindsighters, and hope we never become like them (p. 310, italics original). 
Later in the paper he exploits these considerations in an argument that alongside public-
language introspective concepts we, as actually sighted humans, possess concepts which 
find no expression in public language and which account for the difference between the 
character of our mental lives and the mental lives of blindsight sufferers. There is little 
doubt that recognitional concepts are well suited to supply the desired explanation of that 
difference. 
But for our immediate purposes it is sufficient to note that a failure to pinpoint a
salient difference between our introspective beliefs and those which blindsighters may be 
trained to form would render HOR untenable. HOR, examined here exclusively as a 
theory of qualia, characterises qualia as intentional properties of sensory states available 
to be targeted by higher-order states. While I viewed the availability condition as a 
laudable recognition of the fact that experiences are subject-dependent and require 
experiencing selves, qualia would elude the HOR theorist’s grasp if the very same 
introspective states turned out to also target non-qualitative perceptions, that is, if the 
extensions of the introspective concepts in question included sensory states that are bereft 
of phenomenal properties. Unless propped up by recognitional concepts, HOR will face 
the same problem as FOR did in section 1.2 where it was argued, following Carruthers,
that its portrayal of qualia could not satisfactorily rule out certain non-qualitative sensory 
states.
The final reason that advocates of HOR should be eager to hold onto recognitional 
concepts is that without them they would be compelled to deny raw feels to pre-linguistic 
children and higher animals. The denial will be forced on them if the mind-reading 
module which they need in order to identify the subject of experience is formed only 
upon one’s grasp of public-language higher-order concepts. But, on the other hand, if 
acquisition of qualitative conceptions is achieved purely recognitionally, and thus
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possibly prior to and irrespective of the development of other conceptual domains within 
one’s cognition, then they can quite legitimately maintain that the mind-reading module 
that issues introspective concepts is either hard-wired or develops shortly after birth. 
Only by showing that self-reflexive states ground recognitional concepts can the 
defenders of HOR be entitled to credit small children and higher animals with raw feels.
I hope enough has been said in this sub-section to demonstrate that the topic of 
recognitional concepts in connection with higher-order proposals calls for more than a 
brief examination, as the nature of higher-order states is not a marginal matter only to be 
resolved once the vital commitments of such proposals have been made explicit and 
evaluated. On the contrary HOR does indeed stake its tenability on the existence of 
recognitional concepts. I have indicated several times that I deny that introspective states 
feature anything remotely like the concepts described here and in the preceding sub-
section; and I’m now going to argue alongside Sellars that qualitative conceptions are 
composed entirely out of objective and intersubjective elements. These elements, as we 
will also see, can only be put together by competent public-language speakers. This will 
result in a view that introspective states are internalised public-language sentences and 
that there is nothing over and above that which finds perfectly adequate expression in the 
vocabulary of public language. The consequences of favouring public-language concepts 
over recognitional ones for HOR and intentional theories of qualia in general will be 
explored in more detail in 2.3.
2.2.4 The Origin of Qualitative Concepts in Theoretical Discourse: Sellars
Wilfrid Sellars’ essay Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind is an attack on classical 
empiricism and its remnants in Ayer’s and Russell’s knowledge by acquaintance, both of 
which doctrines, according to him, conflate non-epistemic episodes of, say, sensing redly 
with epistemic episodes of knowing that something is red. To say that having a sensation 
of red either constitutes or entails a non-inferential knowing that something is red is to 
entangle the idea
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(1)…that there are certain inner episodes – e.g., sensations of red or of C# which 
can occur to human beings (and brutes) without any prior process of learning or 
concept formation; and without which it would in some sense  be impossible to 
see, for example, that the facing surface of a physical object is red and triangular, 
or hear that a certain physical sound is C#,
with the idea 
(2)…that there are certain inner episodes which are the noninferential knowings 
that certain items are, for example, red or C#; and that these episodes are the 
necessary conditions of empirical knowledge as providing evidence for all other 
empirical propositions (Sellars, 1997, p.21).
It is, in other words, to assimilate phenomenal consciousness to cognitive or conceptual
consciousness. The former doesn’t entail (let alone constitute) the latter because 
conceptual awareness is classificatory – as Richard Rorty explains in the commentary on 
Sellars that appears in his (1979), according to Sellars’ Wittgensteinian view, knowing
what X is comes down to knowing what kind of thing it is. We do not learn the concept 
of X simply by ‘noticing’ X when in perceptual contact with its instance, which would be 
the case if (1) entailed (2). To notice X is to notice it under a certain description, which 
description presupposes understanding that X belongs to a certain class of things the 
concept or concepts of which we must already possess. So having the concept of X is 
being able to inferentially relate that concept to the numerous other concepts contained in 
propositions used by speakers as premises in justifying their beliefs about X.    
The fact that cognitive consciousness is essentially a classification of things under 
kinds, requiring that a speaker be able to link his newly acquired concepts with other 
concepts in the practices of reasoning and justification is, in the broadest outline, Sellars’ 
reason for endorsing a version of inferential role semantics, one where the appropriate
rules of inference that govern these practices are material rather than formal. Rorty 
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warns, however, of interpreting Sellars as making the case that pre-linguistic children do 
not feel pain until they learn the concept of pain. They feel pains and react to them 
because they have them. What they learn later in their lives is to know what kind of thing 
pains are. Small children of course respond behaviourally to scalds, tingles, itches, etc., 
but it is not until they have a grasp of the relevant vocabulary that categorises these 
occurrences, and participate in reasoning about them with other members of their
linguistic community that we can say that they know what they are.
Sellars does not deny that there are non-inferential beliefs, if ‘non-inferential’ is 
understood in the epistemologically benign sense of ‘observationally elicited’. But he 
would stress that non-inferential uses of concepts (contained in observational beliefs) in 
this sense presuppose that one is already able to use them inferences. What he rejects is 
that there are non-inferential beliefs in the sense that one can arrive at them solely by 
having sensations, even though he has no other concepts and beliefs to which his 
observational concept is inferentially linked. Indeed, on Rorty’s reading, Sellars would 
see no reason not to grant that a congenitally blind person may learn to use ‘red’ 
inferentially to the effect that he will know, for instance, that red is a colour, that it differs 
from blue, green, etc., and hence know what it is in the sense of knowing what kind of 
thing redness is, despite not being able to apply it non-inferentially in response to 
perceptually presented states of affairs. Sellars could grant all of this while maintaining 
that sighted pre-linguistic infants do not know what redness is.
The suggestion that small children must know what redness is just by being awake
amounts to a confusion, nurtured by classical empiricism, of perceptual sensitivity with 
genuine conceptualisation that results in a view of perceptual concepts as labels that 
attach to aspects of sensory contents once the channels of perceptual inflow are opened 
without their prior employment in reasoning (i.e. inferences). If conceptualisation was 
separable from reasoning, justification and inferring, if non-inferential applications of 
concepts were not mere offshoots of inferential ones, there would be nothing to define us 
as rational and sapient beings, for non-inferentially formed ‘labels’ (‘non-inferentially’ in 
the sense that Sellars rejects) would scarcely differ from the outputs of photosensitive 
devices or the noises that parrots can be conditioned to make. The following sums up the 
position:
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The essential point is that in characterizing an episode or a state as that of 
knowing, we are not giving an empirical description of that episode or state; we 
are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify 
what one says (Sellars, 1997, p.76, italics original).
Although so far I have only talked about concepts referring to sensory contents and 
there has as yet been no mention of introspective concepts referring to sensory states and 
their properties, it is clear that if the thought that non-inferential uses presuppose 
inferential ones is carried over to higher-order concepts, it will turn the story of 
recognitional concepts on its head. A recognitional concept is installed in one’s cognition 
when a causal relation with a phenomenal property is established and does not owe its 
epistemic status and reference to having a role in reasoning, which secures that only 
sighted persons are in a position to satisfy its possession-conditions. Again, this is 
precisely the story of non-inferential concept acquisition that Sellars would dismiss as an 
attempt to empirically describe an occurrence that derives its epistemic status from its
existence within the logical space of reasons.
These opening paragraphs are to serve as an outline of Sellars’ general approach to so-
called ‘ground-level’ beliefs about aspects of sensory contents taken by classical 
empiricists to be non-inferentially individuated, where the supposed non-inferential 
individuation was viewed by those philosophers as a means of delineating a privileged 
class of propositions that are the source of justification for all other empirical 
propositions without themselves standing in need of justification. The empiricist project 
of laying a foundation for the entire body of empirical knowledge is a manifestation of 
the Myth of the Given which Sellars dismantles in his work.
The distinction between inferential and non-inferential uses of concepts will, however, 
continue to bear heavily on his treatment of introspective concepts, except that for the 
introspective domain it is drawn so as to have the force of the distinction between 
theoretical and observational uses – theoretical concepts are about entities that are 
unobservable at a certain stage in the development of a given field of scientific study and 
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therefore occur in statements that are only applied as inferences from statements of 
observable fact. But such entities can always become non-inferentially (in the sense of 
‘observationally’) reportable if, for example, someone with a strong background in 
physics gradually (and unwittingly perhaps) abandons the vocabulary of common objects 
in favour of the vocabulary of a confirmed physical theory and instead of reporting, say, a 
bolt of lightning in the sky he is now inclined to proclaim that he sees an electric 
discharge in the sky. In Sellars’ view, the report he is now inclined to make has an equal 
claim to be non-inferential or ‘ground-level’. It does not differ in status from the one he 
has abandoned insofar as ‘electric discharge’ has come to play the role in his conceptual 
scheme that ‘bolt of lightning’ does in the conceptual scheme of lay people. That 
introspective concepts undergo similar shifts from theoretical to observational discourse 
is Sellars’ most notable contribution to theorising about introspection. Further 
clarification of the point is due below.
I shall start with an argument that gets underway in section 10 of his (1997) and is 
closed in section 22 against the idea – common to cartesians and empiricists – that
sensory contents or appearances are given in that they are objects of immediate 
awareness on which knowledge of physical objects in space and time rests. This 
particular argument, unlike the outline of his general approach just above, does not 
depend on our prior acceptance of Sellars’ normativist (as opposed to computationalist) 
version of inferential role semantics. Its primary purpose is not a defence of inferential 
role semantics, although a rejection of conceptual nativism and atomism naturally flows 
from it, but to bring to surface the first dimension of intersubjectivity built into concepts 
of experiential inner episodes, and introduce the terminology from which, as we will 
appreciate later, full-fledged introspective concepts eventually evolve. I will then be in a 
position to focus on the key sections of his essay, those where he rejects the idea that 
experiential inner episodes are given in that they are objects of immediate awareness, that 
one non-inferentially knows that they occur just by having sensations, something which 
would be the case if Loar’s recognitional concepts were possible. At that stage the 
second dimension of intersubjectivity built into introspective concepts will emerge.
Philosophers in the cartesian and empiricist traditions alike took it that beliefs about 
physical objects in space and time are inferences from direct and infallible knowledge of 
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sensory contents or so-called appearances. Knowledge of facts such as X appears red is, 
according to them, a matter of the most fundamental and pre-linguistic awareness from
which, if the circumstances of perception are regarded as standard, a perceiver concludes 
that X also is red. By making the inference a perceiver leaves an ideal world of pure 
appearances known to him intimately and without mediation, and enters a world of 
physical objects in which he is inevitably prone to error. Hence the notion ‘is red’ is 
thought to be reducible to ‘looks red’. Sellars’ considers the following statement: 
(D) x is red ≡ x looks red to standard observers in standard conditions  
Those who are the target of his criticism would see the right-hand side as the definition of 
‘is red’, that is, as the definition of physical redness in terms of ‘looks red’. In response to 
this misconception, he first distinguishes three kinds of states:
(a) Seeing that x, over there, is red
(b) Its looking to one that x, over there, is red
(c) Its looking to one as though there were a red object over there
Although he calls these states ‘experiences’, which slightly obscures his exposition, it is 
clear enough that the term is not used in his text with the meaning it typically has in 
contemporary literature. What he means here, if I read him correctly, is something we 
may call a ‘total experiential state’, one that comprises a perceptual belief occasioned by 
what would nowadays be referred to as ‘experience’ or ‘perception’ on the one hand, and 
an impression or immediate experience on the other, which are Sellars’ equivalents of 
experiences and perceptions as they are currently understood. It comprises something 
belonging to the epistemic realm as well as something belonging to the causal realm. We 
could certainly imagine a little more fortunate choice of terms, but we ought to bear in 
mind that his problem is whether the acquisition of concepts pertaining to sensory 
contents precedes the acquisition of concepts pertaining to physical objects, so including 
epistemic (and hence conceptual) episodes under the term ‘experience’ perhaps helps 
bring out the point of disagreement between him and the approach he criticises. 
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Now, on Sellars’ diagnosis, the above misconception results from an oversight of two 
facts. Firstly, to characterise an experience (in his sense) as that of seeing that something
is the case is to ascribe to it (or to its epistemic ingredient) a certain assertion or 
propositional claim, namely, that x is red. Elsewhere he calls it ‘propositional content’.
Secondly, and more importantly, it is also to say that its subject endorses the claim. Here 
he refers to Ryle and likens this notion of endorsement to his emphasis that ‘see’ is an 
achievement verb. Ryle’s insight, according to him, is that in describing an experience as 
an instance of seeing that something is so and so we “apply the semantical concept of 
truth to that experience” (1997, p. 40). Thus one is compelled to judge “I see that x is 
red” instead of the mere “x is red” when “certain considerations have operated to raise, so 
to speak in a higher court, the question ‘to endorse or not to endorse’” the experience’s 
propositional content ‘x is red’ (p.41). This suggests to Sellars that “x looks red to me 
now” belongs on the same level as “I see that x is red”, for, again, one is disposed to 
judge “x looks red to me now” only when the question ‘to endorse or not to endorse’ has 
arisen, save that now he withdraws his endorsement of that very same propositional claim 
(i.e. ‘x is red’) that his experience involves. We are disposed to judge “x looks red to me 
now” rather than “I see that x is red” when an object is viewed in, say, unusual artificial 
light and we suspect that it may not appear what it is. Nonetheless, in making such a 
report, it is ‘x is red’, where the redness is physical redness, not one ascribed to sensory 
contents, that we recognise or even initially assent to, but subsequently hold back from 
endorsing.
So experiences (a), (b) and (c) share at least those parts of their respective 
propositional contents which may be expressed as ‘x is red’ and ‘there is an x over there’, 
the difference among them consisting in which parts of the propositions, if any, we are 
prepared to endorse. In (a), we commit ourselves to both ‘x is red’ and ‘there is an x over 
there’, in (b) the former falls outside the scope of the endorsement, and neither is 
endorsed in (c). 
We can now understand where this reasoning parts ways with the classical positions 
scrutinised by Sellars. In fact, if it is sound, it rebuts their most basic presuppositions. 
Since ‘x is so and so’ is embedded in ‘looks so and so’, it implies that we do not 
conceptualise aspects of sensory contents until we can conceptualise properties of 
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physical objects. In classical accounts, however, undue importance was attached to the 
thought that because we seem to have infallible (or incorrigible) knowledge of sensory 
contents, that we cannot be wrong about (or be corrected on) how things appear to us, 
concepts pertaining to sensory contents or appearances are formed solely by virtue of 
having sensations and must lie at the base of our entire body of empirical concepts. The
reasoning is also invoked in Phenomenalism (Sellars, 1963) to argue against a cluster of 
positions (including the sense-datum theory) which are in agreement with the classical 
conceptions about there being a more basic form of visual knowledge than seeing 
physical objects, but conceive that level of basic knowledge as consisting of sensings of 
two-dimensional colour expanses floating before an inner sense. Sellars now returns to 
(D), his original formulation of the problem,
(D) x is red ≡ x looks red to standard observers in standard conditions  
and concludes that it is a necessary truth
…not because the right-hand side is the definition of “x is red,” but because 
“standard conditions” means conditions in which things look what they are. And, 
of course, which conditions are standard for a given mode of perception is, at the 
common-sense level, specified by a list of conditions which exhibit the vagueness 
and open texture characteristic of ordinary discourse (1997, p. 43-44, italics 
original).
The discussion reveals the first dimension of intersubjectivity upon which, as we will 
appreciate shortly, introspective conceptions are built. For its gist is that the framework 
of sensory contents rests on the undeniably intersubjective framework of physical objects 
in space and time.22 But before I can explain precisely how this particular intersubjective 
element is involved in introspective conceptions as well as how its involvement 
22 In fact Sellars goes as far as to suggest that the inverted spectrum hypothesis too relies on the mistaken 
assumption that we form beliefs about appearances or sensory contents independently of and prior to 
grasping concepts of the properties of worldly objects. The possibility of inverted spectra would not be 
raised if the role of intersubjectivity in talk of appearances was properly taken account of.  
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undermines the claims that introspective concepts are recognitional, we must pick up the 
line of argument that constitutes Sellars’ denial of the givennes of sense impressions as 
objects of immediate awareness. Its final step is completed when he shows how – once I
possess the concepts of seeing that x, over there, is F, its looking to me that x, over there, 
is F, and its looking to me as though there were x that is F over there – experiential inner 
episodes or impressions are extracted within my conceptual scheme as the common 
components of such families of states as the (a), (b) and (c) above.23 Sellars also refers to 
this common ingredient as ‘descriptive content’ shared by the three situations alongside 
their propositional content (i.e. ‘x is F’ and ‘there is an x over there’) which we either 
endorse or refuse to endorse (or parts thereof). It is the common causal antecedent of the 
corresponding thoughts “I see that x, over there, is F”, “X, over there, looks F” and “It 
looks as though there were an x that is F over there”.
So the latter sections of his (1997) are an attempt to trace, with the aid of a fictional
story about our Rylean ancestors, a process of intellectual development that begins with 
the formation of concepts referring to the perceptible properties of physical objects and 
culminates in the formation of concepts whereby we recognise each other and ourselves 
as creatures who think, have feelings, sensations etc., and who can ‘observe’ and be 
directly aware of the items in their stream of consciousness. For Sellars, the need for 
clarifying the status of impressions by concentrating on their development arises from the 
realisation that 
…once we give up the idea that we begin our sojourn in this world with any –
even a vague, fragmentary, and undiscriminating – awareness of the logical space 
of particulars, kinds, facts, and resemblances, and recognize that even such 
“simple” concepts as those of colours are the fruit of a long process of publicly 
reinforced responses to public objects (including verbal performances) in public 
situations, we may well be puzzled as to how, even if there are such things as 
impressions or sensations, we could come to know that there are, and what sort of 
23 According to Sellars, having the concept of seeing that something is so and so together with the 
concepts of qualitative and existential lookings alone would only enable a perceiver to refer to his 
experiential inner episodes indirectly, by saying that if the common propositional content of, say, (a), (b), 
and (c) was true, they would all be instances of seeing that x, over there, is red. A further enrichment is 
necessary in order for someone to be able to focus introspectively on his sense impressions.   
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thing they are. For we now recognise that instead of coming to have a concept of 
something because we have noticed that sort of thing, to have the ability to notice 
a sort of thing is already to have the concepts of that sort of thing, and cannot 
account for it (p. 87, italics original).
The first part of the story that recreates sense impressions from a base made up of the 
ground-level observational concepts of public objects concerns thoughts. Thoughts are 
examined at the outset because, as I already hinted above, impressions are initially 
conceptualised, or first ‘noticed’, as it were, by someone who has no previous theory of 
mind (whether folk or other) with respect to perceptual situations, as the common causal 
antecedent of the thought “I see that something is so and so”, and the corresponding 
thoughts regarding qualitative and existential lookings. Furthermore, thoughts too are 
treated as theoretical posits which became observable and hence follow a basic 
developmental pattern that is repeated in the case of experiential inner episodes.
Sellars introduces an imaginary community of our ancestors whose language is Rylean 
in that it is confined to concepts of public objects and properties. In addition to these, it 
contains logical operators and whatever other grammatical tools are necessary for 
construction of sentences, but is devoid of mentalistic concepts to the effect that its 
members lack a theory of mind. We can imagine that the situation being described here is
loosely analogous to that in which infants find themselves early in their intellectual life 
when they conceptualise items in their surroundings but respond to scalds, thirst or sleep 
deprivation only in an instinctive and pre-conceptual way. When the members of the 
community try to explain their actions and verbal responses as well as those of others, 
they do so not in the familiar mentalistic vocabulary that we frequently make use of (for 
example, “I ran because I thought I was being chased”), but in the vocabulary of 
behaviouristic psychology. Now, the remainder of the essay is an answer to the question 
as to what additional practices they must adopt to be able to view the actions and verbal 
performances of others as well as their own as being brought about by inner occurrences 
known to us as thoughts, feelings, sensations, etc. 
As for thoughts, the answer has two parts. Firstly, it is the application of semantic 
categories to their utterances, the practice of their semantic evaluation, of clarifying their 
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meaning when ambiguities obscure it, of ascertaining their truth or falsity, etc. Semantic 
categories are indispensable because thoughts (which of course they do not yet 
conceptualise) inherit their ‘aboutness’ from the semantic features of overt speech. 
Linguistic meaning is explanatorily more basic than intentionality. We cannot think what 
does not find expression in our public-language vocabulary. This is clearly a non-
mentalistic approach to the intentionality of non-phenomenal mental states as contrasted 
with, for instance, the functionalist movement initiated in the early work of Putnam 
(1960, 1967). The latter is a mentalistic strategy since it construes linguistic performances 
as expressions of thoughts that are individuated (or at least their narrow component) by 
their computational role within a causal network, not by their correlation with utterances 
which, on this position, may or may not express them adequately. The causal network 
must be complex enough to confer a sufficiently determinate content on various thought-
states, but, crucially, it can be in place regardless of whether a subject has learnt to speak. 
Many have urged with this in mind that concerns about meaning should be taken over by 
theories of the content of thoughts or propositional attitudes because meaning is parasitic 
on intentionality.
On the non-mentalistic picture that is beginning to emerge for Sellars, linguistic acts
are not expressions of independently formed thoughts, rather, thoughts are 
internalisations of public-language sentences. The internalisation is prompted in an 
individual in the following way: when an infant (at the initial Rylean stage) acquires his 
first language, he does what we, having the concept ‘thought’ already, would call 
‘thinking-out-loud’. Later he learns to resist the compulsion to speak so he can think 
without thinking-out-loud. The idea that thoughts are the outcome of suppressing one’s 
compulsion to speak is spelt out in his (1969). 
Let us suppose then that the members of the originally Rylean community are now 
capable of accomplishing thought processes and that their intelligent activity is not 
restricted to sequences of thinkings-out-loud. Although they have become creatures who 
think in precisely the same way as we do, this internalisation alone does not make their 
thoughts introspectible. The key breakthrough in their ascent from behaviouristic 
psychology to the ordinary mentalistic discourse comes with the addition of the practice 
of postulating unobserved theoretical entities (e.g. molecules) in order to explain the 
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behaviour of such observable phenomena as temperature or gas pressure. Inner 
occurrences are introduced into their conceptual scheme when they realise that their 
fellows behave intelligently even when their actions are not accompanied by overt 
speech, and hypothesise on that basis that it is episodes of ‘inner speech’ that lie at the 
beginning of the (downstream) causal chain which steers the course of their action. That 
they are first understood by analogy with inner speech is to give sense to the earlier 
suggestion that thoughts owe their intentionality to the semantic properties of verbal 
performances. Just as before our fictional ancestors started to engage in assessing the 
truth and clarifying the meaning of each other’s (observable) linguistic acts, and came to 
think of them as being about such and such, they now think of these (unobserved) 
theoretical postulates as being about such and such. Thus the analogy is merely to 
highlight the fact that the semantic features of overt speech are carried over to these inner 
episodes, it is not to imply that these episodes are “the wagging of a hidden tongue, nor 
are any sounds produced by this “inner speech”” (1997, p. 104).
Such newly posited entities are not yet thoughts as we know them, for they are in 
intelligent creatures as molecules are in gases. Neither are they in them as ghosts are in 
machines. Like sub-atomic particles, for example, they are unobservable in that they can 
only know about them by means of an inference from observable behaviour, whether 
their own or that of others. Their knowledge of them is always a conclusion of an 
inference. And like all other theoretical, as opposed to empirical concepts, they lack non-
inferential or observational uses. Thinking that they have privileged and infallible access 
to their inner episodes would be deemed, even from their own perspective, as absurd as 
thinking that we have privileged and infallible access to electromagnetic waves. 
At this penultimate stage our fictitious ancestors frequently appeal to episodes of 
‘inner speech’ in interpreting the behaviour of others. And they finally become 
introspectible thoughts once they have learnt to non-inferentially (hence observationally) 
report their presence in themselves. What was until now only known inferentially – if, for 
example, a person wishing to quench his thirst by reaching out for a glass of water said 
“There is a glass of water in front of me”, his knowledge of the corresponding ‘inner
utterance’ that had caused him to act as he did was an inference from his overt behaviour
– is now non-inferentially reportable: “I’m reaching out for a glass of water because I’m 
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in a state of thinking, of which I was directly aware prior to any action or verbalisation, 
that there is a glass of water in front of me”.
But more needs to said about the final step. For Sellars, it is but a mundane case of 
inferentially known theoretical entities breaking into observational discourse. The gap 
between theoretical entities and observable entities is purely methodological and carries 
no ontological import. One useful example is due to Robert Brandom in his (Sellars 
1997) commentary:
Thus when first postulated to explain perturbations in the orbit of Neptune, Pluto 
was a purely theoretical object; the only claims we could make about it were the 
conclusions of inferences. But the development of more powerful telescopes 
eventually made it accessible to observation, and so a subject of non-inferential 
reports. Pluto did not undergo an ontological change; all that changed was its 
relation to us (p. 164)
There is no rigid boundary between what is observed and what is inferred. Moreover, to 
get to the heart of the matter, shifts from theoretical to observational discourse need not 
be facilitated by improving our powers of observation and the ability to report our 
thoughts is certainly not the result of a fine-tuning of an ‘optical’ instrument in the mind. 
Indeed, these shifts are very often a matter of conclusions of inferences gaining a 
reporting role. For there are circumstances in which, say, a chemist is disposed to state
that he is looking at sodium chloride without thinking of the substance as the common 
flavour-enhancing ingredient in food, even though outside his laboratory he would 
normally infer that statement from his seeing that there is salt on the table. What is 
applied observationally in one set of circumstances may be applied inferentially in 
another. The chemist’s non-inferential use of ‘sodium chloride’ does not mean that his 
eyesight is so superior as to enable him to see molecules of sodium chloride in salt 
crystals, it only means that the specialist vocabulary of chemical elements and 
compounds has now, at least in his conceptual hierarchy, established itself at the 
observational level alongside the common-sense vocabulary (e.g. ‘salt’, ‘water’, etc.) 
used by lay persons.
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Once we rid ourselves of the foundationalist misconception that knowledge of 
appearances is a supreme example of observational knowledge in that statements about 
sensory contents do not stand in need of justification but are the justificatory roots of all 
other statements of empirical fact, nothing is observational in an absolute sense and it is
therefore reasonable to demand a justification of any empirical claim. Take, for instance, 
colour predicates applied to physical objects. Think of a situation in which a perceiver is 
challenged to justify his belief that that the ripe tomato in front of him is red, and does so 
by saying that it is being viewed in standard conditions and that in standard conditions he 
is unlikely to be mistaken. Likewise, as we have seen, nothing which really exists is, in 
this context, concealed from observation if ‘observable’ simply amounts to ‘non-
inferentially reportable’.24
Indeed, in Sellars’ sense, one who mastered reliable differential responsive 
dispositions noninferentially to apply normative vocabulary would be directly 
observing normative facts. It is in this sense that we might be said to be able to 
hear, not just the noises someone else makes, but their words, and indeed, what 
they are saying – their meanings (Sellars 1997, p.165, italics original).
Now that our ancestors introspect their thoughts and conceive them as occurrent or 
episodic rather than dispositional, the philosophically-minded members of the community 
will perhaps want to add that they are also private. But it is a sense of ‘private’ that has 
been robbed of its traditional force. Thoughts are originally introduced as common-sense 
theoretical posits in order to identify the true source of intelligent behaviour in situations 
when it is unaccompanied by overt speech. So in its nascence the concept of a thought is 
as intersubjective as the concept of an electron, which intersubjectivity remains 
embedded in the full-fledged introspective concept that is formed later. The privacy of 
inner episodes, from a subject’s point of view, consists in little more than the fact that, 
unlike other familiar examples of theoretical entities, they are his own states. In other 
words, the respect in which the sentence “S is thinking p” stands out in comparison with 
24 I owe this extended interpretation of Sellars’ view of the distinction between theoretical and 
observational discourse to Robert Brandom’s study guide in the edition of Empiricism and The Philosophy 
of Mind that I consult here.
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sentences in the language of the kinetic theory of gases is that it is logically true of it that 
“whereas anybody can use it to state a fact, only one person, namely S himself, can use it 
to make a report (Sellars, 1997, p. 87, italics original). 
Another point that considerably weakens the appeal of the traditional understanding of 
privacy is that one’s employment of mentalistic vocabulary in self-description 
presupposes the ability to interpret in mentalistic terms the behaviour of others. Hence
conceptual responses to inner episodes, as we saw above, can be said to result from
projections from the case of others to our own case, not the other way round. Standing in 
opposition to this is the construal of privacy that is sustained by the supposition that 
thoughts, feelings and sensations are simply laid out before the mind’s eye, that we notice 
them in a primitive and pre-linguistic way, and that our knowledge of other minds is a 
projection of concepts that are the products of such acts of private ostension or noticing.
These last remarks will be repeated in the discussion of sense impressions and are of
great importance as they mark one of the key points where Sellars’ approach clashes with
Loar’s contention that introspective concepts are recognitional.
Having recreated concepts referring to thoughts from intersubjective material (i.e. 
overt speech or ‘thinkings-out-loud’, theoretical entities and the observable behaviour of 
others) while dispensing with conceptual nativism and private ostension, he now vows to 
do the same for concepts referring to sense impressions.
He first returns to his earlier analysis of qualitative and existential lookings in terms of 
perceptible properties of physical objects and scope of endorsement. The upshot was that 
the possession of concepts referring to public objects and properties is a necessary 
condition of our grasp of concepts to do with appearances or sensory contents. Families 
of perceptually elicited thoughts such as (a) seeing that x, over there, is red, (b) its 
looking to one that x, over there, is red, and (c) its looking to one as though there were a 
red object over there, contain the same proposition, namely, “X is red” (where ‘red’ 
refers to a public property) which is endorsed in (a) but fails to be endorsed in (b) and (c). 
Since our ancestors now have a common-sense theory of mind concerning thoughts, they 
can also introspect perceptual thoughts of those three types. Sense impressions are 
discovered in their attempt to explain why there appears to be a red object over there in 
each of the perceptual situations that lead them to think (a), (b), and (c) respectively 
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despite the apparent variations in external circumstances. They hypothesise that there is 
an inner episode which differs from thoughts in that it belongs to the causal rather than 
epistemic realm, and is the common causal antecedent of (a), (b) and (c).
Given that they, like thoughts, are states rather than particulars, they are not literally 
coloured. What is more, we must not forget that this is a reconstruction of ordinary
mentalistic terms and in ordinary talk we only speak of worldly objects as being literally 
coloured, although impressions resemble and differ in a system of ways which is 
“structurally similar to the ways in which the colours and shapes of visible objects 
resemble and differ” (Sellars, 1997, p. 112). Impressions are coloured in ways which are 
analogous to the colours of physical objects. Sketchy though it seems, this 
characterisation does no violence to the vagueness of the ordinary-talk terms we use to 
communicate our feelings and sensations to others. We use them with much authority 
without systematically probing beneath the surface of the entities in question in the way 
philosophers and psychologists do. All that an examination of the common-sense 
framework (what Sellars also calls ‘the Manifest Image’) reveals is that we do not 
conceptualise sense impressions as particulars, let alone as particulars that are literally 
coloured, since within that framework only physical objects are thought of as being 
literally coloured.  
To sum up, the purpose of positing sense impressions in ordinary talk is to throw light 
on situations where, for instance, there appears to be a red object over there even though 
the perceiver has solid grounds for believing either that the object being viewed is not red 
or that there is no object at all occupying that particular position in space. We do not 
simply notice sense impressions in ourselves but initially appeal to them as physicists do 
to sub-atomic particles in rationalising other persons’ verbal or behavioural responses to 
misperceived or hallucinated states of affairs. In short, as in the case of thoughts, we 
proceed from third-person ascriptions to first-person ascriptions. At the beginning first-
person ascriptions are conclusions of inferences and it is only after further mutual 
conditioning and inculcation has taken place that we come to be directly aware of them, 
just as a chemist with a sufficient amount of training develops a disposition to non-
inferentially state that he is observing sodium chloride being dissolved in H2O. So the 
additional conditioning and inculcation gradually compresses, as it were, the however 
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many inferential steps are required to reach a conclusion about a theoretical object up
until the point when it is reported observationally. Nevertheless, in accordance with 
inferential role semantics, non-inferential uses of concepts that previously denoted 
unobserved entities continue to presuppose and be individuated by inferential ones.
This concludes Sellars’ reconstruction of introspective conceptions of experiential 
inner episodes from propositions about observable physical entities of the form “X is F”
on the one hand, and certain propositions about unobserved theoretical entities (later 
appealed to in self-description) on the other. The former come into play by being
embedded in perceptual thoughts about qualitative and existential lookings (but fall 
outside the scope of endorsement), the awareness of which thoughts prompts the positing 
of experiential inner episodes. Both are undeniably intersubjective and public –
‘theoretical’ hardly implies ‘private’. Laying bare the dependence of introspection on the 
conceptual domain pertaining to public objects and properties – whether observed or 
theoretical – has the merit of dispelling the concerns voiced by some wittgensteinians that 
we can have no knowledge of inner occurrences since, being private, they systematically 
elude public discourse. These complaints turn out to be an overreaction. It also casts 
doubts over claims that inner occurrences are ineffable; again, ‘theoretical’ hardly implies
‘ineffable’. The privacy of experiential episodes consists in little more than the fact that it 
is logically true of sentences such as “S has a toothache” that whereas anybody can use it 
to state a fact, only one person, namely S himself, can use it to make a report. From the 
subject’s perspective, experiences differ from other examples of theoretical objects in that 
they are states of his own.
Now that their progression from the Rylean stage to ordinary mentalistic talk is 
complete, some of our philosophically-minded ancestors, having lost sight of how they 
have come to see themselves as creatures who have sensations and feelings, will be
tempted to say that their higher-order concepts are recognitional, that they formed them 
on the basis of brute acquaintance with their experiences, that their mode of presentation 
is exhausted by the causal relations with their referents, as nothing is closer to the mind 
than the mind itself. Others may press the case by pointing out, together with Levine, that 
the concepts in question have non-ascriptive modes of presentation, or, together with 
Loar, that they do not refer via a contingent reference-fixer. There are, they would 
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continue, no constitutive inferential connections with other concepts to which they at 
least partly owe their meaningfulness and such autonomy is perhaps the sole preserve of 
introspective conceptions given that nothing is more immediately and intimately known 
to the mind than what it itself comprises. It is for this reason that I have called this 
position ‘local atomism’. 
Surely, we may not agree with every detail of Sellars’ story, but it is sufficient if we 
acknowledge, as we should, that there are no experiential states to notice prior to their 
serving an explanatory purpose and our recognition of that purpose. The alternative we 
must distance ourselves from 
…makes the mistake of supposing that the logical space of the concept simply 
transfers itself from the objects of direct perception to the intellectual order, or 
better, is transferred by the mind as Jack Horner transferred the plum (Sellars, 
1963, p.334).
To further sharpen the contrast between theory-laden introspective concepts and 
recognitional introspective concepts, note the following remarks by Loar:
In some cases, a recognitional disposition or ability is a disposition or ability to 
apply an independent term or concept, one whose initial mastery doe not involve a 
specific recognitional ability. For example, a person might come to understand 
‘porcelain’ from a technical description and only later learn visually, tactually and 
aurally to identify instances. That is not the phenomenon I mean (Loar, 1990, p. 
88, italics original). 
Setting aside, of course, the fact that introspection is not a matter of perceptual
identification on anyone’s view, it is evident that it is some such phenomenon that Sellars 
means. This is not to deny that, for a certain class of concepts, acquisition requires 
perceptual acquaintance or recognition. For instance, one is not fully in possession of the 
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concept ‘red’ until he reliably identifies the property in his surroundings. However, it can 
not be emphasised enough that the kind of recognition in question is already an exercise 
of concepts to the effect that in order for someone to succeed in visually identifying 
redness he must know at least that it is a visual property, that it is a colour, that it differs 
from blue, yellow, green, etc. What is the source of contention – and what Sellars would 
deride as epistemological fiction – is the purely recognitional capacity appealed to by
Loar and others, the exercise of which does not presuppose conceptual classification, 
thereby turning out concepts whose mode of presentation reduces to the causal link with 
their referents. 
Suppose, for the sake of exposition, that it is possible to flout Sellars’ justificational 
holism about concepts of worldly objects and prove beyond doubt that their logical 
spaces do after all transfer themselves from objects of direct perception to the intellectual 
order. Nevertheless, it would remain utterly mysterious how anything of this nature could 
also hold for introspective concepts – however hard I try to focus inwards, I fail to be 
acquainted with anything in a way that is even remotely analogous to ‘outwardly 
directed’ perception. And to postulate a dedicated organ of inner sense would be to slip 
further into the obscure. Therefore the current scenario still leaves an explanatory void to 
be filled by a theory which reconstructs higher-order awareness rather than assumes its 
givenness.
Let us now return briefly to the argumentation which prompted the examination of 
recognitional concepts. Drawing heavily on Carruthers’ presentation of evidence to do 
with non-qualitative route of perceptual processing in healthy humans (which is thought 
to be preserved in blindsight sufferers and explains their remarkable ability to make out 
certain features of distal stimuli), it was argued against first-order representationalism 
that it is excessively inclusive in that, given its statement of conditions for 
phenomenality, these representations too qualify as qualia-bearing. What is more, as I 
reiterated in several places, organisms which utilise representations of distal stimuli 
without undergoing experiences may arguably be a common occurrence in nature. Recall 
that in 2.1 Tye’s poisedness was deemed ineffective in narrowing down the class of
perceptions that satisfy the condition to qualitative ones. I then agreed with Carruthers 
that, in view of these difficulties, it is experiential subjectivity (as distinct from worldly 
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subjectivity which non-qualitative and qualitative perceptions may exhibit in equal 
measure, provided the former too represent distal rather than proximal stimuli) that 
suggests itself as the criterion that adequately marks out the set of qualia-bearing 
representations. That criterion in fact comes down to introspectability. Thus higher-order 
representationalism was endorsed as a substantially more robust position. 
Introspectability, or availability to self-directed states, took centre stage again in a 
quite independent consideration in 2.2.1. It revealed more deficiencies in FOR that 
worked in favour of HOR. In a nutshell, phenomenality and the self, what Dennett (1978) 
calls the exempt agent, are inextricable. That the self is, as it were, immersed in ‘mental 
paint’ is among the most fundamental facts about phenomenality and it applies with just 
the same force to non-conscious (to mean unattended) qualitative representations – hence 
the looser requirement that qualitative representations be introspectable, not introspected. 
Being first-order, FOR’s statement of necessary and sufficient conditions for 
phenomenality makes reference exclusively to relations at the lower-order level (plus 
external inputs). By severing the inextricable connection, it puts the self in the position of 
an observer rather than a subject, according qualia, I argued, the kind of independent 
status that only naïve realists would be content with. The result is an inconsistent jumble 
of ideas ranging from relationalism to naïve realism. 
While the self will prove to be a thorny matter for anyone whose aim is a fruitful 
enquiry into how it came into existence in the natural order, what seems certain is that 
any such enquiry cannot dispense with a system of metastates. It is here that we noticed 
that HOR is tethered to recognitional concepts. Because the meaning of recognitional 
concepts reduces to the causal relation established in the ‘act’ of pure recognition, it is 
out of the question that blindsighters could deploy them in response to stimulation in their 
blind region. Unfortunately the problem is that to think that these are genuine and full-
fledged concepts, i.e. items existing in the epistemic realm, is to repeat the mistakes of 
classical empiricism which largely due to Sellars’ extensive criticism and the virtues in 
his alternative treatment cannot be ignored. 
Before I can reach the conclusion that has been the aim of my present discussion, 
namely, that
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(iii) to have a higher-order thought about one’s perceptual state is to token an 
internalised public-language sentence whose meaning is holistic and normative,
and hence that there are no concepts which distinctively apply to phenomenal properties, 
I should dedicate a few paragraphs to a response which merits interest for not resting on 
the idea that we acquire concepts upon noticing objects and properties or that there is a 
concept-forming act of pure recognition, while leaving sufficient room for phenomenal 
concepts. The mention of normativity in (iii) also obliges me to give some explanation of 
why it is inevitable that if the introspective concepts in question are internalised public-
language concepts, they will be enriched with a normative dimension. The next sub-
section will be a convenient place to do so as seeing why the response is more 
underwhelming than it first appears motivates a straightforward case for normativity. 
2.2.5 (Innate) Mentalese Concepts?
The response I now wish to assess from a Sellarsian standpoint is outlined in the article 
by Stephen Leeds’ (1993) that helped develop the topic under discussion (see 2.2.3).
Leeds is wholly convinced by what he calls ‘qualia intuitions’ and believes that there are
phenomenal concepts. The idea that there may be beings who display behavioural 
sensitivity to visual stimulation without undergoing experiences is comprehensible to us 
all. Yet we know we are not such beings, or blindsighters, for that matter. Thus it must be
perceptual beliefs containing phenomenal concepts that inform our knowledge that we 
happen to be neither of the two. 
His proposal is that phenomenal concepts are a special class of Mentalese concepts – a 
possibility which Sellars is more or less silent about but would not necessarily want to 
resist. For Leeds, as I’m about to explain, thinks that Mentalese phenomenal concepts 
construed in a certain specific way are amenable to being at least partly combined with 
justificational holism. Nothing along these lines would have been feasible in the case of 
recognitional concepts – it is out of the question that one could argue for the existence 
recognitional concepts and not run afoul of the basic principles of justificational holism. 
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He also makes it clear that it is not his ambition to use phenomenal concepts as a material 
for laying a foundation for the rest of our knowledge.
The core steps in the argument that if there are phenomenal concepts, they must be 
lexical items of Mentalese appear in the final part of his text where he first explores a 
number of ways a technical spoken-language word expressing a phenomenal concept 
such as ‘looks red’ or ‘phenomenally red’ can come to have a meaning (he acknowledges 
that phenomenal concepts have no expression in ordinary language, hence the 
introduction of a technical term). Given his earlier argument for the existence of 
phenomenal concepts, he now simply assumes that there is an underlying phenomenal 
concept which lends ‘looks red’ its semantics. I shall do the same for the sake of my own 
argument. Agreeing with Sellars that we do not notice and name qualitative properties
without prior conceptualisation, he would deny that the concept in question attaches to its 
referent in the same way as purely recognitional concepts do. Nor, needless to say, can it 
be the kind of intersubjective concept reconstructed by Sellars. According to Sellars,
phenomenal states and their properties are conceptualised as unobserved theoretical 
postulates in order to explain why, for instance, objects placed in front of a mirror also 
appear to be behind it, or why some surfaces appear to change colour under artificial 
light. We later develop a disposition to report them directly in the same way as we may 
be trained to report rapid molecular motion instead of heat when looking at boiling water. 
In so far as blindsighters are susceptible to visual illusions, they can surely arrive at 
introspective conceptions of this type. So the set that Sellars’ intersubjective predicate 
‘red’ denotes (i.e. the set of perceptual states which have the property expressed by such 
theory-laden predicate) contains items that lack phenomenality altogether. ‘Looks red’ or 
‘phenomenally red’ cannot inherit their denotation from a higher-order concept conceived 
intersubjectively (as referring to a publicly accessible theoretical posit). 
As for causal co-variance theories, Leeds finds that they are unsuitable for 
phenomenal concepts (see, for example, Fodor’s (1987), where one such theory is 
advanced). He observes that causal covariance allows for misapplications of concepts, 
that is, they allow for the possibility that my tokening of ‘phenomenally red’ is 
occasionally brought about by, say, a green quale and therefore do not capture one 
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peculiarity of phenomenal conceptions – that they are used with certainty and that 
phenomenal beliefs are infallible.25
For, if P is whatever property has caused my past utterances of ‘Something is P’, 
then I ought to at least leave open the possibility that there is no one such 
property, or that the causal mechanism has somehow gone haywire (Leeds, 1993, 
p.320).  
“P is whatever property has caused my past utterances of ‘Something is P’” is not to 
imply that all possible external causes of my application of P will be included in its 
extension. There is a method of differentiating between causes which are not 
individuative of P’s meaning and those which are in non-semantical and non-intentional 
terms.
For instance, in the work mentioned above, Fodor offers an explanation, in purely 
causal terms, of why the extension of ‘horse’ remains stable despite the fact that on some 
occasions ‘horse’ tokenings are caused by cows. What secures that cows do not become a 
part of the extension of ‘horse’ is that the causal connection between cows and ‘horse’s is 
asymmetrically dependent on the causal connection between horses and ‘horse’s. The 
asymmetry is captured in the following: 1.) A’s cause ‘A’s. 2.) ‘A’ tokens are not caused 
by B’s in nearby worlds in which A’s don’t cause ‘A’s. 3.) A’s cause ‘A’s in nearby 
worlds in which B’s don’t cause ‘A’s. Nevertheless, the possibility, however faint, that 
connections between extralinguistic causes and concepts can somehow be rewired 
remains. Accepting such consequence amounts to a denial that phenomenal concepts 
exist.
Having rejected causal co-variance accounts as well as the proposal that phenomenal 
concepts are purely recognitional, Leeds’ solution is a partial identification of 
phenomenal beliefs with sense impressions. It is partial in that sense impressions and 
25 Compare Brandom’s diagnosis of the ostensible infallibility (or incorrigibility) of phenomenal beliefs 
based on Sellars’ understanding of ‘looks-F’ as a withdrawal of one’s endorsement of ‘is-F’: “There is no 
sensible contrast between looks-to-look F’ and ‘looks-F’, of the sort there is between  ‘looks-F’ and ‘(is-)F’ 
because the first ‘looks’ has already withheld endorsement from the only content in the vicinity to which 
one might be committed (to something’s being F). There is no further withholding work for the second 
‘looks’ to do. There is nothing left to take back. Since asserting ‘X looks F’ is not undertaking a 
propositionally contentful commitment – but only expressing an overrideable disposition to do so – there is 
no issue as to whether or not that commitment (which one?) is correct.” (Sellars, 1997)    
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phenomenal beliefs are still conceived as discrete representations. The latter, however, 
are assimilated to the former in the sense that both are parts of the output of the visual 
system. Phenomenal beliefs are formed in the same mechanical and involuntary manner 
as sensory images, and are subsequently fed into the belief box. As pre-linguistic infants 
have sense impressions, they also have phenomenal concepts at their disposal virtually 
from birth.
What is it about these innate representations that makes them belong to the intellectual 
order? It is their potential, by virtue of their syntactic structure or ‘shape’, to causally 
interact in inferential transitions with concepts added to one’s cognitive architecture on 
acquiring a language. Implicit in the syntactic shape of a native concept are all possible 
interactions with what is added through learning later in life. Sense impressions do not of 
course have the kind of structure that would enable their contents to be transferred to the 
epistemic level directly. Their contents must therefore be captured by representations 
which are apt to play a role in thought processes, should one’s cognition contain a 
sufficiently large battery of concepts for thought processes to take place.
So I take the gist of the proposal to be this: We may agree with Sellars that public 
language fails to deliver concepts which apply exclusively to phenomenal properties 
precisely because intersubjectivity is built into introspective conceptions regarding 
perceptual states and properties (recall that ‘looks red’ is parasitic on ‘is red’, and that 
sense impressions are publicly available theoretical postulates). But all concepts that are 
supplied in the learning of a public language must meet certain structural or syntactic 
conditions in order to have the causal efficacy, within our cognition, distinctive of 
epistemic items. Leeds would see no reason why innate concepts cannot satisfy such 
conditions; and the above assimilation of phenomenal beliefs to sense impressions is to 
guarantee that the denotations of phenomenal concepts do not include non-qualitative 
perceptions. 
Leeds now proceeds to demonstrate that his innateness hypothesis is reconcilable with 
justificational holism. The epistemic components of the outputs of the visual system do 
not immediately function as beliefs in their pre-linguistic possessors. The rather 
ingenious suggestion is that phenomenal concepts lie dormant, as it were, in pre-linguistic 
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subjects. Consider, for example, the sentence ‘Ran’ (a is R now) where R is a 
phenomenal predicate:
Indeed, although the inner state S which is the assertion of ‘Ran’ is, I am 
suggesting, available from the beginning, our justification for taking S as the 
assertion of a particular sentence with a particular form is based on inferential 
roles which S may come to play only much later in the child’s development: for 
example, it is only when the child has gotten in the habit of responding to 
occurrences of S by storing in memory beliefs which we can interpret as having 
the form ( s)( t)Rst (i.e. the child remembers having had a ‘red’ experience, but 
has forgotten when or in which part of the visual field) that we can look back and 
interpret S as an assertion of ‘Ran’. This is the remark, promised earlier, which I 
hope makes the innateness claim a little more acceptable: a child is not born 
having beliefs; he does however enter into states which will later play the roles of 
beliefs. (Leeds, 1993, p.391) 
Leeds himself sees what he in fact offers as a use theory of meaning for phenomenal 
concepts. But whether this does not violate Sellars’ version of inferential role semantics 
(or justificational holism), however, remains to be seen. Some quite disparate positions 
have been lumped under the label ‘use theory of meaning’, so it is paramount, in 
assessing its compatibility, to have full understanding of the differences between 
inferential role semantics advanced in the context of a mentalistic approach to 
intentionality, and inferential role semantics advanced in the context of a non-mentalistic 
approach to intentionality. I already touched on the contrast between mentalistic and non-
mentalistic accounts near the beginning of 2.2.4, but the present matter calls for a more 
detailed characterisation. Plainly, Leeds’ innateness hypothesis belongs to the former 
category, whereas Sellars’ contention that inner episodes such as thoughts and beliefs are 
internalised public-language sentences fall into the latter. 
The relevant differences are brought out by considerations regarding dependence-
relations between thoughts and public language. One can be said to have priority over the 
other in the following respects (I borrow these from Davies (1998)): ontologically, 
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epistemologically and analytically. In what priority orders do thoughts and language 
come, according to those three criteria, within a mentalistic framework? A ‘use’ theory of 
meaning for Mentalese concepts in fact comes down to a functional/computational role 
theory of the content of mental representations, hence it is easy to anticipate what the 
respective answers are. The Mentalese hypothesis is a commitment to a self-contained
content-generating network of representations which is ontologically, epistemolgically 
and analytically independent of public language, even though a substantial number of 
representations may be added to the network upon learning a language (Fodor (1975), for 
instance, maintains that all concepts in Lingua Mentis are innate and that its vocabulary is 
as large as the vocabulary of English, but most functionalists working outside MIT would 
not feel compelled to make such a strong innateness claim). On the other hand language 
is, from a functionalist point of view, entirely dependent on thoughts in all three respects 
– there can be no language without thought, public-language concepts owe their semantic 
properties to the contents of thoughts, and finally content is a more basic notion than 
meaning in order of analysis.
What orders of priority does the Sellarsian standpoint entail? We saw in the previous 
sub-section that his view of the relation between thoughts and language is, in essence,
that
…the ability to have thoughts is acquired in the process of acquiring overt speech 
and that only after overt speech is well established, can “inner speech” occur 
without its overt culmination” (Sellars, 1997, p.105). 
As for ontological order of priority, note that on a non-mentalistic approach the relation 
cannot be the reverse of what it is if the truth of a mentalistic approach is assumed. There 
must be an inner causal root of every verbal performance. Overt speech cannot occur 
without being rooted in an inner episode. Hence the relation is, rather, that of mutual 
dependence. What a non-mentalistic approach does reverse in comparison with the 
Mentalese hypothesis, however, are epistemological and analytical orders of priority –
the semantic properties of verbal performances are carried over to inner episodes (i.e. 
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thoughts), which implies that meaning is a more basic notion than content in order of 
analysis.
Leeds’ contention is that his innateness claim would be considered somewhat less 
objectionable from Sellars’ perspective due to the implication that an output of the visual 
system does not function as a concept and does not acquire its semantics until it comes to 
play a certain role in inferences. The inferential potential of the output is implicit in its 
syntactic shape or ‘spelling’ even prior to its doing so. But bearing in mind the contrast 
between this proposal and Sellars’ version of inferential role semantics regarding orders 
of priority, it follows from the latter that, firstly, content does not supervene on functional 
organisation (or functional organisation plus an external causal condition), and secondly, 
that a representation’s inferential role cannot be implicit in its shape or structure when 
considered in isolation. 
Let me begin with the first point. To give linguistic meaning explanatory priority over 
content in the way that Sellars does is to say that inferential patterns are established in
verbal communication, by the practice of giving and asking for reasons in particular, not 
by a self-contained and isolated causal network of representations which can be fully in 
place regardless of whether one is a speaker of a language. Now, granting that inferential 
patterns are formed by communicative practice, could it be replied that the inner 
representations which public language delivers may have a structure by virtue of which 
they will causally interact with native phenomenal concepts? 
Seeing why the answer to this in the negative will bring us to the second point, 
namely, that if a non-mentalistic account is true, the structure or shape of inner 
representations is not such that if we focus purely on those intrinsic properties, we will be 
able to anticipate what thought processes they will appear in. I think we only need to 
draw attention to certain differences between public language and Mentalese to show that 
the response not available. Although Mentalese is thought of as a language, it is a highly 
idealised language in that each representation has a unique spelling or shape. On the other 
hand, one English word can express two or more concepts, e.g., ‘conductor’ meaning a 
substance that allows electricity to pass through it as well as a person who directs 
orchestral performances. In the case of Mentalese, the distinction between words and 
concepts collapses – these two meanings would be assigned to representations with 
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different spellings, say, ‘conductor1’ and ‘conductor2’ (but we need not suppose that there 
are many similarities between their spellings). Because in public language the difference 
between the two concepts is not reflected in the phonetic features of the words that 
express them, the only way to reveal the different concepts is by looking at entire 
inferential patterns formed by sequences of verbal performances containing the word.
Likewise, all inner correlates of the word ‘conductor’ will be alike in their intrinsic 
properties no matter whether on one occasion it is used with its first meaning and its 
second meaning on another. It is for this reason that a non-mentalistic account of this sort 
takes inference and not a single proposition as the basic vehicle of content.
The upshot then is that Sellars’ non-mentalistic approach rules out the possibility that 
a certain class of concepts, however small, can be innate. Since two or more inner 
representations with different meanings can be indistinguishable in their syntactic 
features, no determinate meaning can be assigned to ‘concepts’ that are available from 
birth. Should beliefs understood as internalised public-language sentences ever engage 
such innate items in inferential transitions, there is no guarantee that they will be engaged 
as phenomenal concepts at all. So even though Leeds’ idea that an output of the visual 
system does not gain an epistemic status until it comes to play a role in inferences is a 
much less controversial version of the innateness hypothesis than Fodor’s, he has not 
shown that it is compatible with Sellars’ inferential role semantics. 
The final point to be made in this section concerns the mention of normativity in the 
claim I have been making a case for, namely, that
(iii) to have a higher-order thought about one’s perceptual state is to token an 
internalised public-language sentence whose meaning is holistic and normative.
I have already noted that if public language is viewed as the medium of thinking, 
inferential patterns are needed to assign different concepts (and hence different 
meanings) to certain phonetically identical expressions on the one hand, and to make
certain pairs of phonetically different expressions synonymous on the other. That a non-
mentalistic treatment of the sort I have been discussing is bound to involve normativity –
whereas a mentalistic one (i.e. a functional/computational role theory) isn’t – is an
immediate consequence of the fact that inferential relations between verbal performances 
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are not causal (i.e. non-normative) in the way that inferential relations between 
representations realised in the brain are. It would not make much sense to say that
inferences are computations over utterances, and so understanding one’s assertion, on a 
non-mentalistic approach, amounts to knowing what set of premises entitle him to it, and 
what consequences it commits him to. Functional/computational role semantics dispenses 
with such normative notions entirely. 
So much for (iii). We need not go further into the issue of normativity as the ideas that 
guide my argumentation towards (iv), which was the claim that 
(iv) since higher-order perceptual thoughts are internalised public-language sentences, 
qualia are intrinsic properties of experiences,
have already been set out. My aim in the next and final section of this Chapter is to show 
that with Sellars’ view of introspection in place, we should feel drawn towards (iv) and
even further until phenomenal individuals such as sense-data will make another 
appearance. Given that in Chapter 1. I undertook to gradually shift qualia from 
phenomenal individuals to wide contents, where the first step consisted in dissolving 
phenomenal individuals with the aid of a Lycan-style adverbial analysis, their second 
appearance will be rather unwelcome. I will of course dedicate Chapter III. to exploring 
our prospects for an alternative representational account, one which will not force on us 
the epistemologically dubious purely recognitional concepts or innate Mentalese 
concepts. 
2.3 Sensa and Phenomenal Individuals
The discussion in the last four sub-sections was dominated by a search for a 
conceptual difference at the higher-order level between individuals with inner life and 
those who, at least under certain circumstances, are perceptually sensitive but don’t 
experience anything. It was the failure to find one (conceptual or other) at the first-order 
level that brought higher-order concepts into focus. The implications reached beyond 
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first-order representationalism, for whatever first-order theory one is prepared to back, it 
will at best account for what normally sighted people share with perceivers who don’t 
experience – worldly subjectivity rather than experiential subjectivity (I of course spent 
much of Chapter I. defending FOR against some of its main competitors). 
The discussion of the nature of introspective awareness was to bear directly on the 
tenability of higher-order representationalist accounts of qualia. The view adopted, on 
which awareness if experiential inner episodes and their properties is the result of 
considerable conceptual sophistication, left no room for the two kinds of concepts that 
could sustain HOR, namely, purely recognitional concepts and innate Mentalese 
concepts. Neither brute acquaintance nor tying concepts to the outputs of sensory 
processing almost to the point of assimilation have a part to play in that process of 
conceptual sophistication. 
The implications of the challenge I present for HOR are best brought out against the 
background of Sellars’ remarks about what an advanced science of perception will have 
to say about phenomenal properties, what phenomenal properties turn out to be within the 
so-called Scientific Image. The Manifest Image, on the other hand, was to explain (as we 
saw in 2.2.4) how we ordinarily come to understand each other and, more importantly, 
ourselves as creatures with inner life. The conceptual development within the Manifest 
Image eventuated in non-inferential/observational awareness of feelings and sensations
(recall that at the initial stage we were all ‘behaviourists’ – there was no awareness of 
anything occurrent). 
Now, what is the difference between the status of phenomenal properties within the 
Manifest Image and their status within the Scientific Image? Let me begin with the first 
part of the question. It is to ask, in effect, what our folk-psychological theory of our own 
mind (whose development Sellars traces) says about phenomenal properties. The most 
important point that follows here is that in the Manifest Image only worldly objects are 
coloured, nothing inside is. Experiences, which we come to be aware of at some point in 
infancy, are conceptualised as states (whether or not explicitly). These are not coloured, 
although they, again,
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…stand to one another in a system of ways of resembling and differing which is 
structurally similar to the ways in which the colours and shapes of visible objects 
resemble and differ (Sellars, 1997, p. 112).
The colours of worldly objects that Sellars speaks of, however, are not the colours of 
naïve realism (intended to be a branch of phenomenalism), for the is/seems distinction 
continues to apply in their case via the introduction of standard conditions, with the 
notion of standard conditions, to repeat what was stressed in 2.2.4, being woven into the 
Manifest Image conceptions in question. This is certainly true, as ordinary talk of colours 
frequently makes use of the distinction. To follow naïve realists in collapsing the 
distinction is to stray unreasonably from what is characteristic of the Manifest Image 
conceptions. 
It is only in the Scientific Image that we can coherently claim that nothing in the 
outside world is coloured, let alone coloured in the naïve realist’s sense. The objects of 
the common-sense world are made up of colourless parts. The middle-sized objects of the 
common-sense world that we perceive as being homogeneously coloured are in fact 
collections of microphysical entities. Nothing in the world has the sensible properties that 
common sense attributes to objects as they are experienced, which
…suggests that in the scientific picture of the world the counterparts of the
colours of the physical object framework will turn out to be aspects, in some 
sense, of the percipient organism (Sellars, 1963, p. 99).   
It is Sellars’ contention (not entirely unquestionable) that by running counter to our pre-
theoretic framework of middle-sized objects and persons in the world, physics abandons 
the framework of macro-physical objects altogether to the effect that only micro-physical 
entities (molecules, electrons, etc.) really exist. Only macro-physical objects could have 
the properties they are perceived as having, but according to Sellars, the Scientific Image 
rules out their reality.
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It is Sellars’ next move that I am keen to connect with the key points in my challenge 
for representational theories of qualia. When explaining what becomes of perceptual 
states, or sense-impressions, in the scientific picture, whether it can preserve them, he
says that sense impressions are states of persons which in the Manifest Image are single 
logical subjects. Sense-impressions are folk-psychological posits on which our 
introspective understanding of the qualitative part of our mental lives is based. However, 
as was the case with macro-physical objects, the scientific picture recognises no such 
thing as a single subject of perceptual states. Like macro-physical objects, persons are 
swarms of micro-physical parts which cannot serve as subjects of perceptual states. 
Science once again contradicts the truths in the Manifest Image, in this case the common-
sense framework of persons. A functionalist would of course object that the self is not a 
matter of micro-physical constitution and that it is at the functional level of description of 
an organism that the Manifest Image framework of persons is vindicated. Sellars 
anticipates this and considers an electronic robot which is sensitive to its computational 
processes in the language of persons. An organism’s functional organisation is a system 
of interacting sub-personal components such as the mind-reading module, the 
information-processing unit, etc. Sellars finds the following problem:
...the fact that they are a plurality precludes them from serving either jointly or 
separately as the subjects of the verb ‘to sense red-triangle-wise’, We must 
therefore either introduce another logical subject (an immaterial substance) to do 
this work, or turn each sensing into a logical subject in its own right, i.e. introduce 
a new category of entity (‘phantasms’ or ‘sensa’ we might call them) with 
predicates the logical space of which is modelled on that of visual impressions, as 
the latter was modelled on that of coloured and shaped physical objects (1963, p. 
101)
The first step removed macro-physical objects from the Scientific Image, the second one 
does the same with selves. Perceptual states will also be discarded as a result of these 
moves, for there are no unified persons which perceptions are states of. Since the ultimate 
account of the world does not accommodate persons, states are succeeded by individuals 
and phenomenal properties are properties of individuals rather than states. 
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To begin, it must be pointed out that the representationalist has the most solid grounds 
of all relationalists for opposing the idea that there is a tension between the scientific  
claim that only colourless micro-physical entities exist (and hence that macro-physical 
objects don’t), and the common-sense attribution of colours to macro-physical objects. 
The objects of the common-sense world and the properties they are perceived as having 
(qualia) should be treated as intentional, he suggests, which is consistent with saying that 
only colourless molecules and atoms exist. He would perhaps think it encouraging that 
his position reconciles the two Images by giving a naturalistic account of non-conceptual 
intentionality involved in experiencing in terms of some nomic relation between micro-
physical objects and sensory states of organismsm, for example. Does this mean that 
every representation is a misrepresentation given that nothing in the physically described 
world matches the non-particulate character of macro-objects as presented in experience? 
The representationalist only needs to add that under normal conditions of perceiving 
colour is at least partly determined by certain features of micro-physical objects (whether 
they absorb or reflect light in particular) and that these features produce representations 
of homogeneously coloured (i.e. non-particulate) objects, and this is a fact about the 
design of the visual system, not a troubling failure to see the world as it is.
Having said this, representationalism is powerless to reconcile the two Images when it 
comes to persons. If there isn’t a single subject of perceptual states, constructed out of 
interactions among the components of a computational systems or otherwise, then 
experiences are not states at all, and will be replaced by phenomenal individuals. This 
follows regardless of whether the claim that qualia are intentional is consistent with the 
Scientific Image. 
Here are the points where Sellars’ reasoning about the subject of experience connects 
with my argument in 2.2.1 (Subject-Dependence of Qualia) which developed a great deal 
of the challenge that I am now about to conclude. My thought, inspired by Dennett’s 
(1978) project of building the self out of sub-personal material and repeated a number of 
times in what followed, was that phenomenal properties and single subjects are 
inextricable, that the self is somewhat immersed in them, and that separating them would 
either change the topic beyond recognition or lead to phenomenal individuals. More 
specifically, phenomenal individuals will be unavoidable if the self is separated from 
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qualia because this turns the self into an observer in relation to qualia, which then turns 
qualia into properties of phenomenal individuals. The self becomes an inner sense 
capable of directing and opening itself to phenomenal objects. If states  rather than 
objects are what carries phenomenal properties, the self must be related to them as their 
subject, not as observers. In view of this, Sellars is right in thinking that in the absence of 
a single subject we lose perceptual states too.
This was aimed at strictly first-order theories and was to provide further support for
Carruthers’ argument that first-order representationalism is an account of worldly 
subjectivity shared by unconscious perceivers. To explain experiential subjectivity, where 
inner life is to be found, it ought to involve self-reflexive states. By ‘strictly first-order’ I 
mean those positions on which qualia are not only individuated but also fully determined 
at the first-order level. Failing to appreciate the importance of the subject, experiential 
subjectivity would prove elusive. I wasn’t quite prepared to go along with Sellars in 
dismissing the ordinary framework of persons from some scientific point of view a the 
time. I did not comment much on the undeniably difficult problem of subjectivity and 
thought instead that concentrating on the nature of self-reflexive states promised more 
tangible progress. After all, it seemed sensible to postpone going into the issue of the self, 
since I believed, as I still do, that because higher-order representationalist proposals do 
build self-reflexive states into phenomenal consciousness, they may be thought of as 
recognition of the fact that qualia and the self are inseparable. Bringing introspection into 
focus was likely to be more fruitful because discovering that self-reflection features 
phenomenal concepts, i.e. concepts not shared by unconscious perceivers, would serve as 
evidence that the source of such self-reflexive thoughts is the kind of self that is 
‘immersed’ in phenomenal properties. 
The outcome should by now be largely clear. Introspective concepts do not distinguish 
us from perceivers who don’t experience. For various reasons, many would not want to 
halt all progress with the problem of the subject of experience in the scientific picture 
quite as resolutely as Sellars does, but the alternative route via the examination of 
introspective concepts appears to reinstate objects at the expense of states with equal 
force. Let me explain this in more detail. In section 2.2.1 I also outlined a general form of 
higher-order representationalism. In order to place sufficient emphasis on the role of the 
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subject and to be regarded as an account of experiential subjectivity, it must meet the 
minimum requirement that lower-order states be available to be picked out by higher-
order states. The result is a view where qualia are partly determined by long-armed 
functional roles and partly by being related to the subject in terms of availability to 
introspection. 
What position succeeds HOR given that introspective states are internalised public-
language sentences containing nothing that applies distinctively to phenomenal 
properties? It will not help to return to the first-order level for we would repeat the 
mistake of misidentifying phenomenal consciousness with worldly subjectivity. It seems 
that the only option now is a position which is neither first- nor higher-order, one which 
abandons a reference to states altogether, thereby removing the distinction between 
perception and introspection. That position is the sense-datum theory according to which 
experiences are sensings of phenomenal objects, i.e. sense-data. Why can in not be 
characterised as either first- or second-order? Why should it be understood as 
assimilating perception to introspection? These question can be answered together. If we 
take perceptions as well as introspecting to be states (as of course HOR does, for 
example), then perceptions are first-order states, whereas introspecting is to be in a 
higher-order state. At the beginning of Chapter 2. I grappled with difficulty of whether 
the sense-datum theory ought to be understood as a higher-order position. It is its rather 
anomalous nature that causes the difficulty. It is correct, on the one hand, to suppose that 
higher-order awareness is awareness of the contents of one’s mind no matter whether 
these are perceptual states or phenomenal objects, in which respect the sense-datum 
theory is a higher-order theory, and to also suppose, on the other hand, that there can only 
be higher-order awareness where there are first-order states, in which respect awareness 
of sense-data is first-order awareness. I think the best way to clarify the situation is by 
saying that it is neither because on the sense-datum theory perception and introspection 
are one and the same thing. So what I mean by the sense-datum theory’s assimilation of 
perception to introspection is not that it adopts the standard higher-order theories’ layout 
with first-order perceptions and higher-order introspecting, and has it that introspecting is 
itself like perceiving rather than an occurrence of a thought. 
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So the sense-datum theory has none of the drawbacks of first-order or higher-order 
theories and combines the virtues of both. Most importantly, it accommodates 
experiential subjectivity without being higher-order, whereby it does not depend on the 
existence of phenomenal concepts. HOR, whose qualia-determining factors range from 
external objects to self-reflexive states, implodes into something considerably simpler –
experiencing comes down to the sensing of sense-data, to opening the inner sense to 
phenomenal individuals.
It goes without saying that reintroducing sense-data comes at a great cost not least 
because such an outcome leaves us at a complete loss as to why sense-data occur in some 
perceivers but not in others. Even more troubling is the fact that it closes the circular 
argument that started with Lycan’s attempt to purge the mind of phenomenal objects by 
treating after-images, supposedly the prime examples of sense-data, as intentional 
inexistents. His diagnosis of the perceptual situation involving a green after-image is 
summarised in the following:
There is a mode of sensing M such that Leopold is sensing in way M and Leopold 
would be sensing in way M if a green patch were present to him and conditions 
were normal,
and Lycan adds that
the antecedent of this counterfactual is “there is a green patch present to 
Leopold”. Thus, any of the standard accounts mentioned above directs us to look 
at an alternative world in which (it is really true that) there is a green patch 
present to Leopold. And this is the source of our quantifier: the value of its 
variable is a green – physically green – patch (1987, p.87-88, italics original).
I presented this as a basic sketch around which representationalism can be built and at the 
end of Chapter I. I arrived at the claim that (i) qualia are not intrinsic properties of 
perceptual states, and if so, they must be wide contents.
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Having reintroduced phenomenal objects in the above way, we encounter the general 
problem – to be dealt with in the final chapter – that my circular argument raises. Sellars 
is one of many authors who favour a non-mentalistic approach to the intentionality of 
thoughts. Thoughts inherit their intentionality from the semantic properties of public 
language (which implies, as I briefly explained at the end of the previous section, that 
intentionality is normative). The idea that concepts do not appear out of nowhere, but 
their grasp presupposes adopting the communicative practices of the linguistic 
community of which one is a member was at the heart of my criticism of phenomenal 
concepts. That intentionality is normative and therefore irreducible is not something we 
should find problematic. It is not a concession to dualism, as normative phenomena are 
not targets for reduction. The issue my circular argument raises is that the normativity of 
introspective thoughts does become problematic if they turn out to be indispensable in an 
account of a phenomenon that is not a matter of collective conventions and hence is a 
target for reduction. That phenomenon is of course experiential subjectivity or 
phenomenal consciousness. Wide content representationalism is the strongest reductive 
strategy we currently have, or so I argued. As an account of experiential subjectivity, it
cannot dispense with something which, unlike the visual system, is not part of our 
phylogenetic equipment. Finally, accepting that it collapses into a position which 
characterises phenomenal properties as properties of objects floating in the mind is a 
substantial concession to dualism.
We have now reached the last part of my work where I want propose a 
representationalist view which I believe stands a chance of addressing the problem by 
tying qualia even closer to the subject than the standard form of higher-order 
representationalism I have been discussing. The proposal is that qualia are properties of 
higher-order states.  
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3. An Alternative Proposal
3.1 Qualia as Properties of Global Higher-Order States
In presenting the position that deals with the difficulties we encountered in Chapter 2., I 
shall first bring together the main themes developed in the course characterising 
representationalism in Chapter 1., as what I am about to put forward adopts the 
understanding of content externalism we arrived at. It was mainly the clarification of the
notion of a functional profile and that of a long-armed functional role (especially 1.2.1 
Functionalism and Intentional Contents) that shaped that understanding. They are of 
course interrelated – functional profile is just the totality of the functional roles of the 
states a system can enter in the context of what their outputs are supplied for (e.g. 
cognition, motor control, etc.). Functional profile also explained the attribution of less 
determinate contents to visual systems with poorer sensitivity. If an organism is unable to 
make out certain shades of colours, its functional profile subsumes two or more external 
inputs under the same output. We don’t need make a firm decision as to whether the 
causal links between the environment and states of visual systems should be understood 
in terms of causal co-variance or teleologically, although some of my defence of content 
externalism in Chapter 1. did rely on anchoring contents in the environment 
teleologically.
On the view I have set out to outline, these externally determined contents are non-
qualitative, but I am keen to preserve the above points about content as well as everything 
else that was said about them in Chapter 1. I want to add, however, that the intentional 
objects of first-order states have their properties homogeneously. This party reiterates the 
insight offered by representationalism in response to Sellars’ contention that there is a 
friction between the Manifest Image and the Scientific Image in that nothing in the world 
has the homogeneous colours that common sense attributes to external objects since only 
colourless microphysical entities exist. I replied on the representationalist’s behalf that 
this is an oversight of the possibility that the colour terms of common-sense talk used to 
refer to the homogeneous colours of macro-physical objects express the properties of 
intentional objects. My current suggestion is in agreement with this move to the extent
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that it is right to treat perceptions as contentful states and that the contents in question are 
properties which represented objects possess homogeneously. The general picture here is 
that the impact of heterogeneous reality on the visual system produces representations of 
macro-objects with homogeneous features, which features are categorised by long-armed 
functional roles. All I disagree with is that the features are phenomenal. 
Keeping a firm grip on the ontological status of intentional objects and properties 
(particularly in the context of non-conceptual representations) was also a matter which 
received careful attention near the beginning of Chapter 1. Inadvertent confusion of the 
causal powers of intentional objects and properties with those of physical things in the 
proper sense of the term can result in the mixing of relations which only hold at, say, the 
personal level with the underlying sub-personal relations, not to mention the blurring of 
the distinction between functional and structural levels of descriptions or Sellars’ 
Manifest and Scientific frameworks, thus turning a potentially fruitful set of ideas into 
something that is impossible to evaluate. 
Assuming the truth of content externalism, the intentional object of a non-conceptual 
mental representation is, trivially, topic-neutral. Its topic-neutrality, however, is to be 
distinguished from the topic-neutrality of the content-bearing state. Content externalism 
is a broadly functionalist approach and it is a familiar point that functionalism entails no 
ontological commitments despite the fact that functional states must ultimately turn out to 
be realised either materially or immaterially. Further, the states themselves have a 
functional reality, they exist only relative to a system, which is not to introduce a new 
kind of substance, some functional ‘stuff’ that emerges from matter organised in a certain 
way – abstracting away from the states’ specific type of (presumably material) realisation 
simply has the purpose of facilitating formulation of law-like generalisations and 
prediction of the behaviour of the whole system. But the causal relations which hold the 
system together are nonetheless relations among physical things in the proper sense of the 
term. Incidentally, Sellars’ insistence that only micro-physical rather than macro-physical 
objects exist is driven by a concern to steer clear of issues to do with property-emergence. 
On the other hand, the intentional objects of the non-conceptual mental 
representations we are considering are topic-neutral and hence, again, there is no 
entailment of an ontological commitment, but questions about what they will ultimately 
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turn out to be are clearly misguided. They are neither material nor immaterial. Further 
clarification of their status, while keeping the functional and external causal condition in 
view, will emphasise their subjective reality. Intentional objects exist relative to the 
subject (e.g. Dennett’s ‘exempt user’), something that is external to the visual sub-system 
an exploits the outputs of that sub-system in ways which are sensitive to their intentional 
objects. ‘Sensitivity to content’ means that the intentional content is preserved through 
the course of the processes in which the user involves the corresponding representation 
and acts with respect to that content even though, for example, its external cause as it 
occurs does not match the content (and hence fails to satisfy it), or its external cause 
occurred in distant past (if the representation is retrieved from memory, albeit in a less 
vivid and degraded form). The most basic requirement for something to serve as an 
exempt user is that whatever it is that is sensitive to an output’s intentional object (which 
stands, as it were, in an external cause’s stead) is the same as that which coordinates 
motor responses with respect to the object. 
We therefore must bear in mind that this does not introduce yet another substance –
some subjective ‘stuff’ – from which intentional objects are made, and that the 
representation has these causal powers by virtue of its physical realisation. At any rate, 
talk of subjective reality of intentional objects can only be justified if the outputs of 
sensory sub-systems are properly related to the exempt user.
While my claim is that first-order intentional objects as I have descried them lack 
phenomenal properties, these remarks constitute the first important step towards 
phenomenal consciousness. The idea that underlies my remarks about subjective reality is 
that only physical things have objective reality, but this is by no means intended to make 
our talk of subjective reality appear derisory. All I aim to show is that if matter (in this 
case the brain) is organised in a certain way, more specifically, if it is arranged into a 
functional system, it can give rise to phenomena (i.e. intentional objects) which have the 
same sort of significance for that system as things that have objective reality without 
postulating new kinds of substance existing alongside material things. For these very 
reasons, the form of functional arrangement of matter that I believe gives rise to 
experiences will do justice to phenomenal properties’ subjective reality without the 
contrast between subjective and objective reality becoming an ontological one. Of course 
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many functionalists, and representationalists in particular, have attempted to do just that, 
and yet as many so-called qualia realists remain unconvinced. Qualia realists’ objections 
to every functionalist theory that has been advanced are based on what has come to be 
known as ‘qualia intuitions’ – they draw their force from reflections on the supposedly 
occurrent nature of phenomenal colours and the fact that they are presented in experience 
as occupying more or less clearly defined regions of space or, alternatively, as saturating 
portions of one’s visual field. Such evidently non-relational and non-dispositional 
occurrences could not possibly be generated by functional systems, or so we learn. I think 
it is correct to say that the idea of homogeneity is what unifies these intuitions, that 
homogeneity lies at their root. I will argue that the account I am proposing allows me to 
probe further into the intuitions than perhaps most relationalist positions do until they are 
shown to be futile as a challenge. 
Note that nothing in the qualia intuitions will prompt a qualia realist to deny that first-
order intentional objects can have their properties (categorised by long-armed functional 
roles) homogeneously precisely because I do not claim that the properties are qualitative.
That a certain functional organisation generates homogeneity would be seen as 
unproblematic from a qualia realist’s point of view provided that the homogeneity in 
question is not phenomenal. It is only homogeneity which makes itself felt in some way 
or other that is supposed to be irreducible to functional roles. Separating homogeneity 
from phenomenality, although we cannot of course have the latter without the former, 
clears the way for a position on which qualia are the contents of higher-order states 
representing the non-phenomenal (but sensory nonetheless) homogeneity of first-order 
intentional objects. The original objection wielded against functionalism was that 
functional roles could not produce the kind of homogeneity we experience, but my 
suggestion is that experienced homogeneity develops from homogeneity that we already 
have in place in the form of first-order contents, one which qualia realists should not find 
problematic. This has an indisputable potential to silence qualia realists, or at least the 
burden of explaining why non-phenomenal homogeneity is a problem for functionalism 
is certainly on them. It is difficult to see, in any case, what explanation qualia intuitions 
alone would motivate. The main strength of my suggestion consists in placing an 
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intermediate step between functional roles and experienced homogeneity, namely, non-
phenomenal homogeneous intentional objects. 
More clarification will be provided, however, as I further develop my account. My 
immediate interest now is in introducing the idea of a global non-epistemic higher-order 
state. A global non-epistemic meta-representation is a representation of the contents of 
the outputs supplied by all five sensory modalities as well as proprioception at any given 
time. It is global in that it integrates all perceptible features of my surroundings as well as 
all sensible states of my bodily parts into a single content. Due to its totality, i.e. its 
global scope, it is subject to continuous changes as, for instance, some of my current 
bodily discomforts become less severe, I scratch an inch on my left palm, a new scene 
comes into my view when look in a different direction and so on. My view then is that 
qualia such as phenomenal colours, sounds, smells, twinges, throbs, cramps, awareness of 
the position of my toes, the feeling of my lungs expanding as I breathe in, etc. are 
portions of the content of a single meta-representational state a perceiver happens to be in 
at a given time.
In defending the identification of qualia with global higher-order contents I shall seek 
to explain what it is that sets a global higher-order content apart from first-order contents 
and makes it qualitative. I shall also finalise my reply to those who are sceptical about 
relationalist views in general on the grounds that qualia are experienced as being 
occurrent rather than relational (and that it is self-evident that for a colour expanse to be 
experienced is for it to be occurrent) by explaining how something can be occurrent from 
the subject’s perspective despite its relational nature. Let me begin by highlighting the 
key differences between first- and higher- order (global) contents. First and foremost, the 
contentful outputs of sensory modalities are utilised as states of discrete sub-systems. I 
have stressed that talk of content in this case is justified only if these outputs are related 
to an exempt user. We can think of the exempt user as some sort of control unit which 
coordinates the movements of the limbs in response to such contents according to the 
current needs and motivations of the whole system. In section 2.1 (Worldly vs. 
Experiential Subjectivity) I rehearsed a number of examples mentioned by Carruthers of 
how non-qualitative perceptual contents can be used to guide swift and instinctive motor 
reactions, not to mention blindsight.
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The point to note is that whatever serves as the user of first-order contents (and 
whatever the exact manner of their utilisation is), it is external to the sub-system that 
supplies them. A first-order perception does its representing for something other than the 
sub-system itself. I deliberately avoid speaking of persons as being the users of these 
first-order perceptual states to emphasise that the problem of identifying a single subject 
of perceptual states does not arise if they are non-qualitative, for it arises distinctively for 
experiences. We can grant that the motor-control unit is a sub-personal part, although for 
the states to be contentful it must coordinate motor responses in accordance with the 
needs and motivations of the whole system. 
On the other hand, a global meta-representation is a single self-directed state aimed at 
the first-order contents of all sensory sub-systems – and the content of my global higher-
order state is, unlike the contents of first-order states, qualitative because the situation 
now is not such that the output of a discrete sub-system does its representing of 
something red for me, it is, rather, that I represent something red. I believe that only the 
latter (‘I represent something red’) does full justice to the subjectivity of qualia and that 
the correct statement of every experiential situation should have this form. For I am 
claiming, in effect, that the global higher-order state is what the experiencing self comes 
down to. I am experiencing something red when looking at a ripe tomato because the 
experienced redness is integrated into the higher-order content of a state which also 
represents the position and state of my body and its parts and everything else that there is 
to be sensed and perceived at this particular moment. In short, it becomes part of the 
content of a state which represents everything that constitutes me as I experience myself.
We may struggle to understand why there should be a certain feel to the content of a 
representation produced by a sub-system whose receptors are sensitive to sound waves, 
and a certain (other) feel to the content of a representation produced by a sub-system 
whose receptors are sensitive to light, especially when these sub-systems produce their 
representations in isolation from one another. But we will not need to strain our powers 
of understanding quite so much if the suggestion is that both experienced colour and 
experienced sound are parts of the content of the same personal-level representation 
aimed at first order intentional objects. Having said this, it remains the case that the 
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differences between visual and auditory qualia are determined by the character of the
first-order intentional objects picked out by the meta-representation. 
An all-encompassing meta-representation is presumably a brain state and I have no 
reason to deny that at one level of description it is sub-personal, although it is equally 
legitimate to describe it as a personal-level representation. Nonetheless, what matters for 
my purposes is that owing to the global scope of the meta-representation, there is no such 
level of description at which its content is sub-personal. This overcomes the difficulty 
discussed in the final section of the preceding chapter that draws Sellars towards 
phenomenal individuals. His reasoning was that sense impressions are states of unified 
subjects which have no place within the Scientific image, since living organisms, 
including humans, are bundles of countless micro-physical particles. Even attempts to 
construct the self out of interactions among the sub-personal components of a computing 
machine inevitably fail, as we still have a plurality instead of unity. Because sense 
impressions depend on the existence of a single subject, we are forced to replace states 
with objects as the bearers of phenomenal properties. Sellars’ observation that sense 
impressions require a single subject whose states they are is not something to be 
concerned about if we do not hold that (first-order) perceptual states are the bearers of 
phenomenal properties. My account only requires that the states have a wide content and 
hence satisfy the conditions mentioned above (long-armed functional roles and the 
presence of a motor-control unit serving the system as a whole). Clearly, if first-order 
perceptions are not experiences, we are under no obligation to identify the experiencing 
self.
So I avoid introducing phenomenal objects by claiming that qualia are properties of  a 
higher-order state rather than properties of first-order perceptions. In view of this, the 
issue of finding a unified subject of what I take to be a qualia-bearing state poses no 
threat to my position, since the global higher-order state is what the experiencing self 
comes down to. It is by virtue of being in a such a self-directed global state that the 
description ‘I represent something red’ is applicable to my present experiential situation 
as I, for example, stare at a ripe tomato. The unity, as opposed to multiplicity, is 
guaranteed by the fact that there is only one such self-directed global state at a time with 
a single all-embracing content. There is no doubt that the unity understood in terms of a 
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materially realised meta-representational state is consistent with the Scientific Image 
plurality regarding sentient organisms.
In 2.2.1 (Subject-Dependence of Qualia) I acknowledged that a position on which 
qualia are first-order contents – provided it relates them to the subject in the required way 
– is not precluded from moving from ‘There is a representation of something red in me’ 
to ‘I represent something red’. But this alternative would not fare as well as the view I am 
putting forward when faced with Sellars’ denial of the existence of a single subject. A 
direct identification of the subject to which we could relate phenomenal states proved to 
be beyond reach, as it would endlessly run into to difficulty of having to refer to sub-
personal material, thereby inviting obvious counterexamples (which would only confirm 
Sellars’ doubts). I chose instead an indirect route via phenomenal concepts. Showing that 
phenomenal concepts were possible would be an encouraging indication that there was an 
experiencing “I’ to pursue after all. At least, quite interestingly, we would be gifted the 
option of suggesting that there is a global conceptual meta-representation featuring a 
large but not infinite number of, say, innate mentalese concepts. The state would be far 
too complex for each concept involved to be applied consciously (i.e. to focus attention 
on the entire content), but examples such as absent-minded driving are a reminder that 
non-conscious applications of concepts may often vastly outnumber conscious ones. As 
for purely recognitional concepts, on the other hand, first-order states must be 
phenomenal prior to the kind of recognition by means of which one forms a purely 
recognitional concept, and therefore phenomenal states would still have to be tied to 
something other than a global meta-representation containing purely recognitional 
concepts, that is, a subject which the global state itself would be a state of rather than a 
subject that is reducible to the global state.
Unfortunately, as it turned out, phenomenal concepts are too epistemologically 
dubious to be any kind of encouragement. I should also add that it would not be open to 
us to say that all first-order qualitative contents at a given time are simultaneously 
targeted by a global non-epistemic meta-representation. Being a (non-conceptual) 
representation, its global content would necessarily have its own qualia, thus resulting in 
an odd duplication where the phenomenal properties of lower-order states are hidden 
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beneath those of the global one. A lack of its own qualia would mean that we should all 
be diagnosed, amusingly enough, as ‘sightblinders’. 
I hope the basic commitments of my view are now largely clear, and that it is easy to 
anticipate at least the immediate objections and counterexamples it may prompt. I have 
yet to spell out how I understand the relation between the global non-epistemic meta-
representation and introspection as well as attention, and, crucially, specify where exactly 
it breaks the circular argument that motivates this solution. But first I would like to return 
to explaining why qualia are occurrent from the subject’s perspective despite their 
relational/functional nature. I left off after indicating that we can begin to undermine 
qualia intuitions by saying that the impact of heterogeneous reality on our senses 
produces states with homogeneous intentional contents. The thought was that we could 
rightly expect much hesitation on the qualia realist’s part as to whether he should deny 
that homogeneous intentional objects can have subjective reality in a functionally 
described system if we add that they are not phenomenal. For if the point is granted, 
qualia intuitions will be under considerable strain once we go on to claim that qualia are 
the contents of a state which represents objects (i.e. first-order intentional objects) that 
already have some of the features that, according to qualia realists, make phenomenality 
impossible to capture in relationalist terms.
This argument will only do the work I need it to do when it is conjoined with the 
second part of my proposal where the idea of a global higher-order state is introduced, 
otherwise I would not be able to explain why the represented properties of first-order 
non-phenomenal homogeneous intentional objects aren’t just that – homogeneous and 
non-phenomenal. Suppose first, for illustration, that I’m viewing an abstract painting 
depicting a cat in the foreground (suppose there is just the most abstract feline-like 
outline) and a certain scene in the background. The only occurrent features of the 
painting are, plainly, the two-dimensional patches of various colours on a large piece of 
canvas. What it represents, however, is its dispositional feature, one that depends on my 
understanding of this particular convention of depiction. I mention this to highlight the 
point that what is dispositional in this example is, from the subject’s perspective, in the 
case of a global meta-representation. This is so because I equate the experiencing self 
with the global meta-representation. I argued that the identification of the subject with the 
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global state is justified, on the one hand, by the state’s being self-reflexive in that it is 
directed at the contents of lower-order states, and its global scope on the other, thus 
ensuring that there is no level of description at which the single global content is sub-
personal (although the meta-representation itself is presumably a brain state). 
Assimilating the subject, the experiencing self, to the global state means that the subject’s 
perspective amounts to the global state’s pointing towards its all-embracing content; and 
for the subject to be confronted with an analogue (as well as global and self-reflexive) 
content in this most direct and immediate manner is for that content to make itself felt in 
a certain way. Needless to say, making itself felt entails being occurrent even though our 
underlying ontology of qualia is relationalist. 
Whereas in the case of the abstract painting my awareness of its three-dimensional 
content, i.e. the cat in the foreground and the scene in the background was mediated by 
awareness of the intrinsic features of the painting, i.e. the two-dimensional patches of 
paint, the visual portion of the meta-representation’s content is presented to me directly 
and hence in three dimensions – the presented objects have volume and orientation, some 
are closer than others, etc. This is of course a reference to the familiar idea of 
transparency, the source of which in the context of on my account is the understanding of 
the (experiencing) self in terms of a global meta-representation. Since my subjective 
perspective towards qualia comes down to the meta-representation’s pointing towards its 
content, I have no non-conceptual awareness of its intrinsic features – trivially, its 
intrinsic features are not part of its content and so are not part of what I have a subjective 
perspective towards. It now seems right to say that a non-conceptual state to which the 
statement ‘I represent something red’ (as I, say, have a ripe tomato in my view) applies
without relying on a move from ‘There is a representation of something red in me’ should 
be regarded as a paradigmatic case of non-conceptual mental representation. 
Qualia realists are unlikely to be wholly convinced and would complain that they still 
don’t find the explanation, as Carruthers likes to put it, ‘cognitively satisfying’, since
something so intensely felt cannot be topic-neutral in the sense that it is neither material 
nor immaterial. I can only repeat in response that the materially realised global state is 
already directed at topic-neutral objects (lower-order intentional objects). The 
metarepresentation ‘records’ properties of topic-neutral objects, ones which are neither 
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material nor immaterial. What is more, they encode them as homogeneous –
homogeneity, at least in this sense, being a property that has no reality in nature outside 
sentient organisms – which makes the symbolic structures a unique occurrence perhaps 
already at the level of biochemistry. Revealing how homogeneity, not only visual one but 
that of all sensory modalities and proprioception, is ‘recorded’ in the brain would clear 
the way for an exhaustive explanation of qualitative content. Like all intuitions, qualia 
intuitions are poorly articulated, yet quite unyielding, hunches that we will have no 
qualms ditching if such an exhaustive explanation of the mechanisms of ‘encoding’ 
phenomenal homogeneity can be given. 
Similar intuitions regarding non-mental topic-neutral objects prove to be misleading
almost without exception and lose all appeal as soon as the ‘realist’ about such objects
comes to have a full grasp of, say, the relevant laws of optics. Holography illustrates this 
well. Holograms are images replicating spatial relations in the original scene along all 
three dimensions. Take, for example, a sizeable hologram (1m2) where a Rubik’s Cube 
appears to be positioned half a metre behind its two-dimensional surface. There is also a 
smaller cube concealed by the larger one when the viewer aligns himself with them. The 
image is three-dimensional in that when the viewer moves right or left to change 
perspective, he can see the side of the large cube and the smaller one behind it. Having no 
understanding of the methods used to create holographic images, our viewer is likely to 
be gripped by an intuition as unquestionable on the face of it as those about qualia. He 
thinks it inconceivable that the cubes he can view from different perspectives are topic-
neutral, that there is no cube-shaped substance (material or immaterial) at that precise 
location.
While a photographic film is only sensitive to variations in intensity, a holographic 
plate also detects differences in phase between light waves reflected off the cubes being 
recorded. Differences in phase correspond to relative distances of the objects’ exposed 
surfaces. Phase is made detectable (in the so-called transmission type of equipment set-
up) when the light crosses another beam, one that avoids striking the cubes (so all of its
light waves are in the same phase), and hits the plate at an angle. Where the uniform
beam and the light waves in different phases travelling from the cubes meet, an 
interference pattern forms marking the waves’ phases (and hence the relative distances of 
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the cubes’ surfaces). The pattern then leaves a recording on the holographic plate later 
developed into a hologram.
To view the hologram, the uniform beam must illuminate its back (‘back’ in relation 
to the viewer) surface at the same angle that it did during recording. When these light 
waves travelling in the same phase pass through the image, the optical features of the 
image obtained by developing the ‘recordings’ on the plate convert them into so called 
spherical front waves which leave the front surface of the hologram and spread towards 
the viewer. Spherical front waves spread in the shape of concentric circles in a ripple-like 
way. Finally, although the circles begin at the surface of the hologram, their size is such 
that their centres are behind the hologram, at the very same location where the exposed 
parts of the cubes that reflected light onto the plate were positioned. In other words, the 
centres are where the sources of the ripples would be if no hologram was involved and 
they had spread from point sources. Vision then reconstructs the point source from the 
wave even though it does not originate in a point source. Hence the point source is virtual 
or, to place it in the context of my account of qualia, topic-neutral. The outcome is a
startlingly realistic three-dimensional arrangement where the viewer’s change of 
perspective reveals more of the large cube as well as the small cube behind it. 
But suppose that, having been told this story, our viewer consults his initial intuition
(one which made the topic-neutrality of the cubes seem inconceivable) and decides, in the 
spirit of qualia realism, that the story does not ‘satisfy’ the intuition. For he can, after all, 
see that the virtual point source is there. He now declares himself a ‘virtual point source 
realist’. At this point there is no further argument to undermine his ‘virtual point source 
realism’, but not because we grant that the intuition is to be employed as the ultimate 
measure of an explanation’s success, rather, the illustration helps us realise that nothing 
can ‘satisfy’ or do full justice to the intuition except the intuition itself. This makes the 
intuition, if taken seriously, restrictive to such an extent that it halts all progress on the 
matter. Our viewer’s ‘virtual point source realism’ would of course be ridiculed by 
scientists, but in more speculative fields such as philosophy of mind’, appeals to similar 
intuitions tend to be much more charitably received. I do not deny, however, that they at 
least have some diagnostic value.
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My aim has been to show that the qualia realists’ continued reservations about 
qualitative content should be likened to the viewer’s intuition in the above example. I of 
course make no claim to have established beyond doubt the nature of phenomenal 
properties in the same way that the laws of optics explain the nature of the cubes 
reproduced in a holographic image. The idea of qualitative content may turn out to be 
flawed, but I hope it is obvious enough that if this does happen, it is not the qualia 
realists’ intuitions that will uncover the flaws. 
I conclude with an observation that holography, setting aside now the illustration for 
the sake of which I began talking about it, perhaps hints at one useful way to think of the  
(non-qualitative) homogeneity of a first-order intentional object – whatever it is that 
causally mediates between a first-order state and the global meta-representation, instead 
of carrying information about the object as being divisible into numerous point sources 
on the ‘surface’ of the intentional object (i.e. as having a microstructure), the causal
mediation only carries information about a single (topic-neutral) ‘macro-source’, namely, 
the unstructured homogeneous intentional object itself (in holography, a point source is 
the smallest point on the surface of the object being recorded that is able to reflect light, 
such as a molecule of a certain size)
3.2 Reviewing the Circular Argument
Having laid out my alternative HOR position, I will now return to the circular 
argument and explain how the position, when fed through that argument (by replacing (ii) 
with the alternative I put forward), escapes the consequence stated in (iv) that closes the 
circle. The argument consisted of the following four claims: 
(i) Qualia are not intrinsic properties of perceptual states, and if so, they must be wide 
contents.
(ii) The thesis that qualia are wide contents can be plausibly held only as a claim of 
higher- rather than first-order intentionalism.
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(iii) To have a higher-order thought about one’s perceptual state is to token an 
internalised public-language sentence whose meaning is holistic and normative.
(iv) Since higher-order perceptual thoughts are internalised public-language sentences, 
qualia are intrinsic properties of experiences.
I was keen to show in Chapter 2. that the form of HOR (as referred to in (ii)) that 
stretches from wide first-order qualitative contents to introspective thoughts implodes 
into phenomenal individuals and hence returns us to the beginning of Chapter 1. where 
Lycan’s adverbial analysis is invoked to dissolve those very same phenomenal 
individuals. In the remainder of Chapter 1. I gradually proceeded towards claim (i). 
We saw that in view of Sellars’ thought about introspection, the form of HOR in 
question is only as defensible as the existence of phenomenal concepts. Firstly, in order 
to tie phenomenal first-order states closely enough to the (experiencing) self, the relevant 
self-reflexive states must contain concepts whose extension excludes non-qualitative 
perceptions. Secondly, FOR was abandoned in favour of HOR because it did not 
distinguish blindsighters as well as other non-conscious perceivers, which can be seen as 
cases of absent qualia tailored for testing these accounts, from normally sighted 
perceivers. HOR offered to find a difference by mentioning higher-order states in its 
characterisation of qualia, for which predicates excluding non-qualitative perceptions 
from their extensions are necessary. Besides, the extension of every such predicate must 
be stable across worlds (actual and possible) to pre-empt qualia inversions. And finally, 
only phenomenal concepts (purely recognitional and innate Mentalese concepts) have 
possession-conditions (Peacocke, 1992) that one can meet prior to and independently of 
learning a public language. Their absence would make phenomenal consciousness the 
sole preserve of language-using creatures. 
I need not repeat that Sellars’ non-mentalistic treatment of introspection as 
internalised public-language sentences brings the epistemological soundness of 
phenomenal concepts into question. He would hardly feel uneasy about the loss of the 
rigid type of designation characteristic of phenomenal concepts on which HOR in its 
present form relies, as he would dismiss qualia inversions as a pseudo-problem, a 
regrettable episode of the epistemologist’s fiction that nurtures the Myth of the Given. 
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For the meaning of introspective predicates applied to experiences is exhausted in what is 
communicated in overt speech, leaving no ineffable residue.
Unless we could find an alternative, the absence of phenomenal concepts would 
deprive us of a reductive explanation, in functional/representational terms, of what many 
feel must be a natural phenomenon  - experience belongs to the logical space of nature, as 
opposed to the logical space of reasons, to which introspection, as Sellars treats it, as well 
as thoughts in general belong (the understanding of the contrast between experiences and 
thoughts as one between the logical space of nature and the logical space of reasons is 
from McDowell (1994)). 
Suppose now that qualia are higher- rather than first-order contents in the way 
specified in the previous section and that (ii) is restated accordingly. The central idea is 
that a property one is non-conceptually aware of in experiencing is qualitative if the way 
he as the subject is related to it is identical to the relation between the global 
metarepresentation and its content. It is qualitative because the subject’s perspective 
towards the property amounts to the metarepresentation’s pointing towards its content. 
Only if first-order perceptions are taken to be qualia-bearing within a HOR picture do we 
have to link qualia to concepts that meet the above conditions. Shifting qualia to the 
higher-order level allows me to give a HOR account independently of phenomenal 
concepts and introspection in general. None of the components out of which my account 
is constructed are conceptual, since the qualia-bearing higher-order state must be non-
epistemic. 
Although it is higher-order, it would be unreasonable to say that the idea of a global 
metarepresentation may be extended to account for the introspective faculty dedicated to 
experiences given that the metarepresentation is itself a qualia-bearing state. There is of 
course a sense in which it is correct to say that, on my account, sensory qualia are self-
reflexive – they are the contents of a state that is aimed at other mental states (i.e. lower-
order perceptions) rather than at external objects.  
I reserve the term ‘introspection’ for the type of conceptual exercise which involves 
an explicit reference to one’s own inner episode, thereby presupposing a folk-
psychological theory of mind. So the predicate ‘red’ is introspective if its user applies it 
to an aspect of what, based on his theory of mind, he is non-inferentially aware of as an 
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inner sensory occurrence. But I also spoke of phenomenal concepts as though they were 
introspective despite the fact that their acquisition does not require that the user views 
himself as having inner episodes (see the characterisation of purely recognitional and 
innate Mentalese concepts). They are introspective even though, due to a lack of a theory 
of mind, the user never employs them in thoughts which contain an explicit reference to 
such episodes. If phenomenal concepts were possible, they would indeed count as 
introspective while flouting the above ‘explicit reference’ requirement, as every 
phenomenal concept rigidly designates a phenomenal property, i.e. something necessarily 
being an aspect of an inner episode, not of something non-mental such as an external 
object. For example, a phenomenal concept formed by means of brute recognition rigidly 
designates a certain phenomenal property even though the user lacks concepts referring to 
his inner occurrences, and can only attribute that property to worldly objects.
Sellars’ non-mentalistic treatment traces the origin of introspective predicates to the 
intersubjective framework of physical objects and properties expressed by public-
language concepts (‘looks-F’ is parasitic on ‘is-red’ – to say that x looks F is to take back 
the endorsement of ‘x is F’). Public-language colour terms do not designate rigidly. 
Things I overtly judge to be green differ in their perceived colour from those which my 
counterparts at various possible worlds, speaking the same language, overtly judge to be 
green. Possible-world variations of this kind mean that my public-language concept 
‘green’ does not capture a phenomenal property (at least not ‘non-comparatively’ (see 
Chisholm, 1957). Nor does it, for that reason, capture an aspect of an inner occurrence. 
The introspective predicates derived by Sellars from these ordinary colour terms are 
similarly non-rigid and it would be hard to see how they are deployed inwardly if 
internalised public-language sentences did not contain an explicit reference to an inner 
experiential episode to serve as the subject of predication. Introspective concepts lose 
their prominent role in my higher-order alternative. I can therefore accept that the 
introspective capacity is the outcome of internalisation of public-language sentences. A 
story of how we ordinarily come to understand ourselves as creatures with experiences 
can at best supplement, but certainly not undermine, my account of qualia.
What does the difference between cases of perceiving without experiencing and actual 
experiences consist in if we assume that my position is correct? On the version of HOR 
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my proposal replaces, qualia are properties of first-order states and their characterisation 
must connect them in the required ways with higher-order states. In the case of 
blindsight, the connection with the requisite higher-order states is missing. My claim, on 
the other hand, is that blindsighters’ all first-order states are as intact as those of normally 
sighted humans. Even the latter’s perceptions lack qualia. We are spared the task of 
finding such elements of higher-order states which reliably indicate, by means of rigid 
designation, the presence of qualia if we suppose that the meta-representation itself is 
qualitative. Being blindsighted means that a certain portion of the meta-representation has 
been lost, perhaps due to the links between perceptions and the metarepresentation 
having been partially severed. 
If claim (iii) (stating that to have a higher-order thought about one’s perceptual state is 
to token an internalised public-language sentence whose meaning is holistic and 
normative) is true of introspection but is irrelevant to experience, (iv) will not follow. My 
proposal enables me to capture in (higher-order) relational terms what non-conscious 
perceivers lack in comparison with sighted creatures, avoiding intrinsic qualia. What is 
more, since the difference is so captured while staying within the framework of states 
rather than objects, it is clear that the above reintroduction of phenomenal individuals 
(see 2.3 Sensa and Phenomenal Individuals) is no longer enforced on us. It is no longer 
inevitable that the difference lies in the fact that whereas we have sense data, non-
conscious perceivers don’t. 
3.3 Higher-Order Contents Without Higher-Order States
The position I put forward in the previous section had been shaped primarily by 
Sellars’ worries about the existence of phenomenal concepts as well as the existence of 
the self serving as the subject of experience. In advancing my alternative version of 
higher-order representationalism, I avoided relying on phenomenal concepts by 
suggesting that the higher-order structure of phenomenal consciousness is non-conceptual 
throughout, while treating the introspective capacity as a separate (and essentially 
conceptual) matter not involved in that structure. We found sufficient evidence in Sellars’ 
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work that he would dismiss phenomenal concepts, which are delivered ‘privately’ and 
independently of any inferential links with other concepts, as an instance of placing 
something allegedly epistemic outside the logical Space of Reasons. Since the states that 
I do take to belong in the HOR structure of phenomenal consciousness are non-
conceptual, I am not forcing anything epistemic outside the Space of Reasons. 
Of course, my claim that the higher-order states in question are non-epistemic is not in 
itself a novelty. Lycan’s (1996) is also a presentation of a higher-order perception model. 
I have already noted, however, that it does not overcome the problem of the self to which 
we attribute experiences. He has it that higher-order states are the outcome of the 
operation of internal monitors (or Inner Sense). The monitors as well as everything they 
interact with are sub-personal parts rather than the sort of persons to which experiences 
are attributable.26 Recall from Chapter 2. how Dennett (1978) stated some such difficulty: 
At best a sub-personal theory will seem to give us no grounds for believing its 
instantiations would be subjects of experience, and at worst (as we have seen) a 
sub-personal theory will seem to permit instantiations that obviously are not
subjects of experience (p.154, italics original).
Nor is the content of the monitors’ outputs a personal-level one – they are intended to 
explain introspective attention in Lycan’s theory, and the amount of perceptual and 
proprioceptive intake introspection can focus on at a given time is therefore limited, in 
other words, the monitors’ introspective content is local rather than global at any given 
time. This is where my emphasis on global higher-order content comes into play. I 
observed above that once we think of the higher-order level as a global meta-
representation, it is open to us to say that although the meta-representation is sub-
personal (as it is a brain state), its content is personal due to the fact that it is all-
encompassing (i.e. it covers one’s entire perceptual and proprioceptive output) and 
26 The terms ‘personal’ and ‘sub-personal’ are often used to distinguish, say, early visual processing from 
the output of visual processing. The former has no direct psychological significance for the subject, 
whereas the latter become a part of the subject’s mental life. Clearly, it is not this distinction that I have in 
mind in the present context.  
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higher-order.27 The main strength of this answer is that it replaces the arguably 
insurmountable problems regarding the self to which we ordinarily attribute experiences 
with far more tractable questions about global meta-content. It also squares rather nicely 
with Sellars’ claim that, since we consist of a multitude of micro-physical parts, there is 
no unified self serving as the subject of experience. Positing a global state does not 
contradict that claim. Nor does my answer rely on building the self out of the inevitably 
sub-personal neural counterparts of the components of a computing machine (such as a 
mind-reading module or a system of internal monitors).  
Unlike Lycan’s internal monitors, the global meta-representation is not meant to 
function as an inner attention mechanism – it is not to explain the difference between 
states we are aware of being in and those we aren’t. It is continuously aimed at all 
perceptual and proprioceptive outputs and I also take it to be qualia-bearing.
Introspection, on the other hand, is an altogether distinct mechanism. As I understand it,
following Sellars, it is purely conceptual, requiring that one be a member of a linguistic 
community. 
Another important point made in the preceding section concerns my shifting qualia to 
the higher-order level. I said that a position on which there is a non-qualitative (non-
epistemic) global meta-representation alongside qualia-bearing first-order states would be 
unworkable. For the sake of illustration, think of the global meta-content as being 
superimposed over all lower-order contents. Now, if it was a non-qualitative meta-
content that was so superimposed over qualitative lower-order content, the outcome 
would be a quite unfortunate situation where we suffer from a condition that is the 
reverse of blindsight, namely, ‘sightblind’, as I called it above. Because lower-order 
contents would be continuously covered by a global higher-order ‘layer’ of content that 
lacks qualia, we would have phenomenal states at the lower level and yet not experience 
anything. Similarly, allowing the presence of qualia at both levels would mean that 
lower-order qualia would not be a part of our inner lives. 
Lycan’s (1996) has been criticised (see (Neander 1998)) on the grounds that the Inner 
Sense – the inner sensing being representational rather than non-representational – should 
27 An objection may be raised here that a thoroughly global content should also cover thoughts, beliefs, 
etc., but it is a characterization of the experiencing self that I’m interested in, one which I ought to be able 
to provide regardless of conceptualization. 
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produce its own qualia alongside lower-order ones. If the introspective mechanism 
misrepresents and there is, for example, a green lower-order quale and a red higher-order 
quale, it becomes unclear what exactly the perceiver is experiencing. This, however, is 
unfair, for Lycan does stress that internal scanning produces representations in the 
Language of Thought. So the contents of these representations must be understood as 
epistemic and hence by no means as qualitative. Introspection is perception-like because 
the way it is shifts from one sensation to another resembles the way the eyes shift focus 
from one part of a scene to another, not because it produces non-conceptual 
representations. It is worth reminding that only if lower-order qualia were sensed non-
representationally – much like sense-data – could we have non-epistemic introspection 
that lacks qualia. But of course Lycan’s programme, as he announces it, is that of 
establishing the hegemony of representation, not that of establishing a ‘mongrel’ position 
with elements of representationalism (in the case of perception) and elements the sense-
datum theory (in the case of introspection).   
With these summarising remarks in mind, I shall go on to consider some notable 
overlaps with the work of Robert Van Gulick and Peter Carruthers. There are also equally 
notable disagreements to be recognised regarding the way they would approach the 
challenge my position is intended to deal with. Common to their proposals is the idea of 
higher-order qualitative contents without higher-order states. I will explain a little later 
why I reject the idea. 
Van Gulick (2000, 2004) is the only author who mentions global states, although he is 
interested in sketching a model of introspective awareness not in a theory of qualia. As 
we will appreciate shortly, it classes neither as a HOT model (higher-order thought) nor 
as a HOP model (higher-order perception). It draws heavily on Dennett’s (1991) multiple 
drafts theory. The key assumption is that all qualia, whether introspected or not, contain a 
subjective element in that that they presuppose the existence of a subject (in my account 
the subject as it is traditionally understood is replaced with a global higher-order state). I 
have of course said on many occasions that this is the essential characteristic of qualia, 
both heeded and unheeded. Van Gulick calls it a ‘self-referential element’, but it is clear 
from his writing that it is subjectivity in the above sense that he speaks of.
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The most striking difference between standard higher-order models and Van Gulick’s 
thought is that according to him higher-order contents occur in the absence of actual 
higher-order states. How can a first-order system generate higher-order contents? 
Suppose there is a (first-order) phenomenal visual state S implicit in which is the 
aforementioned subjective element. S’s causal potential is initially limited; it has, as it 
were, a local causal impact on a relatively small number of states. However, S can be 
integrated into a larger causal network of states where its causal potential increases. In 
particular, the kind of circumstances that make integration possible are those in which a 
state becomes a part of one’s current flow of consciousness. One’s flow of consciousness 
at a given moment is a set of states which together form what Van Gulick calls a ‘global 
state’. Even though the individual content-bearing states in one’s current flow of 
consciousness are first-order, they have a global causal potential by virtue of being parts 
of that flow. As their sphere of causal influence increases, they gain a more central role in 
the system. In the case of a phenomenal state like S, gaining a more central role means 
that the subjective element implicit in its quale is accentuated, so to speak, to such an 
extent that the content is transformed into a higher-order one – it is so transformed even 
without the occurrence of a higher-order state. Since this is presented as a model of 
introspection, the first-order states that together form one’s flow of consciousness (i.e. 
one’s global state) have introspective contents. So Van Gulick’s global state is somewhat 
less global than the meta-representation as I described it when making my own proposal. 
I introduced it as representation that is continuously aimed at all sensory and 
proprioceptive stimulation, whether introspectively attended or not, and held that 
introspection is a conceptual capacity independent of that meta-representation.
As for the transformation of first-order contents into higher-order ones, Van Gulick 
says the following: 
Nonetheless the HOGS model remains a type of higher-order theory in so far as 
the change that occurs in a lower-order state’s function as it is integrated into the 
momentary global correlate of self-awareness transforms its content in ways that 
involve a heightened element of experiential self-reference (Van Gulick, 2000). 
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To some degree this self-referential aspect may be present in a limited and wholly 
implicitly way even in states that we typically regard as nonconscious. Even 
nonconscious perceptions or a nonconscious desires may incorporate some 
implicit elements of self-reference in their satisfaction conditions:a complex such 
as “me-seeing: a tree/ here/now”or “me-desiring: a drink of water/here/now”may 
do a better job of capturing the intentionality of such nonconscious states than 
would the merely objectual “tree/here/now”. In so far as this is so, the change in 
content that accompanies the move from unconscious to conscious status is not 
the totally de novo addition of a self-reflexive aspect but rather the transformation 
from a limited and implicit self-referential aspect to a richer and more explicit one
(2000). 
It follows then that both (lower-order) perceptual contents and the relevant introspective 
contents are qualitative, the difference between the respective qualia lying in the degree 
of explicitness of the subjective aspect, not in the occurrence of a discrete higher-order 
state. But a lower- and a higher-order quale do not occur simultaneously in a given 
experiential situation, for when a lower-order perceptual state joins a larger causal 
network (of first-order states), its quale is transferred to the higher-order level (although 
of course the state itself does not undergo a similar shift). 
Because they do not occur simultaneously, Van Gulick avoids the criticism of HOP 
models I mentioned in connection with Lycan’s internal monitoring. The problem was 
that if a red quale is misrepresented by a non-epistemic introspective state as a green 
quale, it is unclear which of the two determines the character of my present experience. 
In the case of Van Gulick’s model, for every experiential situation there is only one 
qualitative content which is either lower- or higher-order depending on how global or 
local the causal network it belong in is, hence no such problem arises here.
I will now argue that the objections that constituted my challenge for 
representationalism reapply to Van Gulick’s model. I have already said that I agree with 
his claim that all qualia, regardless of whether they are the objects of introspective 
attention or not, contain a subjective element to the effect that they presuppose the 
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existence of a subject to which sensations are attributed. In the quoted passage the 
subjective element is expressed as “me-seeing: a tree/ here/now”, and this seems to me to 
be unproblematic. Now, Van Gulick holds that higher-order qualia differ from lower-
order ones in that the subjective element is present in them in a more explicit manner, in 
other words, it is something about the quale itself, something which is ‘intrinsic’ to it in 
some sense, that makes it higher-order, not something about the qualia-bearing state; 
there is no corresponding adjustment in the qualia-bearing state – it (as well as the global 
causal network in which it belongs) remains first-order. Thus we should expect the more 
explicit presence of the subjective element, which qualia have ‘intrinsically’, to show up 
in a certain distinctive way in the character of my experience. I nonetheless don’t see how 
it does. 
Suppose that, looking at a tree, I am in a lower-order state with a green quale to
which I’m not paying introspective attention. The phenomenal greenness is experienced 
as a property of the tree I’m looking at. Let us state the subjective element present in the 
phenomenal property in the same way as Van Gulick does, i.e. “me-seeing: a 
tree/here/now”. Suppose also that I turn my attention inwards and that the changes taking 
place in my brain as I do so can be exhaustively described using Van Gulick’s model and, 
as a result, the green quale turns into a higher-order content (without the occurrence of a 
higher-order state). Van Gulick would say that it is not the case that I have entered into a 
new state, a higher-order one, all that has changed is that my quale now has a 
strengthened subjective aspect. But just how does this change translate into how the 
phenomenal property is experienced given that I continue to experience it as a property of 
the tree? Having turned my attention inwards, I simply fail to notice a more ‘tangible’ 
subjective element which contrasts my quale with the lower-order quale my state featured 
before I started introspecting. 
The fact that it is impossible to distinguish higher-order qualia from lower-order ones 
in terms of the degree of explicitness of the subjective aspect alone rather than in terms of 
the occurrence of a higher-order qualia-bearing states leads to the blindsight-based 
objection to first-order representationalism raised, following Carruthers, in Chapter 2. 
Blindsighters do not strictly satisfy the set of conditions that the acronym ‘PANIC’ (Tye 
1995) stands for, more specifically, they do not satisfy the requirement that phenomenal 
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perceptual states have an impact on first-order beliefs and actions, since they do not form 
beliefs with respect to stimulation in the blind portion of their visual field. In spite of this, 
the concession appeared to be a minor one, as they do show substantial behavioural 
sensitivity to external stimulation in view of which first-order belief-formation can hardly 
be a decisive factor in attributing or not attributing wide contents to their ‘blind’ states. 
Since their behavioural sensitivity suffices to warrant attribution of wide contents, their 
states should class as phenomenal even though they apparently aren’t. This meant that the 
locus of phenomenal consciousness, as Carruthers (2000) says, is experiential subjectivity 
not worldly subjectivity and that we need to formulate a higher-order condition to 
distinguish ourselves from blindsighters. The condition with which I began my 
examination of HOR was that a perceptual state is qualitative if it is available to be 
picked out by a higher-order representation, although I realised in the discussion that 
followed that not all types of higher-order representations apply distinctively to 
qualitative (as opposed non-qualitative) perceptions.
An argument along some such lines also undermines Van Gulick’s position despite 
having been put forward as higher-order representationalism. The first obvious difficulty 
is that he only speaks of higher-order contents while higher-order states are absent. He 
might argue that his view does not imply that blindsighters’ states are phenomenal 
because they are not available (or poised we may say) to be integrated into a global 
representation, they do not join one’s flow of consciousness, as their causal impact is 
limited at best and remains such. But again their behavioural sensitivity is sufficient to 
justify attribution of content and the states’ not having a global impact on other first-order 
states is unlikely to be an overriding reason not to attribute content. Another move Van 
Gulick might make is to say that the source of the required higher-order condition is this: 
When an individual perceptual representation joins a global representation, its content is
transformed into a higher-order one, which does capture experiential subjectivity even in 
absence of higher-order representations. Blindsighters clearly do not satisfy this 
condition.
I must point out, in response to this move, that the only criterion by which Van 
Gulick differentiates between higher- and lower-order qualia is the degree of explicitness 
of the subjective element. However, I struggled to see how we can specify any distinctive 
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way the explicit subjective element alters the character of my experience – phenomenal 
colours are still experienced as features of worldly objects; and I noted that it is not open 
to him to say that what sets higher-order qualia apart from first-order qualia is that they 
are contents of higher-order representations, for such representations are missing. 
Consequently, if there is nothing to distinguish his position from FOR – the difference 
does not lie in there being higher-order representations, nor does it lie in the character of 
‘higher-order’ qualia – the blindsight-based objection is reinstated. 
On the other hand, my account does not imply that higher-order qualia differ 
‘intrinsically’ (in the degree of explicitness of the subjective element) from qualia 
construed as first-order contents – both contain the subjective element in equal measure. 
Global meta-representational qualia are experienced as features of worldly objects and 
what sets them apart as higher-order is the presence of an actual meta-representation. But 
I also deny that first-order perceptual contents are phenomenal.  
In view of Sellars’ reconstruction of our introspective conceptions regarding 
experiential episodes, there is another (rather major) flaw in Van Gulick’s position to 
draw attention to. Recall that Van Gulick’s primary interest is in giving an account of 
introspective awareness with respect to experiences, so the global higher-order content he 
speaks of is in fact introspective on his view. Since such an introspective content is 
qualitative and hence necessarily non-conceptual, it does not require that we have a 
theory of mind in order to be able introspect. To have a theory of mind is to have a 
certain understanding (which of course presupposes conceptualisation) of inner 
experiential episodes. It is by virtue of having a theory of mind that we see ourselves as 
creatures who have feelings and sensations and, crucially, are able to turn our attention 
inwards. So Van Gulick’s claim that introspection is non-epistemic inevitably raises the 
question of what exactly it is that guides my attention inwards if I have no understanding 
of anything ‘inner’, let alone of any inner episodes. To this he can give no satisfactory 
answer28. Van Gulick does (in his 1988) offer a general functionalist account of 
28 I should explain that Van Gulick uses the term ‘introspection’ in a much narrower sense than I have 
been doing throughout my work. He understands introspection as just one form of self-awareness, one 
which consists in actively focusing inner attention on one’s own thoughts and experiences. More passive 
cases of self-awareness where one’s focusing his attention inwards is prompted by, say, an intense pain 
would not class as introspective. So it is self-awareness in general that the proposal under discussion is to 
account for. On the other hand, ‘introspection’, as I have been using the term (throughout as well as in this 
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introspection elsewhere, one which is not tailored for, and does not imply, for that matter, 
any specific theory of qualia. In that paper introspection is not conceived of as a non-
epistemic faculty, so it could not be so obviously criticised on the same grounds as the 
model under discussion. Unfortunately, the general account by no means complements 
the present model and hence does not vindicate it.  
For these reasons, I was wary of entangling the global meta-representation with the 
introspective capacity when presenting my account. The global meta-representation, on 
my account, is innate, which means that my higher-order account is such that it has no 
astonishing implications for phenomenal consciousness in small children and some 
animals, while our introspective capacity develops later in life with the acquisition of 
public-language. 
The problem of illegitimately forcing a conceptual faculty (i.e. introspection) outside 
what Sellars calls the logical space of reasons does not beset Carruthers’ (2000) higher-
order model. His model is another instance of higher-order qualia without higher-order 
states. His story of how higher-order contents are generated in absence of higher-order 
states differs from Van Gulick’s in such a way that it avoids mixing non-epistemic 
phenomena with epistemic ones. To begin, Carruthers holds that lower-order perceptual 
contents are non-qualitative, which is one important overlap with my proposal. Now, a 
pre-linguistic child’s lower-order perceptual states have non-qualitative analogue 
contents such as ‘reda’ (where the index ‘a’ stands for analogue). When a child has learnt 
his first language, he eventually comes to have a grasp of the is/seems distinction 
resulting in the development of a theory of mind, whereby he acquires the ability to
conceptualise and refer, both covertly (in thought) and overtly (in verbal reports), to his 
experiences. This ability turns all of his non-qualitative perceptual contents (such as 
‘reda’) into qualitative higher-order ones (such as ‘experience of reda’). It is not that 
‘experience of reda’ is the content of the state which constitutes the child’s referring to his 
experience (it is, after all, out of the question that epistemic states could have non-
epistemic contents), rather, the thought is that when the lower-order perception with 
section), is interchangeable with ‘self-awareness’, so passive cases of self-awareness also qualify as 
introspective. But nothing important depends on this terminological difference, for my criticism is directed 
at Van Gulick’s treatment of passive forms of self-awareness. Even the sharpest pain won’t turn my 
attention inwards if I have no understanding of anything ‘inner’.     
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content ‘reda’ causally connects with the newly-formed theory-of-mind module, this new 
causal/functional connection alters its content to such an extent that it becomes a higher-
order one. If we suppose, as all functionalists do, that content is determined by functional 
role, and that an adjustment in a state’s functional role brought about by a new 
causal/functional link also alters the state’s content, the claim is not at all implausible. 
We notice at once that unlike my proposal, Carruthers’ model does have startling 
implications for phenomenal consciousness in pre-linguistic children and some animals. 
Small children perceive without experiencing, much like blindsighters, until they have a 
full-fledged theory-of-mind module. Secondly, it does not address the issue of identifying 
the subject of experience, since the theory-of-mind module and other module it interacts 
with are sub-personal parts. I tried to address it with the notion of a global higher-order 
content. 
Some may be bewildered by Carruthers’ suggestion that infants develop their theory 
of mind with respect to perceptions which aren’t yet experiences. For it is only when the 
theory-of-mind module is in place that their lower-order non-qualitative contents are 
transformed into higher-order qualitative ones. So the process of the formation of the 
module is underway while they still don’t experience anything. Nonetheless, Sellars’
story of how we come to have the sort ordinary theory of mind on which our 
introspective conceptions are based offers a response, although Carruthers doesn’t refer 
to his work. Central to the story was the idea that inner experiential episodes are 
conceptualised as unobserved theoretical posits which later become non-inferentially 
reportable, just as someone working in a laboratory may be disposed to report the 
presence of NaCl rather than salt. Stephen Leeds’ main contribution in (1993), as we saw 
in 2.2.3 (HOR’s Commitment to Recognitional Concepts), was the argument that nothing 
in Sellars’ reconstruction precludes blindsighters from learning to non-inferentially report 
previously unobserved perceptual episodes in the blind portion of their visual field given 
that the reconstruction does not involve phenomenal concepts at any stage. Nor is there 
anything which precludes pre-linguistic children from developing a theory of mind with 
respect to perceptions which are not yet experiences. 
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Conclusion
Having reached the very end, let me repeat briefly what the main line of argument in
my work has been. Chapter One was a way of showing how we can get from intrinsic 
qualia to qualia viewed as wide contents. Although no knockout argument is offered at 
any stage, all of the objections that lead to claims that qualia, or qualia as well as 
experiential contents, aren’t wide can be overcome. 
The beginning of Chapter Two is a suggestion that far more insight into the notion of 
qualitative content is to be gained if the debate in the current literature on 
representationalism shifts its focus to how representationalists can distinguish between 
non-qualitative perceptions and experiences. The failure to distinguish them in first-order 
representational terms means that we should begin by exploring whether qualitative 
perceptions connect with higher-order states in ways that non-qualitative ones don’t. This 
strategy will prove fruitful, however, only if we can establish that it is higher-order states 
containing phenomenal concepts that qualitative perceptions connect with. I then argue 
that Sellars thought regarding introspection must be taken into consideration in deciding 
whether phenomenal concepts can be accepted as epistemologically sound. We saw that 
the appeals to phenomenal concepts I discuss repeat the mistakes of classical empiricism, 
which rules them out as a possible distinguishing factor. Provided one finds each step of 
the argument so far convincing enough, it appears that first-order qualia connect with 
higher-order thoughts are supplied by public language, not by an act of brute recognition 
or innate Mentalese. But non-qualitative perceptions aren’t precluded from forming 
connections with higher-order thoughts so conceived either, at which point the strategy of 
identifying a higher-order connection that is unique to qualitative ones seems to have 
reached its limit. Remember that Chapter One I argued that (wide content) 
representationalism is the most robust reductive strategy we have, and hence that if qualia 
are extrinsic properties of experiences, they must be wide contents. However, even the 
higher-order condition cannot sustain qualia taken as wide contents, in which case it must 
be intrinsic qualia that phenomenal states have and non-phenomenal perceptions don’t.
I make my contribution in Chapter Three where I make my alternative 
representationalist proposal. The idea is that in order to avoid reintroducing intrinsic 
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qualia we should abandon the view that qualia are first-order contents. The first-order 
states of normally sighted humans lack qualia, and so they do not differ from the states of 
blindsighters in this respect. They differ from those of blindsighters in that their (wide) 
intentional contents are represented by a global higher-order state, the content of which 
global state is qualitative. So when wide contents are represented at the higher-order 
level, the meta-representational content is qualitative. In the case of blindsight, the causal 
link between some of their first-order states and their global meta-representation is 
broken.
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